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## COMMENT ON FRENCH STANCE ON EUROPE AS NUCLEAR FORCE

DW301034 Bonn DIE WELT in German 30 Jan 80 p 6 DW

[Commentary signed HHH: "The Game With the Bomb"]

[Text] At a moment when Western solidarity ought to be the highest necessity, one of the closest advisers of the French president, Poniowski, again points out the pet idea of the Elysee Palace: an independent military nuclear force of the Europeans. This can be sold very well in domestic politics as a sign of national greatness, and fears that the Germans in this way could obtain the bomb can be easily dispersed. Bonn could be given a "partnership" but it could not sit at the controls. More closeness of the Europeans--also in the military field--is a matter that is necessary and that must be welcomed.

But it would make sense only if it did not entail a weakening of NATO, if it were aimed at strengthening the European side of the Atlantic partnership. Like the French force de frappe, which can only be considered a defense contribution within the alliance--that is only in a complementary way--, a European nuclear force would make sense, if at all, only if it were set up together with the United States and not against it. Poniowski ought to know this, he probably does and he is just trying to support the foreign policy line of his president. But European security at the moment is too risky a field for independent action aimed at shaping an image.

CSO: 3103

## SWISS, EUROPEAN POLICE COOPERATE IN FIGHTING TERRORISM

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHEN in German 5 Dec 79 p 2

[Article by Marcel H. Keiser: "Document. Fighting Terrorism in Switzerland. Guard Against Surprises."]

[Text] Since the suspected German terrorist Rolf Clemens Wagner was arrested after a shoot-out in Zurich, the authorities have been expecting possible liberation attempts. To guard against such undertakings and to prevent them, Swiss police departments are working closely with authorities in other countries.

On the basis of experiences in neighboring countries, the detention of Rolf Clemens Wagner (35) in Zurich is causing Swiss authorities to fear liberation attempts. Conceivable would be concerted international action which would include in its list of demands (similar to the Entebbe Case) the release of the top terrorist and also that of Gabriele Kroeher-Tiedermann and Christian Moeller, who are presently serving long prison sentences for the shootout at the Jura Mountains border-post at Fahy; the list of demands would also include the release of the German-Italian terrorist Petra Krause.

But an evaluation of the situation by the federal police does "not entirely exclude" a nationally directed action. In this connection, the Bern authorities mention the possibility of a member of the national government or a representative of Switzerland abroad being kidnapped.

As recognized in an internal document, plans for similar operations have, after all, been in existence already. In the past the abduction of the German ambassador in Bern and of a Spanish attache residing there was discussed "seriously" among the "Zurich anarchists," the group around Petra Krause. The Federal Prosecutor's Office has also "some evidence" that immediately prior to the abduction of the president of the German Employers [Association], Hanns Martin Schleyer, a member of the executive



committee of the Deutsche Bank who was in Switzerland in September, 1977, was spied out and was "apparently being considered as an object for a criminal assault." Moreover, under the caption "Portrayal of Threats," the document, addressed to police officers, mentioned the danger of explosive-attacks "against certain objectives"; after the verdict in the Pruntruter terrorist trial, there were explosions at the Bern High Court and the Bern County Court, and according to the findings of the Federal Council's latest report accounts "foreign culprits were apparently behind it."

Nine European countries, including Switzerland, are now cooperating closely in the fight against the terrorists. Their most important technical contrivance consists of the now installed coded telex-system, directed towards Palestinian and other terrorism, and defense against espionage.

Besides multilateral, the country also maintains bilateral contacts, for instance with Austria and Israel. The connections with West Germany are, moreover, especially strong. Based on indications that, after the Schleyer-abduction, terrorists stayed in the German-Swiss border area, a search was started in November 1977, which has so far not been made public. Decisive was a search-screen worked out by the Federal Criminal Police Bureau (BKA) in Wiesbaden. As the Federal police confirmed, "considerable knowledge was gained" within the framework of this process.

BKA experts have assisted their Zurich colleagues in an advisory function in the search for Wagner's fugitive accomplices.

9011

CSO: 3103

## OEMV HAS DIFFICULTY SATISFYING CRUDE OIL SUPPLY

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 25 Dec 79 p 7

[Article by gr: "Austria's Oil Supply Problems"]

[Text] Vienna, 23 December--Austria's foregoing nuclear energy for production of electric power--the result of a plebiscite a year ago and a subsequent statute outlawing nuclear power altogether--is causing difficulties in the procurement of oil on the international market. The board director of the Austrian Oil Administration responsible for crude oil purchases, Feichtinger, said recently that he and his buyers were being told by their trading partners in the oil-producing countries that a country which could afford the luxury of foregoing nuclear power had no right to complain about having to contend with an energy shortage. For this reason, the suppliers have no intention of granting Austria the right to buy more crude at contract or at basic price. Like other oil companies, the OeMV has therefore had to increase its purchases on the open market. As compared to the long-term average, these purchases at spot prices will double in 1979, i.e., make up about one-fifth of OeMV's foreign oil supply. Next year they will remain at this level at least, if they do not rise to one-quarter. According to the OeMV, the oil-producing countries are scarcely willing to enter into long-term supply agreements any more; the agreements that are concluded now run for 1 year as a rule. In most cases, they are signed only in exchange for extra concessions on the part of the purchaser, e.g., premiums for signing and for admission and spot market prices for part of the supply quotas agreed upon.

## Increased Consumption

In 1979, consumption of petroleum products in Austria will be higher than the preceding year, contrary to the conservation goals set by the IEA. Between January and October the crude oil base increased by 6 percent to about 9.1 million tons. The likely figure for the whole year will be 11.6 million tons, an increase of 3.6 percent over 1978. Crude oil imports therefore had to be raised by 1.1 million tons to 9.2 million, almost all of it charged to OeMV which will be importing 6.1 million tons of crude (as compared to 5.2 million) because the private companies have reduced their imports of oil derivatives somewhat, according to the OeMV. Up to October,

the heaviest increase was registered in regular gasoline (10.3 percent); consumption of high-octane gasoline remained about the same, rising by 0.8 percent. But diesel fuel and home heating oil consumption rose sharply (by 8 and 8.6 percent) as did medium-grade and light-grade heating oil (by 11 percent) and airplane fuel (by 11 percent), the latter being in short supply in Vienna because prices are kept artificially low. These figures, which are normally classified as consumption statistics, actually reflect the product quantities supplied by the Schwechat refinery to the trade and by importers to the consumer. The amounts held in storage by the purchasers--aside from the mandatory reserves--are not ascertained separately. Actual consumption may therefore be taken to be a good deal lower than the official statistics tend to indicate. For this reason, a much smaller rise in the crude oil base by only 1 percent to 11.8 million tons is expected for the coming year.

#### Looking for New Sources of Supply

The OeMV has been advised by its suppliers that the agreed long-term supply quotas will be cut next year. By how much, the OeMV will not say; but it has let it be known that it is looking for new sources of supply. After a number of years of trying without success, OeMV now hopes to obtain 1 million tons of crude oil from Saudi Arabia with the help of an "intercession at the highest level." Negotiations with Nigeria about 0.5 or 1 million tons annually are also being conducted. In addition, efforts are being made to establish some kind of relationship with Venezuela and Mexico.

#### Controversy About Price Adjustments

In the meantime, both the OeMV and the Austrian branches of the multinationals have become increasingly unhappy about the minister of commerce's delaying tactics in the matter of the oil companies' request for price adjustments for regular and high-octane gasoline as well as home heating oil. The pertinent department of the Federal Chamber of Commerce had asked the pricing commission as early as 23 June to lift the price freeze or to grant sizable price increases. But up to now their request has not even passed beyond the so-called "pre-examination phase" and the end is not yet in sight. Representatives of the labor union and the chamber of labor are outspoken in their opposition against an end to gasoline price controls or a price rise. They feel that the oil firms or rather their parent companies made so much money last year in particular that a price rise is by no means called for. And, they have no intention whatever of having the petitions acted upon before the results of the OPEC meeting in Caracas have become clear.

For their part, the oil companies point out that the 2,300 schillings they are making for the "production package" of 1 ton of crude is 600 schillings less than they have to spend for importing the oil, transporting and processing it and for refinery losses and mandatory reserve costs. In other words, the shortfall has increased fourfold since the request for a price rise was

submitted last June. The OeMV itself figures the resultant losses to be 600 million schillings for the second half of the year alone. But since this will merely hurt the state-owned holding company OelAG, which will make good on these sizable OeMV losses and none who are destitute but in fact only the "conglomerates," chances are that the fuel price decisions will have to wait until after New Year's. And so, the gas stations along the border can continue to count on plenty of customers crossing over from eastern Switzerland and southern Germany.

#### Electric Bills To Rise

Following weeks of bargaining in the so-called pre-examination commission of the Price Administration, Minister of Commerce Staribacher approved a rise in the cost of electricity to take effect on the first of the year. The upward adjustments which range from 6 to just under 15 percent are appreciably lower than the 13 to 26 percent originally requested by the electric companies. The premises on which the Ministry of Commerce acted are all but incomprehensible even to the companies involved. But, at any rate, the ministry refused to accept those calculations which were tied to losses incurred by the shutdown of the nuclear power plant.

9478

CSO: 3103



## MARTENS HAS DIFFICULTY HOLDING GOVERNMENT TOGETHER

PS, CVP Disagree

Brussels LE SOIR in French 18 Jan 80 p 1

[Article by J.v.S.: "Divergences between Socialist Party and Social Christian Party Complicate 'Patchup Job' on Martens Cabinet"]

[Text] Contrary to what the CVP [Social Christian Party] and the Flemish press want to believe, the FDF [Francophone Democratic Front] pullout did not help defuse relations within the ruling majority. As we announced in our earlier editions, the PS [Socialist Party] and, to a lesser degree, the PSC [Social Christian Party] are demanding supplementary guarantees in the matter of government reform from their partners, the CVP and the BSP [Belgian Socialist Party].

For a good part of the night from Wednesday to Thursday, the majority leaders negotiated in an attempt to arrive at an agreement--but without success. They then got together again on Thursday morning, first of all, in the small committee, since Mr Marten talked with Messrs Cools and Vanden Boeynants. These three personalities were then joined by Messrs Tindemans and Willy Claes, the latter replacing Mr Van Miert who was detained at Strasbourg in connection with the European Parliament. Other ministers, including Messrs Spitaels and Desmarets, were also present at the private hotel on Lambermont Street.

Shortly before 1400, the talks were interrupted. It then appeared that the CVP had rejected the conditions stated by the Socialist Party, in other words, essentially, the irreversibility of tripartite regionalization and the situation of the regional or community executives. It is as a matter of fact difficult to keep the Brussels regional executives within the central government the moment the FDF, the dominant party in the country's center, goes back into the opposition.

Leaving Lambermont Street to go to the office of the PS, Mr Andre Cools declared: "Due to the fault of the CVP, the administration no longer has a two-thirds majority, nor even a plain majority in Brussels. If we do not get the counterpart to this new situation, that is to say,

implementation of commitments undertaken, then we have no business in the administration. The prime minister belongs to the party which has triggered the crisis ever since its congress in the month of December and that party has interfered in a very delicately balanced agreement concluded by the Francophone [French-speaking group]. It is up to it to find a solution; let us address ourselves to those who are responsible and not to the victims; let public opinion not be deceived: this is not just a game among politicians; it is the very future of the country that is at stake."

Mr. Vanden Boeynants, for his part, confined himself to saying that they were still far from being able to take up the issue of the distribution of portfolios abandoned by the FDF. As for Mr Tindemans, he made no comment at all. Mr Claes finally underscored the gravity of the situation.

Early in the afternoon, with a delay of several hours beyond the scheduled time, the PS bureau and the steering committee of the PSC began their work, the former on Empereur Boulevard and the latter in the premises of the Senate.

Mr Martens convened the ministerial committee on general policy for 1600.

What had happened just prior to that?

Wednesday started with a meeting of the ministerial committee on general policy, intended to put the finishing touches on the brief declaration which the prime minister was to make several hours later to the Chamber. Everybody expected to learn the explanations which Mr Martens was going to provide on the compromise that had been entered into last Friday within the administration regarding government reform. The prime minister on that occasion submitted a draft. The meeting was then interrupted to permit the head of government to participate in the work of the senatorial committee on institutional reforms.

During that interruption, the various ministers consulted the leaders of their respective parties. When the restricted cabinet met again, Mr Defosset revealed that the FDF could not accept the terms of Mr Martens' draft. The Brussels Federalist Party thus was completely isolated because all of its partners, both French-speaking and Dutch-speaking, had approved the prime minister's propositions.

The prime minister then, in the midst of disaster, convened a cabinet meeting which could only note that it was in complete disagreement. From that point on, the situation rapidly came to a head: Messrs Outers, Defosset, and Persoons would wind up outside the administration, looking in. And the Chamber meeting lost any justification for serving as the stamping ground for the various opposition parties who were hoping to be able to cross swords with the majority. Presiding officer Nothomb could only adjourn the session prematurely although not without being copiously insulted by the liberals and Volksunie.

Let us now go back to the draft which started the fireworks within the majority and which led to the exclusion of the FDF.

It began by explicitly calling for "agreement and confidence" by the Chamber on the subject of the compromise that was worked out Friday within the cabinet in connection with government reform. "The administration," it said, "agrees that there was prior coordination and united action between members of parliament belonging to the same language group in each chamber, as provided for in Article 38 bis of the Constitution (editor's note: pertaining to the procedure for the protection of minorities, called an 'alarm bell') in cases where a bill or proposal would seriously impair relations between the communities."

#### Martens to Mend Coalition

Brussels LE SOIR in French 18 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by J.v.S.: "Following FDF Pullout, Mr Wilfried Martens Attempts to Patch His Team Up Again--But on What Basis?"]

[Text] Taking up next the problem of recourse against regional ordinances, Mr Martens recalled the content of the Friday compromise: "Except for budget ordinances, the law can repeal an ordinance in its entirety or in part. In this case, the bill proposal must be introduced at the very latest within 6 months, as of the date of publication of the ordinance."

Taking up the worries of the French-speaking groups, who were afraid that the Flemish majority might be tempted to exercise a real veto right over Brussels and Walloon ordinances, the prime minister specifically stated that the alarm bell procedure is applicable to bills or proposals tending to repeal an ordinance.

However, he added, "This procedure can be invoked only as an exceptional and last resort, after it has been established that the other means did not produce any results."

And Mr Martens' draft contains some specific juridical points: "The procedure may be invoked only after the filing of the report and prior to the final vote. And it furthermore requires three-quarters, at least, of the members of one of the language groups individually to sign a motivated motion declaring that the provisions of a bill or proposal relating to it are of such nature as seriously to impair relations between the communities. It goes without saying that the members of the Chamber of Representatives or the Senate, who sign such a motion, are entirely free to do so and entirely independent in this respect, and they do so only as members of their particular language group in the Chamber or Senate."

## FDF Says No

Wednesday evening, the FDF held a press conference in the course of which party chairman Antoinette Spaak and three former ministers explained their version of events. We are reporting their statements in our columns.

Several observers felt at that moment that, under the increasing pressure from their grass roots, the leaders of the FDF had yielded to a sudden surge of sentiment in the face of the reticence of the Flemish conversation partners regarding three-way regionalization.

On the other hand, it was evident within the party itself that a by no means negligible group was conducting a war of attrition against the supporters of government participation.

### "Grave Responsibility"

The PS and the PSC Wednesday night refused to comment on the situation that had been created by the FDF pullout. They preferred to wait for the meetings on the next day.

We might however report one expected reaction by Deputy Prime Minister Jose Desmarets, PSC: "The FDP took enormous risks by threatening solidarity between the French-speaking parties, a solidarity to which we were very devoted. Our solidarity was broken by the FDF which assumed a very grave responsibility."

In the CVP, Mr Leo Tindemans did not conceal his satisfaction at the end of his party's bureau meeting. The operation of a democracy, he said in substance, was made impossible by the demand of significant majorities in each of the three regions. "It was bad," he emphasized, "to make the country's profound reorganization dependent upon one small party."

### Crisis or Reshuffling

What will happen next? For Mr Martens, the simplest solution will be to reshuffle his team by appointing the successors to Messrs Outers, Defosset, and Persoons with the PS and PSC.

On that score the socialists for instance mentioned the names of Messrs Herve Brouhon, Andre Degroeve, and Francois Guillaume while the Social Christains mentioned the names of Mrs Cecile Goor and Mr Jean-Louis Thys. It was also remarked that the functions of Mr Outers, that is to say, foreign trade and science policy, would not necessarily have to be assigned to a person from Brussels and could just as well go to a Walloon.

Moreover, the question was asked as to how the PS and PSC would divide the three positions among the two of them.



On Wednesday night, however, nobody could say with certainty that the crisis had been avoided.

The temptation might be great, within the PS and possibly also within the PSC, to demand supplementary guarantees from their Flemish partners.

On the one hand, there was absolutely no question as to the friends of Mr Cools and those of Mr Vanden Boeynants falling in behind the FDF. This is true especially since the Brussels Federalist Party, in falling into the trap laid by the CVP, reduced to nothing the strategy which had so carefully been worked out for several months to fit in with the aims of the CVP.

On the other hand, it is also evident that the PS and the PSC do not intend to present themselves as the consenting victims if they were again to wind up in a cozy setup with the CVP and the BSP.

The future attitude of the three parties of the defunct alliance of the French-speaking parties thus for the time being is a big unknown. The PS would find it difficult to forgive the FDF for having destroyed the dam partly erected against the CVP and, on that same occasion, having released the members of the PSC who were most tempted by a policy of rapprochement with the powerful Flemish "brother."

But the FDF would be driven into a corner if it had to decide whether, in joining the opposition, it would have to take responsibility for bringing about the failure of a possible government reform, including three-way regionalization.

For the immediate future, everything thus depends on the conversations which Mr Martens will have with the majority leaders.

5058

CSO:3100

## QUEBEC TO ESTABLISH GENERAL DELEGATION IN MEXICO

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 5 Jan 80 p 19

[Article by Brigitte Morissette: "Quebec's Delegation to Mexico Is Given an Economic Mission"]

[Text] Mexico--By establishing its fifth general delegation--out of 15 overseas bureaus--on Taine Street, in the rich Polanco quarter, a few blocks from where Canada's new embassy in Mexico is being built, Quebec wants to give a new direction to its international relations.

At least that is the opinion expressed by Mr Richard Pouliot, deputy under-secretary for intergovernmental affairs, during his first visit to Mexico. "Traditionally, Quebec has been interested in France, the Francophone countries, and the United States," confided Mr Pouliot. "But we have largely neglected the countries of Latin America, and in particular Mexico, considering the role it plays now and the role it will play to a greater and greater extent on the international scene and the oil market."

This tribute to Mexico is coming just in the nick of time, if we recall that the great industrial and exporting nations (Japan, Germany, Sweden, France, Great Britain) have for the last 3 years been courting the Mexican market and its 68 million--perhaps already 70 million--consumers. However, 3 years ago the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs was betting that Venezuela was the place to open its first delegation in a Latin American country.

It is true that Mexican oil had its skeptics then, whereas Quebec (not to mention Canada) was parading the huge annual deficit in the balance of trade with Venezuela (\$50 million in exports against \$1 billion in imports of Venezuelan oil).

In a study prepared by employees of the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs for the opening of the first Quebec delegation in Latin America, Venezuela came out clearly ahead of Mexico. But Prime Minister Levesque himself, newly elected, did not conceal his disappointment, and disclosed,

in an interview he gave me for television, in Mexico, that sooner or later we would have to turn to Mexico.

But let's not celebrate Easter before Palm Sunday! The premises of the future general delegation, a large house which once must have belonged to a rich Mexican family, surrounded by a pleasant garden and hidden behind a high stone wall, as is the custom in Mexico, are going to require considerable alteration, which probably cannot be undertaken before mid-January.

It will thus not be before mid-April that the fifth general delegation of Quebec will be in a position to get under way with its primary mission of economic promotion. What distinguishes a general delegation from an ordinary one, to borrow the words of Mr Pouliot, is the multiplicity of its functions. The Quebec delegation to Mexico, with a staff of "five or six people in the early stage," is first of all going to dedicate itself to economic promotion.

"We are interested in developing our trade with Mexico in the leading sectors such as public transport, communications, management, and energy transport. We have, in addition, some expertise in data processing which could interest the Mexicans," Mr Pouliot stated.

The second priority of the Quebec general delegation in Mexico will surely be tourism. It is predicted that 230,000 Canadians (a good majority of them Quebecois) will visit Mexico in 1980. Now 200,000 if not 300,000 Mexicans come to New York each year. Why not try to attract this Mexican tourism toward Montreal and Quebec? Obviously, the organization of educational and cultural exchanges is also going to have an important place, because "these events can only reinforce our exchanges in the economic sector," adds Mr Pouliot, who concludes: "The sole fact of opening in Mexico our fifth general delegation demonstrates the importance Quebec attaches now to its relations with this country, a country expanding at full throttle." And, one must add, the second largest market in Latin America.

For those who follow the "nation-to-nation" bickering of Ottawa and Quebec, one can say that relations between the representatives of the two capitals in Mexico commence under the most favorable portents. Mr Claude Charland, Canada's ambassador to Mexico, an unabashed French-speaker, spontaneously offered his help to the Quebec representatives and told us: "A general delegation from Quebec to Mexico is going to assure a more important Canadian presence, and reflects, moreover, the interest we have in Mexico. It is going to allow Mexicans to grasp more thoroughly the reality of Canada by showing the role, the place that Quebec occupied, all its uniqueness. In sum, the Quebec presence will help us to accomplish our work, to be better understood by the Mexican people."

And on the economic plane, Mr Charland adds, Quebec has a preponderant role to play, particularly in the area of transport, hydro-electric energy, etc.

The new Canadian ambassador to Mexico, previously assigned to Brazil, explains further: "Mexico has really become a turntable. Not only in the field of energy, but also politically. For a country, or a province which wants to expand its commercial ties in Latin America, I think it is absolutely essential to have antennas in Mexico."

The Canadian ambassador hopes to augment his cultural and commercial staff, and will even add an energy specialist. One can nevertheless ask why Ontario, which several years ago took the lead in opening offices in Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico, closed these three posts in 1976.

Insofar as Mexico is concerned, the answer seems rather clear: Ontario was in 1976 launched on a great austerity program, while Mexico was entering its most serious economic crisis since the World War II. But several months later, Mexico stunned the world by revealing its oil reserves and its willingness to turn on the tap to assure the industrial development of the country. Ontario has doubtless revised its opinion, to judge by the court it has paid --along with Alberta--to Mexico in the last 2 years.

Quebec is entering the race, albeit a little late, particularly with respect to Mexican private enterprise and the most prestigious cultural institutions. But if one judges by the efforts made since the beginning of 1979, Quebec could rapidly succeed in impressing on the Mexican mind its idea of cultural kinship, and of two economies which ask no more than to complete each other.

9516  
CSO: 3100

CYPRUS PAPER CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT, U.S. FOR AFGHAN STAND

NC260735 Nicosia O AGON in Greek 26 Jan 80 p 2 NC

[From "Our Positions" Column: "Stone's Demarche"]

[Text] Cyprus' attitude toward the UN General Assembly voting in connection with Afghanistan has not been what it should have been. We believe this because Cyprus, itself being a victim of invasion and continuing occupation, should have sided against any military intervention by any power in another country.

We do not agree with the government that abstention has been the best stand under the circumstances. So many other countries, which are friendly toward the Soviet Union, have denounced invasion and have shown devotion to certain principles.

Nevertheless, the United States is the last country that has the right to protest the Cyprus government's attitude and moreover the U.S. Ambassador should not have used strong or severe language.

This is so because in the case of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus the United States abstained when the United Nations Organization was to condemn the invasion. Moreover, the United States warned us that it was going to make use of its veto right in the Security Council if we asked for sanctions.

In a few words, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus has been good, while the Russian invasion of Afghanistan has been bad.

We denounce our government's attitude for the same reason as we denounce the U.S. protest against our attitude.

Invasion is invasion irrespective of origin, no matter against whom it is directed.

CSO: 4908



## CYPRUS

### CARTER STILL COMMITTED TO SEEKING CYPRUS SOLUTION

NC270819 Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 27 Jan 80 p 3 NC

[From the "Freely" Comments: "Carter"]

[Text] "We have committed ourselves to courageously seeking a settlement of the question through every hopeful way, and we continue to have close consultations with all parties interested in the Cyprus problem--with the United Nations, with our European allies, and with other countries that care about peace on this troubled island." This is a passage from President Carter's Cyprus Report to Congress. The President does not refer directly to the Cyprus debate at the UN General Assembly or the Security Council, but he makes it clear that he is still committed to seeking a Cyprus solution. We do not know whether there will be any new initiative by the West. Right now, the question appears to have two aspects: firstly, how willing are the Western powers to exert the necessary pressure on Turkey to be more conciliatory at the conference table? Secondly, how will our side act--not only in the case of a new Western initiative, but also in the case of the resumption of the intercommunal talks? Some decisions must be made and a concrete line charted. We believe that circumstances are such that the government must hold consultations with the political parties and decide what has to be done.

CSO: 4908

## CARTER HAS FORGOTTEN HIS STATEMENTS, PROMISES

NC270816 Nicosia ELEVTHERI KYPROS in Greek 27 Jan 80 p 3 NC

[From the "Comments" Column: "The Carter Report"]

[Text] In his so-called report to the U.S. Congress on the Cyprus problem --a now traditional report issued bimonthly--President Carter repeats for the hundredth time the same things and avoids dealing with the substance of the question, which is that the inter-Cypriot talks are not being held because of Turkish intransigence and because of the unacceptable conditions put by the Turkish side. The United States is not free from responsibility for the continuing intransigence, since it has not only failed to put pressure on Turkey--the United States could do so if it wanted to--but it is also giving Turkey economic and military aid.

President Carter, who ignores this reality and deals in his report--in the form of a reportage--with what others have done or have failed to do, calls on both sides to show political courage in order to achieve, as he says, a fair and lasting solution. As for the political courage he himself has shown so far, this is proved by the way he has forgotten his statements and promises and has sacrificed--at the altar of political and strategic expediency--the principles and ideals that he tried to use as his platform during his election campaign. Thus, instead of advising others to display political courage, it would be better for President Carter to set the example by pointing out both the real reasons and those actually responsible for the Cyprus deadlock.

CSO: 4908

CYPRUS DAILY DEPLORES 'AKEL,' 'EDEK' DOMINATION OVER KYPRIANOU

NC291116 Nicosia I MAKHI in Greek 29 Jan 80 p 1 NC

[Editorial: "After All, When?]

[Excerpts] All that has been said and done by the government and all the rumors and reports in the Cypriot press concerning the Cyprus developments, the American plan, the President's forthcoming visits to various countries abroad as well as the President's relations with parties and close associates, have come to justify the utterance that "the President of the Republic follows the foreign policy of Lyssaridis and the domestic policy of Papaioannou," an utterance attributed to one of Mr Kyprianou's closest associates.

Since we have a bitter experience of some of the President's backstage activities and combining all that is said, rumored and reported, we do not hesitate at all to believe that President Kyprianou has really fallen prey to AKEL and EDEK; he yields at the last moment to their pressures and blackmail and--instead of doing what he himself believes to be correct--finally does what is imposed on him by the two parties which cooperate with the government. [passage omitted]

Asked recently why the government makes so many serious mistakes which are incompatible with the policy or principles of the DIKO [Democratic Party], one of the President's closest associates replied: "Unfortunately, the President is short-circuited by AKEL and EDEK and depends on their crutches. He knows what is correct but he is unable to do it. Many times he gave promises that he would carry out some quite serious actions which would be most beneficial both on the domestic front and for the promotion of our national issue. At the last moment, however, he did exactly the opposite and remained exposed to close friends, associates and even to his opponents. Don't you see that the President's domestic policy is Papaioannou's and the foreign policy that of Lyssaridis?"

Unfortunately, this is the state of affairs. Unfortunately, the President is weak and powerless; short-circuited by AKEL and EDEK, he cannot chart his own line on the domestic front or in foreign policy. Our national issue goes from bad to worse because: on the domestic front it loses friends

and collaborators, isolates itself and falls prey to AKEL and EDEK; on the external front it makes for liberal countries being cautious toward us; nonaligned countries not trusting us and the West not looking favorably upon us.

However, how far will this evil go? For how long will the President of the republic wrong or embitter his associates, friends and other elements? How long will President Kyprianou continue to go back on promises and appear inconsistent? When will he realize that his associates are right in saying that he is following an AKEL domestic policy and a Lyssaridis foreign policy and that with this stance he harms our national issue irreparably.

CSO: 4908

CYPRUS

CYPRUS SPOKESMAN COMMENTS ON 'FUROR' OVER WESTERN PLAN

NC251205 Nicosia PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE in Greek 25 Jan 80 NC

[Statement by the Cyprus Government Spokesman Released on 25 January]

[Text] The government spokesman made the following statement:

Because of the continuing furor about the Western framework-plan, the government clarifies the following:

1. A section of the press, using the usual improper language, has been trying to give the impression that the government has not made a definite decision on the plan or that it has regretted its original decision. The decision of the government has been clear. The Western framework was not accepted as basis for talks, but it was accepted as a nonbinding working document. There has been no regret or change in this position. Acceptance of this document as basis for negotiations would have serious and detrimental consequences and would prejudice an unacceptable solution ad initio.
2. The view that we could accept the positive points of the plan and express reservations on its negative ones does not stand since the plan was submitted as basis for negotiations. The word basis creates a serious danger of commitment to undesirable positions. Moreover, the above view is, at the very least, naive, because the Turkish objections to points that they would consider negative, would have been added to our objections and in the end the contents of the plan would have been completely neutralized and we would actually end up with a discussion without agenda.
3. The government believes that continuation of this furor does not serve any useful purpose. Therefore it will not pursue it any further, and at this stage it is not going to make any other statement on the plan unless it finds it absolutely necessary.

CSO: 4908



## CP CHIEF JENSEN PLEDGES MORE OPEN PARTY DISCUSSION

Copenhagen LAND OG FOLK in Danish 29/30 Dec 79 p 11

[Article by John Wilken]

[Text] On the political level, the seventies took leave of us in a way which could be felt and will be remembered: a lot of economic measures which beat everything which a non-Socialist government could dream of introducing, as well as encroachments on the rights of wage-earners with threats of state-directed agreements to remain in force for several years.

It was against this background that the interview took place with the chairman of the Communist Party of Denmark, Jørgen Jensen. The appointment had to be changed three times before it was finally possible to find a free moment squeezed in between two other appointments. A glance at Jørgen's calendar shows clearly that the pressure of work certainly has not eased because the Communist Party of Denmark was thrown out of the Folketing.

## Bankruptcy of Non-Socialists

[Question] Have the hard times started anew, Jørgen, are there more fundamental reasons for the setbacks experienced by the working class?

[Answer] Many of the setbacks are only seeming setbacks. For it is not the case that the non-Socialist ideologies have prevailed now that we are on our way into the eighties. Neither here in Denmark nor in the rest of Europe. On the contrary, it is their policy which has gone bankrupt.

The sole reason why it may look different on account of the election results and similar circumstances, is that the labor movement has been split and is uncertain. Especially the social democratic parties have not recognized their responsibility in the present situation. They have, to a very large extent, created the opening to the forces of the Right which has been taking place. For this reason, it is not a question either of an advance on the part of the forces of the Right, but our weaknesses have been exploited to conceal the crisis of the capitalist social system.

It is true that our party has suffered a defeat parliamentarily, but this does not mean that what we stand for nationally and internationally has suffered any defeat. It is our way of looking at the problems which is being repeated, time and again, in the hundreds of political statements from the places of work and from all sorts of other popular organizations.

[Question] Nevertheless, it is as if there is a division between those who have made the statements--thus workers representatives and other elected representatives--and the broad masses. It is as if they have succeeded in introducing a passivity into large sections of the population.

[Answer] That is true, of course, and what I said by way of introduction was not said either to conceal the fact that we, as a party, ought to have been better at mastering the situation. Confusion and hopelessness have spread in large sections of the population. Through anti-Sovietism and propaganda against socialism, they have succeeded in creating a confusion in large sections of the population. They have created a passivity in order to have more peace for encroachments in the political field. No right-wing party would have been able to accomplish what Anker Jørgensen has now carried through. This is one of the things that create confusion in the working class. We must realize that the activity which is being created through united action must be converted into clear political positions. And it is up to us to create this certainty.

#### Serious Encroachments

[Question] This has also been decisive for the position taken by the party in connection with the emergency measures of intervention?

[Answer] It has been decisive for our position. We do not say "everything or nothing." We fight for every bit of improvement for the working class. We have also, in the Folketing, been voting for measures of minor progress which have been coming from the reformists.

But it is just as clear that when the Social Democratic Party in a so-called comprehensive plan produces a very reactionary, right-wing oriented policy, and they try to conceal it by, at the same time, proposing some minor improvements in the area of taxation, which seemingly take measures against big business, it is then necessary to regard this in its entity and oppose it. For the other encroachments were quite serious, and when the government demands that it be regarded as a whole, then one has to oppose the whole thing in order to prevent the encroachments.

[Question] With the danger involved that the Social Democratic government falls on it?

[Answer] We have said repeatedly that we do not want to overturn a Social Democratic government, but we shall never be able to prevent a Social Democratic government from unseating itself. If a Social Democratic

government submits proposals which it knows cannot be carried through, we cannot prevent it from being overthrown, nor should we do that.

And it is not the case that we or the working class have been making demands on the Social Democratic government which it could not carry through. It is a question of attempts on the part of the Social Democratic Party to carry through proposals which the working class does not want. This is shown through statements and actions from the working class. Also actions for a better environment, for security in employment, that the workers will not give up the results which were obtained through struggle in the last century, but here a number of trade union leaders have failed grossly.

#### Taking the Lead

[Question] You said earlier that we had not been living up to the expectations we have of ourselves as a party. How do you then want to formulate the demands we must now make of ourselves?

[Answer] We must not forget that, although we have suffered a parliamentary defeat, the Communist Party of Denmark has, to a major extent, been formulating the policy underlying the decisive movements. This was the case with the opposition to the EC. Nobody had any doubt that the reason why Denmark in the EC election was able to muster the strongest opposition group of any country was that the Communists were active within the resistance movement. The recent actions against missiles, the actions for improved wage and working conditions show the same thing.

But having said this, we must also ask ourselves the question: why is it that these results do not, at the same time, cause people to vote for our party and strengthen the Communist Party of Denmark so that the struggle among the population can also, by this means, gain strength?

We must not just push ourselves into the background as communists. We must openly admit that it is our struggle that is being carried on. We must lead the way at the places of work and in the movements, disclose the aimlessness of and hopelessness of the capitalist system. We must stress the results of the struggle of socialism for peace and relaxation and show our interest in that struggle. We must show that it is worth while fighting for a different and more just social system, and that it is our road that leads to socialism. That means that all the minor struggles must be carried on with still greater awareness and vision.

This, moreover, makes very big demands on the individual communist who is part of the individual movement. Whether it be in trade unions, in tenants' or residential movements, environmental groups, etc.

[Question] In all these small movements, it may perhaps be difficult for the individual communist who feels that he receives the right messages from the population also to feel that he receives the feedbacks from the party which he needs?

[Answer] It is clear that this is the problem to the individual communist. Our party, of course, consists of individual communists, and our development shows that they are strong people. That is also the reason why we have strong collectives and thus a strong party. Also the many new members we have got have shown a fantastic degree of maturity during the last year.

But each communist must also feel that things are going in the right direction. We are living in one of the most developed capitalist countries in which the propaganda can be directed most strongly against the actual needs of the people and thus create confusion.

If, nevertheless, in small as well as big actions, we are able to succeed, we shall then not only help change the situation in our own country but also on an international basis.

That is what the individual communist knows when he is involved in a separate action which has a concrete goal. It also is the basis for unity of action. If we as communists fight together with other people in a tenants' association against rent increases, that is the decisive thing--if we fight at a place of work for a wage increase, it is the wage increase which is the decisive thing, but, individually, all these actions help change the development also in our country. The Danish people would have been poorer if, in the 60 years of our existence, we had not been a prime mover in the movements.

Nor has the population in the big historical movements always been giving the Communists the recognition we ought to have had, but I wonder what the situation would have looked like if there had been nobody to give the Danish people the strength to carry on that struggle.

#### Not Feeling Superior

[Question] Nevertheless, there are movements with a popular strain which we may tend to call flipped out, the participants of which may have the impression that the Communists act as if they know better?

[Answer] The Communists must not appear superior, and if we do that, we are acting wrongly. But if there are movements which arise because of people's fear or insecurity or because those who are in power want to create confusion, the Communists have got to say so. But it is clear--we must not act in a superior manner. We must understand the thoughts and feelings of the population when, for example, so many people today become strongly opposed to nuclear power. It is because they have a justified fear of some of the consequences of this source of energy, and we must then not act as if we know better. But we must also point out where the actual discussion must be carried on and where the actual danger lies.

Actually, it is fantastic that hundreds of thousands turn against the peaceful exploitation of nuclear power, and that some of them disregard the nuclear rearmament which is taking place and the atom bombs which are lying at their very doorsteps.



This does not mean that we are not to see the dangers and problems inherent in the peaceful exploitation of nuclear power. As communists, we have, moreover, been saying that we must not have nuclear power in Denmark under the present circumstances, but it is clear that there is a need to unite the various movements against an acute nuclear danger.

[Question] And we here have a task?

[Answer] Yes, in such areas as within the environmental movements which are emerging. Environmental movements cannot by themselves change the structure of society, create socialism, but the environmental movements are some of the attempts of man to point to the existing dangers. It is the task of the Communists to join these movements and to help make the struggle as effective as possible, and we must not refrain from saying that, in order for these movements and demands to prevail, it will be necessary for us to change the society as well.

[Question] These are some of the things which have been included in the program for the party discussion which must be presented at the 1980 Easter congress.

Make Party Stronger

[Answer] That discussion has the very clear goal of making the party stronger. It implies that we must, to a greater extent, understand the situation in Denmark and, to a greater extent, must understand our own policy, our own program.

It has, for example, not met with understanding everywhere that, in our work to create a force that will change the society, we also attempted to obtain results by entering into municipal agreements with the Social Democrats in Århus and in Copenhagen and other places. We must learn from these things that it is not enough to take the initiatives but that the working class must also understand them.

[Question] And the party?

[Answer] It is clear that the party comrades, first and foremost, must understand this. That is the condition for us to be able to win the support of the working class. Otherwise, we cannot convert our theory into practical action. Otherwise, the theory cannot be used as a tool.

But I understand many reactions from the working class, for the Social Democratic Party has betrayed them in one agreement after the other. That is why they fear an agreement with the Social Democratic Party.

But it depends, of course, on the activity of the working class. Developing this activity is our primary task, and it always will be.



## GREENLAND CHIEF STEENHOLDT DISCUSSES HOME RULE POLITICS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Dec 79 p 9

[Article by Johannes Bundgård]

[Text] "The Greenland home rule is a good thing that has happened to us. It does not mean an eternal bed of roses, nor eternal happiness among the people. No, it is a good thing because it creates a Greenland which is alive, with all its good or bad qualities.

It is a good thing that the Greenlanders will be shaping the everyday life of Greenland. It is not a good thing that we who represent half the voters in the party Atassut ["Mutual Cooperation"] must already at this stage warn the government party Siumut ["Forward"] against misusing its power as the Big Ungilagtaq did it in the old legend."

Member of the Landsting and the Folketing Otto Steenholdt, who, in the Folketing election, scored a big election victory for his party, has no doubts as to the overall evaluation of the home rule, which was introduced on 1 May 1979. But a detailed evaluation must wait till more time has elapsed.

"We are gratified that we have avoided mistakes in the daily administration, and that the criticism is being levelled against principles and very specific mistakes on the part of the Greenland government," he says.

New Address for Criticism

"Does this mean that the general criticism has had a change of address from Denmark to Greenland?"

"Yes, it is now being levelled against the parties and the Greenland government. Through radio transmissions from the Landsting meetings,

the voters have learnt that Siumut wanted to prevent the work in the committees and brushed aside our party's criticism of the Greenland government's extravagant way of spending its funds. Our party's criticism was levelled against the unnecessary and big entertainment allowances to all members of the Greenland government, the purchase in Godthåb, which is subject to a housing shortage, of public housing for the same men, including the purchase of a two-family house for a government member who already had a good house. Our criticism was also levelled against the forcing through of an unnecessary expansion project for the Landsting hall, which cost millions of kroner that ought to have been spent on housing construction."

#### Landsting, not Greenland Government Responsible

"It sounds as if Atassut and Siumut have difficulties cooperating with one another, though each party has the support of half the voters?"

"That is true. We have even experienced that Siumut in the Landsting committees wanted to cut off all discussions because they are in majority. The worst thing is that the Greenland government, which has been elected by Siumut, and which is without independent responsibility, conducts hush-hush negotiations with the Danish government, without informing the Greenland parties and the members of the Folketing.

The Home Rule Act places the full responsibility for decisions with the Landsting. It says in an appendix under Section 1 of the Home Rule Act: 'The administration shall be vested in the Greenland government on behalf of the Landsting.' And to make it abundantly clear, it says that this arrangement may be changed if developments 'make it natural for the administration to be vested in the Greenland government on its own responsibility.' Today, the responsibility thus does not rest with the Greenland government. Our government cannot enter into new agreements, for example with the Danish government, without having beforehand been authorized to do so by the Landsting. I am of the opinion that the Landsting, to bear this responsibility, must be kept continuously informed of the decisions and actions of the Greenland government. That was not the case during our government's negotiations with the Danish government on such serious issues as the EC and residence permits for Danes in Greenland. That information we must have no later than at the spring session.

#### The Big Ungilagtage

But I also want to propose the reintroduction of the arrangement which allowed Greenland members of the Folketing to be observers during negotiations between the Danish government and the Greenland government. If Siumut does not change its procedures, we shall demand that minutes of the negotiations be submitted to the Landsting, with whom the responsibility rests. Siumut may then misuse its majority to vote down this

demand. But should this happen, the voters of Greenland will have the possibility of considering whether they like the way Siumut acts."

"There are, of course, sensible people in our government as well," Otto Steenholdt adds. "But we must warn them against continuing the way they have been doing hitherto. It is a good Greenland custom that one must not misuse one's power like the Big Ungilagtaq of the legend."

"It sounds like a summary of pure party politics. Have the voters also switched from voting for persons to voting for parties?"

"This is coming, but it will take some time. The personal relationship of trust is still decisive. But the development can be furthered through a change in the Election Act, which will give the voters the possibility of putting a cross against a party or a person instead of having to write down the name of a candidate."

"Siumut got a majority of 500 votes at the election to the Landsting, but, in the single-member constituencies of the whalers districts, it gained five 'cheap' mandates. Will the rules have to be changed?"

"It will be difficult, and it will be of no present interest as long as Siumut thinks that it can keep the whalers districts. Siumut won them by promising industrial development and a special member of government from these districts. With his salary, allowance, and a newly purchased home, he has proved superfluous, and most of the development of the area is being financed with funds from the EC, to which Siumut is opposed. The smart people in these districts will, no doubt, find out about this, so Atassut does not give up. At the election to the Folketing, we not only got the majority for all of Greenland but also in three of the five whalers municipalities, and, in the fourth, we were only one vote from the majority.

During the last few years, a positive development has been initiated in the country settlements and in the whalers districts, which, to a great extent, has been financed by the EC. That we must remember when Siumut talks big against the EC. We must also remember that, without the EC, we shall run into big problems in connection with the fishery regulations.

If, at the proposal of Siumut, Greenland takes leave of the EC, its aid and loans, I shall not be the one to go to the Folketing to say: 'My dear friends, now it will be you and your voters who will have to pay.' According to the Home Rule Act, the Danish state shall neither make profits nor lose money on the introduction of home rule. The Folketing will have a clear right to veto such a decision. Nevertheless, Siumut still talks about an EC referendum in 1982."

"What is the opinion of Atassut on this?"

"We hope that Siumut will become more sensible. And I believe that the majority of voters will want to keep our ties with the EC. Not least to our principal industry, the fishing industry, this is extremely important."

"Have there not been tendencies to sit down and enjoy the fact that the goal of home rule has been reached?"

"No, On the contrary, things are going to happen only now. Both good things, such as the taking over of new administrative areas, and bad things.

In the forefront of the everyday life is probably the realization that the introduction of liquor rationing became a fiasco. The silence has passed. The storm is now brewing."

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CSO: 3106

## MERCHANT MARINE EARNINGS INCREASE 1.2 BILLION IN YEAR

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 31 Dec 79 p 2

[Text] The total foreign exchange earnings of the Danish merchant marine increased in 1979 to approximately 10 billion kroner, as against 8.8 billion kroner the year before. This means that the third largest export industry of the country was able to record an increase of 1.2 billion kroner.

"The year has, in several respects, been marked by a favorable development for Danish shipping," says the chairman of Denmark's Shipowners' Association, J. D. Lauritzen, shipowner. "The freight market has shown considerably higher rates than in previous years. This has had the effect that all laid-up tankers have been put into operation again, and the idle Danish tonnage is now comprised only of older tonnage."

"For the first time in several years, the merchant marine will, however, show a minor setback. Especially the number of ships will be reduced on account of the trend of too sharply increasing costs under Danish flag. The shipowners' new construction program is the smallest in many years and will be insufficient to maintain the fleet in its present size. The extremely weak freight market in the years 1975-78 has been making inroads on the reserves of shipowners. Particularly many shipowners with smaller tonnages may become forced to sell out unless the increasing demand in the freight market will also affect these types of ships," J. D. Lauritzen said.

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CS0: 3106



## GREENLANDERS IN DENMARK FORM LOBBY TO PREVENT URANIUM MINES

Nuuk [Godthåb] GRØNLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 27 Dec 79, pp 1,2

[Excerpts] Greenlanders in Denmark have now formed a committee which will contribute to creating a popular opposition against uranium mining in Greenland. The committee, so far, has approximately 20 members. It is a non-party committee, and the membership is on an individual basis, i.e. the individual member does not represent political groups or other organizations.

As the basis for the activities of the committee, the objects clause states that the committee recognizes that the Greenland people alone have the proprietary right in the subsoil and its resources.

## Task of Committee

The task of the committee will also be to disseminate information to the Greenland population on uranium mining in the Third and Fourth Worlds (the developing countries and minority populations) and the environmental, social, economic and political consequences of uranium mining in these areas. And the committee will, conversely, pass on information on the Kvanefjeld project to the populations in the Third and Fourth Worlds.

It is also the task of the committee to procure and pass on information on the application today of uranium in nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons.

## Opposition Groups in Greenland

GRØNLANDSPOSTEN has talked with some of the Greenlanders in Copenhagen who have been instrumental in the formation of the committee.

Mike Siegstad: "We are looking forward to the formation all over Greenland of groups in opposition to uranium mining with whom we can cooperate. We have the advantage of being centrally located, as far as dissemination of information on uranium mining is concerned, and, in that way, we are able

to support the groups in Greenland. After the recent conference on uranium in Copenhagen, we, moreover, feel that we have an obligation to pass on the information we got on that occasion. For there has not been much information published in Greenland on the risks involved in uranium mining. We shall try to make up for that."

#### Dissemination of Information

Karl Isaksen: "We intend to contribute to the formation of pressure groups all over Greenland, and, as far as I know, groups have already been formed at Narssaq and Qaqortoq (Julianehåb). At Narssaq, a study group has been formed, via the evening school, the subject of study of which is uranium and uranium mining. The same thing has been planned at Qaqortoq. The group here in Copenhagen will cooperate closely with the OOA--Organization for Information on Atomic Power. It has not been our intention to act as a kind of steering committee or as an authority charged with supervision of the information services in Greenland. But we want to make use of our possibilities to provide information and material across the Atlantic in both directions."

Kaj Kleist: "Much of the information on uranium mining is only available in the English language. The group in Copenhagen will, moreover, see to it that all essential material be translated from the English into Greenlandic and vice versa."

#### Inadequate Information

Karl Johan Lyberth: "We shall now start collecting as copious information as possible on the Narssaq project because we want to try to make up for the inadequate information that is being received from the Ministry of Greenland Affairs and the nuclear power station at Risø. We are particularly interested in passing on the information which the two official authorities, for one reason or the other, do not pass on."

Karl Johan Lyberth: "Siumut has asked some environmental experts to prepare a report on the Narssaq project because we have received requests from Narssaq to provide information on the project. Both the Ministry of Greenland Affairs and Risø have kept saying that they have all the time kept the population at Narssaq informed via the mining committee of the local authorities. Nevertheless, it is a fact that many people at Narssaq feel that they know nothing about the uranium project, and there has never been any actual debate on the question among the people at Narssaq, nor, for that matter, in the rest of Greenland. Such a debate we also want to help create."

#### Paradoxical

Karl Isaksen: "It is paradoxical that, simultaneously with the planning of the uranium mining, there have been strong efforts during the last few years to develop the sheep farming in Southern Greenland. These two things do not go together. It can harm the entire Greenland export of foodstuffs--also the fishery produce--if importers come to realize that the sheep feed

off areas near a uranium mine, and the fish is caught in waters receiving large quantities of waste water from the mine."

"The group in Copenhagen will not only be interested in uranium but in the entire complex of problems in connection with the raw materials in Greenland. We are aware of the plans to construct a huge hydroelectric power plant in connection, among other things, with the uranium mining. Hydroelectric power on such a large scale will be a threat to the environment. The water balance in an entire fiord system may be changed, with unpredictable consequences for the environment and the fauna," Karl Isaksen adds.

#### Experience from Marmorilik

Kaj Kleist: "We must be very much aware of the social effect of an entirely new mining town at Narssaq with several hundred workers from the outside. It is unrealistic to believe that the Narssaq inhabitants will get the possibility of working in the mine to any major extent. We have our experience from Marmorilik."

Karl Johan Lyberth: "Indeed, and from Marmorilik we, moreover, have the experience that the profits from mining in Greenland will not benefit the Greenland society. The representatives from the United States, Australia and Africa reported on exactly the same kind of experience at the uranium conference in Copenhagen. It is the governments and the multinational corporations which launch and benefit from the mining of raw materials. The local population gets all the disadvantages and the long-term harmful effects. We can just as well abandon the dream that the uranium from Narssaq will be able to pay for the home rule or just part of it."

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CSO: 3106

## STRIKES IN METAL INDUSTRIES INCREASE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Dec 79 p 3

[Article by Lisbeth Nebelong]

[Text] In the course of the seventies, the number of strikes contrary to collective agreements has increased nearly tenfold within the iron and metal industries. And the same thing applies to the number of strike hours.

The employers of iron workers yesterday published a report on strikes for 1979. It shows that, on an average, 260 workers have been striking throughout the year contrary to the collective agreements. This is an increase of 79 percent over 1978, and if one takes into account political strikes and sympathy strikes, the figure increases to 400.

But 1979 is far from a unique year. On the contrary, this year's report is only a confirmation of the trend: A steadily increasing number of workers strike for a steadily increasing number of hours.

## 600 Strikes This Year

The late sixties saw between 60 and 90 strikes annually within the iron and metal industries, and the number of lost working hours in connection with the strikes amounted to between 60 and 90,000. This year has seen just under 600 strikes and a total of 486,800 strike hours contrary to the collective agreements. In 1978, 385,000 hours were registered and 43,000 people were involved in strikes. This year, 60,000 workers have participated in the strikes.

The vice-president of the Employers' Association of the Danish Iron Industry, Ebbe Nielsen, regrets the development, which he says is the result of a lack of respect for the labor legislation system among workers. Over 80 percent of the strikes are of a very short duration, and Ebbe Nielsen says that this is connected with the change of the Industrial Relations Act in 1973.

## Trade Unions Too Passive

"The fact that workers cannot now be fined if they resume work within 48 hours is interpreted by them as a legalization of their right to strike, and they use this deliberately towards their employers each time they are dissatisfied," Ebbe Nielsen says. And he adds that the efforts on the part of trade unions to bring their members to reason have not been sufficient.

The chairman of the Central Organization of Metal Workers in Denmark, Charles Hansen, admits that the workers, in certain cases, take advantage of the labor legislation system. When this happens, it is due to the fact that it is far too difficult to get to speak to the employers, and that they diffuse their responsibilities towards their workers. When the workers are not able, through discussion of the problems, to obtain results, they go on strike in order, in that way, to get to speak to their employers.

Charles Hansen is of the opinion that the major reason for the many strikes is that the government, in the course of the seventies, has been intervening three times in the collective bargaining.

"The government must keep out of it, and we must have the free negotiations back. Otherwise this unfortunate development will continue into the eighties," Charles Hansen points out.

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## COMMENTATOR CRITICAL OF WESTERN APPROACH TO CRISIS

DW011013 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 1 Feb 80 p 1 DW

[Editorial by Werner Holzer: "Despite All Friendship"]

[Text] Dealing with international crises does not seem to be a strong point of the present governments in Moscow and Washington. Furious and stubborn reactions can be seen more frequently these days than the absolutely necessary cool assessment of risks and chances.

That pertains certainly not only to the two world powers but to many politicians and publicists in all parts of the world. Too many people eventually want to see action without thinking through the consequences and bad after-effects some perhaps senseless acts of strength could have. Others tend to duck like a groggy boxer who hopes to survive the round that way. But neither fearful inactivity helps in a serious international crisis, nor the activity of those action-thirsty people who act like children in a dark room who make noise in order to cover up their fear.

In the present international back and forth between loud threats and quiet illusions, the policy of the European states seems to be halfway sensible. It is [word indistinct] here that the Soviet Union with its military action in Afghanistan has openly provoked the rest of the world. How one ought to react to the provocations, however, is disputable between the United States and Europe--last but not least because one is surprised over and over again by more and more new announcements and demands for solidarity--despite all assurances to the contrary.

It is not a question of whether solidarity exists between the United States and Western Europe--but a question of consultation in connection with public statements. Good politics and diplomacy at all times have been considered a high and difficult art. Quick draws were not in demand. A wise and patient policy in the present situation is more necessary than it has been for many years.

In contrast to the widespread opinion that we are presently experiencing an escalation of crises, the following is a fact: The significance of the first crisis, the Iranian-American, has been basically changed by the second, the Afghan crisis.

As long as the matter at issue was just the controversy between Washington and Teheran after the taking of hostages, the Americans and the entire Western world, despite general avowals of international law, continued to regard themselves as being in the state of prosecution. Granted, the states of the Third World were also alarmed by the often irrational activity in Iran, but in their hearts they harbored understanding for this weak country which had dared revolt against a world power.

The change came with the Soviet military action in Afghanistan, however. Moscow's defeat in the UN General Assembly and at the foreign ministers' meeting of the Islamic states has shown that a parallel of interests of the West and the nonaligned states has emerged as a result of this development.

With all due care in the use of this word this spells a change in the international tendency. Even the politicians of the nonaligned states who are most hard of hearing and suspicious now had to realize that the Soviet Union, notwithstanding its alleged solidarity, is pursuing an imperial policy of interests without the least regard for the feelings and the interests of the Third World.

This is the point where the policy of the Western world must come in. The chance to become the accepted partner of the nonaligned states has never been so good. Yet, the danger is quite evident that this chance will soon be lost again if the shortsighted tendency prevails in the West to play the old bloc game in a new variety according to the motto: If you come to my camp I will help you. The fundamental error of such a policy is the misunderstanding that there is an absolute identity of interests between the Third World and the West. In reality the motives that have elicited the anger at Moscow are entirely different. To the countries of the Third World nothing is as important as their right to independence and sovereignty. They even consider economic interests second to that. The West's controversy with Moscow, in contrast, is connected with the apprehension that the sensitive balance between East and West is being threatened by the Soviet Union just as are our vital economic interests in the Middle East.

If in this situation we do not come up with any other idea than a repeat performance of power policy--along the lines of only the enemies of my enemies are my friends--we will soon find ourselves without potential partners among the nonaligned states again.

CSO: 3103

## PRESS DISCUSSES STRAUSS VISIT TO ROMANIA 30 JANUARY

DW301031 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German to East and West Germany  
0605 GMT 30 Jan 80 DW

[Press review on visit by Franz Josef Strauss, Bavarian minister president and CDU/CSU candidate for chancellor, to Romania]

[Text] NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG writes: The remarkable result of the visit to Romania is that Strauss, together with his host, supported in an unrestricted way a realistic detente policy. That has not been heard recently in such clear terms domestically. The warning against a military collision in Europe could not have been more emphatic. It reflects how serious both politicians consider the situation. The Soviets probably did not like it at all that Ceausescu stressed in the presence of the CDU/CSU union politician, who is considered a cold warrior, the right of every people to determine its development path without outside interference. Moscow has to consider this at least as indirect criticism of a violation of Afghanistan's independence. The fact that Strauss maintained great restraint in all his Bucharest statements confirms his efforts to change his image of being political poltergeist. Through this carefulness the candidate for chancellor has rendered the best service to the cause of detente, to his hosts and to himself. This is what the NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG has to say.

GENERAL-ANZEIGER of Bonn points out: What has been said by chancellor candidate Strauss in Bucharest could have been said in a similar way or exactly like this by Federal Chancellor Schmidt or Foreign Minister Genscher. At the side of his Romanian host and being aware of the dangerous situation of Romania, Strauss advocated the exploitation of all opportunities for a realistic detente policy. Detente policy in the style of Brandt or Bahr is not considered realistic by Strauss. With his appeal that this is not the hour to fan the fire, he was varying several warnings of SPD and FDP politicians against aggravating the situation through unnecessary dramatizations. All in all Strauss clung in Bucharest to the rules he had set up, namely that a German politician cannot castigate other German politicians from abroad.

WESTDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG compares Strauss' visit to Bucharest with recent efforts of the Federal Government to again establish contacts with East Bloc states. The paper notes: Three visits of federal ministers to communist-ruled countries have been canceled, and the dates when Federal Chancellor Schmidt was supposed to visit SED Chief Honecker and party chief Brezhnev still are hanging in the air. In the vacuum of East-West contacts the 3-hours talk between Minister President Strauss and Romanian State and Party Chief Ceausescu has caused even more attention. Strauss likes that. With his second official visit to an East European country he continues persistently--a few weeks after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan--to correct his image as being an inveterate nationalist or an advocate of cold war.

CSO: 3103

## CANCELLATION OF SCHMIDT-HONECKER TALKS WAS PREDICTABLE

DW311311 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 31 Jan 80 p 4 DW

[Commentary signed DR.: "Honecker Had To Cancel"]

[Text] The cancellation of the invitation to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt by the chairman of the GDR State Council, Erich Honecker, cannot come as a surprise if one has attentively watched developments in the East Bloc following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The meeting of the two had long become uncertain. It is due to the logic of the development that the GDR, too, had to lock the door to Bonn visitors after Moscow had shut the gates to other visitors currently unwanted. Obviously the GDR leadership had been interested in preventing any severance of contacts with Bonn even after the beginning of the crisis. This was made evident if alone by the economic relations from which mainly the GDR profits.

By the same token it was to be expected that in view of the mutual escalation by the two world powers a point would come at which East Berlin would no longer be capable of giving its own interests priority over solidarity with the Soviet Union. Even the argument of the two German states vis-a-vis their main allies that they ought to be interested in keeping the inter-German "flank" free, no longer counted. In this situation Honecker would have had to show greater cooperativeness toward Schmidt than he would have otherwise done. Yet, he is being prevented from doing exactly that at a time when Moscow attaches greater importance to the cohesion of its sphere of power than to the continuation of detente policy.

We may claim without exaggerating that the damage from the crisis may become greater for the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic than for other states. In the field of human contacts alone headway has been made which neither side will carelessly risk. What we have to fear is that setbacks will occur at this particularly sensitive spot for relations which will not be reparable so soon. The Federal Government has made an effort--in vain--to decelerate the downward slide. The international crisis is intensifying.



## COALITION TAX PACKAGE OFFERS STRAUSS CAMPAIGN OPPORTUNITY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 20 Dec 79 p 1

[Article by Walter Kannengiesser: "A Miserable Tax Package"]

[Text] So Schmidt and Genscher, Matthoefer and Lambsdorff managed after all to present their tax package before Christmas. With his proposals for tax relief Strauss evidently made them get a move on. During the fall Matthoefer had announced that his tax relief program must be carefully prepared. There is little evidence of this now, for the proposals fail to take advantage of every reasonable point of departure for reform. Many are offered something, nothing is done right. For years there has been talk about the necessity of a tariff reform. Matthoefer, however, is pursuing antireform. Election policy calculations have determined the compromise between the SPD and the FDP.

Matthoefer set the accents with his proposal to introduce a new children's allowance and to extend the proportional threshold of the tax scale. With this he has left the FDP only a few chances to adorn the package further for its followers. What the FDP has contributed is for the most part reasonable, but partly also encumbered with fatal consequences, such as, for example, the baby supplement to the children's allowance. It would have been better if the FDP from the very beginning had insisted on the smoothing of the progressive tax rate. For a good many Free Democrats it must have been sobering that precisely those demands of the FDP which relate to the better consideration of the providential payments in terms of taxation have been put off until 1982.

The value of the tax package will have to be measured primarily by what is done to soften the progression in the case of the average and middle incomes. If today the unmarried average wage earner is burdened with upper tax rates of almost 40 percent, the tax scale is no longer valid. Previously only the really wealthy were subjected to a progressive tax burden, whereas today it is the mass of the citizens. At the time when 80 percent of the citizens could still be covered with a uniform tax rate, the proportional zone made sense. Today it encompasses by far under 50 percent of the taxpayers. In other words, the good old times are also over for the taxpayer; we cannot bring it back. The state could not cope with such a tax loss.

The attempt to once again extend the proportional zone of the tax rate must lead into a dead-end, especially if--because of ideological motivations--the top tax rate is pinned down to a certain income. And yet Matthoefer is traveling along this path, instead of softening the progression following the proportional zone in force, which would benefit all.

The fairy tale is also being spread that the tax progression curve is being flattened for taxpayers with above-average incomes. Precisely the opposite applies, for the progression curve in the future, at least on the average, will have to run even steeper than up to now. What is right is that the upper tax rates up to incomes of DM60,000/120,000 (unmarried/married) will be lower than previously as the result of a certain "shift to the right" of the progression rate. The new tax rate formula, however, leads to the fact that these tax rates will rise even more rapidly than up to now. Thus the tax rates for incomes between DM30,000 and DM60,000 at the present time increase by 10.4 percentage points, and in the future 13.6 points are envisaged. This effect is further enhanced by the fact that the tax-free income allowed by the tax table, which softened the progression up to now, will be added to the tax-free base income. In view of this, how can one speak about a flattening of the progression curve?

The progression effect of the tax scale, in spite of lower average burdens for the taxpayers, is further amplified. The same nonsense was concocted in the last tax package. With every tax package, in other words, the progression curve is drawn more steeply. This has the disadvantage for the taxpayer what the relief effects fizzle out quickly. Matthoefer, by contrast, can be hopeful that the relief measures running into the billions will soon be made up through additional revenues. In short, there is method behind the madness.

The planned tax-free base income for children will make the equalization of burdens for families even more unintelligible. To be sure, the tax relief of DM29 monthly per child is considerable. But it reaches only those families which actually pay taxes. This makes it imperative to introduce new payments via the unemployment insurance, pension insurance, and living allowances, so that low-income parents do not go empty-handed. These payments are added to the children's allowances, to the child care allowance (which Matthoefer would like to do away with, but cannot), to the supplementary payments in connection with providential expenditures, and to the baby premium. And this is what Matthoefer means by simplification. One could discuss the shifting back of the child allowance payments from the labor administration to the revenue office, but only within the framework of an overall concept.

The best thing about this tax package is still that it cannot become law in its present form. Matthoefer has avoided providing points of departure for compromises with Strauss. The tax package, in short, also has the function to force Strauss into confrontation before the election. That can be dangerous for the SPD and the FDP, for they are challenging Strauss in a field which he commands. The coalition, by contrast, throughout its existence has been stumbling from failure to failure in the realm of tax policy under the pressure of the redistribution ideolog.

SCHMIDT TALKS ON ECONOMIC, POLITICAL POLICIES, ELECTION

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 24 Dec 79 pp 36-40

[Interview with FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, "I Will Not Let Us Harbor Any Illusions"; date and place not given]

[Text] Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt gives information to WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE about the FRG's economic and political prospects and tasks in the eighties.

[Question] Mr Chancellor, the new year is at the same time a step into a new decade. In the decade which is ending, you have had a substantial voice in policy--and not just that of the FRG. What concerns you about the eighties?

[Answer] Again and again questions arise as to whether we will be able in the next decade also to preserve internal and external peace; to seek and use prospects for detente; to maintain the world economy in working order, so that economic exchange can remain one of the most important forces for improving the standard of living; and to make it clear to the peoples of the world that they depend on each other and must therefore be ready to make compromises.

[Question] An abundance of problems which go far beyond the national scope. Let us for the moment remain in Germany, on the subject of energy: What can the FRG do to assure the supply of energy, and, while costs are increasing, to keep industry competitive and thus able to export?

[Answer] The question of ability to compete and export arises not only for us, but also for all countries which must meet a substantial part of their energy needs through imports. The federal government has tried for more than 5 years to reduce this dependence on oil imports. To begin with, we have put a stop to the further erection of oil power stations and have granted priority to German coal. I want to reduce the remaining 6-8 percent share of oil in the electric supply to zero by the mid-eighties. Second, we have created the preconditions for long-term supply contracts for natural

gas. Third, since the winter of 1973/74 we have never allowed the illusion to be harbored that we would save consumers and enterprises from the pressure created by the horrendously increased crude oil price. This pressure makes more economical and efficient use of this power suppliers necessary. In the meantime, our heating energy savings program, with more than DM 4 billion in subsidies for energy saving investment, is in full swing. In industry, because of high oil costs, the energy saving process is surely being intensified. It has to be.

Finally, at the beginning of 1980 the federal cabinet will be occupied with the concrete project of liquefaction and gasification of coal. I want no illusion to prevail here: these and other alternatives to oil will, at first, increase energy costs. Every step toward an assured supply has its price. For this reason I have, as early as 1967 and ever since, fought decisively for an important role for German coal. I must add that acute risks exist in the world oil market against which not even the most circumspect government policy can insure.

[Question] Do you expect further convulsions in the oil supplying countries of the Near East? Do you rule out a war over oil? The development will in no small measure depend on whether the United States regains its leadership ability. Do you see a prospect of this?

[Answer] The FRG will surely not make war over oil. The majority of countries of the world, above all of the Third World, are affected even more vitally than we are by what you call convulsions in the oil market. This creates tensions which may be discharged some day. Contrary to you, I am of the opinion that the leadership ability of the United States is thoroughly accepted. The American president has, with great tenacity and decisiveness, brought more of his energy savings program through the Congress than pessimists considered possible last summer.

[Question] Nevertheless, it is our impression that the American weakness cannot be denied. What can be done from the side of Bonn to meet the consequences of this debilitation? Should the FRG be less modest politically, and also militarily, then up to now--at least in Europe?

[Answer] I take issue with your formulation of the American weakness. We cannot constantly expect a policy of "heave-ho" decisions from democratically legitimized governments. After all, this cannot even be expected by the German citizens from their own federal government.

As to energy policy in general and oil policy in particular, it is necessary for the industrial countries of the West to work together as closely as possible. The Tokyo economic summit has brought this home to the public. I think that in this particular area of policy but also in general it behooves the FRG not to be too forward; the historical experience of our partners with the Germans suggests this to us.



I believe that the international energy dialog should be set in motion again. Therefore, we support the proposal by Mexican President Lopez Portillo for a worldwide conference of crude oil supplier and crude oil consumer countries. Therefore, we also support Soviet Secretary General Brezhnev's proposal for an all-Europe energy conference. It appears particularly important to me that the European Community finally develop a common energy policy--both within the community and toward outside countries. I supported this vigorously at the last meeting of the nine country and government heads; the commission in Brussels has received an order for preparation.

As to the FRG's military role: We should fulfill our obligation to the alliance as agreed up to now, but we should not want to stand out.

[Question] The European Community has a multitude of its own problems. It will have to come to terms with problems which arise from the admission of Greece and Spain. Will this organization in its current form be equal to these stresses?

[Answer] To begin with, I must point out that the EC's member countries would have a great many more problems of their own if the EC did not exist. Obviously, the admission of Greece and Spain to the circle of member countries raises new questions for both sides. Many answers have already been found, and we shall clarify the remainder also with patience and tenacity. The EC will be equal to future stresses if it approaches matters with patience, judgment and the will to compromise. I see no cause for pessimism. Neither do I think that debates on the organizational form of the EC are useful to us.

[Question] Mr Chancellor, next year you must enter an election campaign. Which opponent seems more dangerous--Franz Josef Strauss or the new fringe groups of the so-called Greens and the adherents of Fredersdorf?

[Answer] I would consider it wrong to mention Mr Strauss and the Greens politically in one breath. For the Fredersdorf adherents this would be more feasible. The opposition would be dangerous in the election campaign if it succeeded in representing candidate Strauss as a statesman with mastery over himself--or if it should succeed in creating a climate of fear and crisis.

As far as the Greens are concerned, many of them appear to have started reflecting when they heard from Mr Strauss that they actually are his idea of the fourth party. I think that this process of reflection will continue more intensively next year. Mr Strauss is urgently interested in a split vote between the SPD and the FDP.

For the rest, I warn against underestimating candidate Strauss, but also against making him out to be a demon. Despite all his talents, his unpredictability will probably decide the issue in the end.



[Question] The Greens give expression to the uneasiness of many citizens with the established order. What, according to your opinion, are the causes of this aversion? Is it merely one of the usual surges like the increase of the NPD [National Democratic Party of Germany] at the time or the appearance of the Apo [Extra-Parliamentary Opposition], or is there more to it?

[Answer] If I see it correctly, the movement of the Greens is fed by different sources and for different motives. Here the discontent and uneasiness of some young citizens with the style and programs of the four parties represented in the Bundestag surely play a part. The four parties are not entirely blameless for this. Another part, however, is probably played by the feeling that the parties and our system of government are unable to fulfill the longing of some young people for spiritual content in their lives. Obviously, however, this is hardly the main duty of political parties.

Some of this is due to the fact that our system of education does not promote the development of virtues and understanding of citizenship as it does the learning of foreign words or mathematical formulas. Therefore, this uneasiness and lack of comprehension should be differentiated from those citizens' initiatives which are not directed against something but instead are in favor of something: a nature park, a children's playground, a quiet traffic zone, better noise protection, or better protection against environmental pollution.

Moreover, I do not believe that the uneasiness that you refer to should off-hand be valued negatively. It also contains a certain resistance to plainly materialistic conceptions of life, a downgrading of the mentality of pretentiousness. At the outset, these desires should be valued as fundamentally positive. To be sure, one must reject positions which would make such desires unconditional and which do not want to recognize the necessary compromises in our society.

[Question] What can be done to counter youth's lack of enthusiasm? New tasks, new goals?

[Answer] There are a sufficient number of tasks in our society. Often, however, they are not spectacular. For instance, I think it is excellent that some young people are definitely in favor of the integration into our society of foreign workers' children or of handicapped persons. I am not of the opinion that the government should set new tasks or goals for young people. Historically we have not had good experience with this. What often saddens me is the unwillingness of older people with experience in life to come to an understanding of the thoughts and dreams of young people with critical sympathy, and if necessary to contradict them in the same way in which these young people constantly contradict adults.

[Question] Mr Chancellor, in certain circles our economic system is criticized again and again. The proponents of a pure market economy face the adherents of an order with a more socialist imprint. Is the /social/ [in italics] market economy in danger? Is there a danger of polarization of the social partners?

[Answer] I do not consider the socially obligated market economy to be endangered, nor do I believe that a polarization of the social partners is threatened. I consider both concerns, as far as reality in the FRG goes, to be artificially contrived problems. They are expressed in clever books, in purposely thoughtful lead articles, and at Sunday party gatherings. When you listen around abroad in the world, you learn that no one believes that our socially obligated market economy is in danger or that a polarization of the social partners is threatened. On the contrary: most foreigners are astonished that neither is the true case for us. Some German Sunday speakers simply do not take cognizance of this.

[Question] In the past Keynesian boom guidance was considered to be the ultimate in governmental economic policy. In the meantime, however, noted economists advise that government should stay out of active boom guidance because--simply stated--whatever it does, it does it all wrong. It reacts too late, on too small a scale, and in the wrong place. Do you agree with this?

[Answer] I positively do not agree with this; instead I contradict it vigorously. Government is directed by law to intervene with the means of boom policy when this is necessary. This legal obligation has existed for a dozen years. Moreover, we would also have done, without any legal obligation, what we have done successfully in the past 5 years for recovery of a self-supporting economic growth. If not every detail of this policy looks strictly correct, it is because scientists are able to criticize /afterwards/; politicians make decisions /before/, if they are to achieve anything [words in slantlines in italics]. Moreover, during the world economic recession of the middle seventies we were not dealing with Keynesian boom guidance. Reference to Keynes always aggravates me a little because he intended his theories for the conceptual model of a deflated social economy, which does not have any economic or monetary relation to its surroundings. We do not live in a "national" social economy, but instead in a closely connected inflationary world economy. Consequently, close collaboration with our partners in economic and monetary policy has always been for us an important --if not the most important--ingredient of our economic policy. You see this most clearly in the fact that the country and government heads of the most important industrial countries have already met five times at summit conferences, concerned almost exclusively with economic questions. We thereby prevented one country's solving its problems at the expense of another, as unfortunately occurred at the beginning of the thirties.

[Question] The next decade could, it appears, become a period of social tensions. The burden of social taxes has for some citizens reached or exceeded the limit of what is to be expected. If the social system is to function in the future as it has hitherto, citizens will have to be burdened with additional taxes. Is it timely to put a damper on the demands made of the social state?

[Answer] I am totally opposed to putting a damper on the social state, by which is meant the social constitutional state prescribed by statute, in the sense of dismantling it. On the other hand, it is true that we cannot, nor do we have to, fulfill every new sociopolitical demand which appears to be justified. In this sense we must put a damper on many expectations of more rapid extension of social services. I am disturbed that in our debate some consider only the contributions and taxes in our social security and not the services which this network assures. Yet, this network has its price. However, for this price we have achieved a level where most people can live free of material distress and therefore in this area live without fear. This has decidedly contributed to our social peace. This should be worth a high price in the future as well.

[Question] While the dollar and other currencies stagger from one attack of weakness to the next, the German mark becomes ever stronger. In many countries the mark is already the secret international reserve currency. Do you welcome this development?

[Answer] I do not think that your question correctly describes the state of the dollar and other important currencies. With the exception of a few nervous occurrences, we have not for a long time had a year like 1979, in which the most important currencies showed such a degree of relative stability. This limited success did not fall into our lap. We owe it in part to the creation of the European currency system and in part to close cooperation with our American friends.

I by no means welcome a development which would assign to the mark the role of a major international reserve currency. Even just on the basis of orders of magnitude, this can hardly be considered possible; after all, on the basis of national product, the national economy of the United States is 3 1/2 times as large as ours.

It is an entirely different matter, obviously, that the strength of the mark is also a graduator of successful economic policy.

[Question] The North-South dialog, although it was started with much publicity, has not yet yielded anything tangible. On the contrary, the situation in the least-developed countries has become still worse. In your opinion, what should be done to render effective assistance here?

[Answer] I think that the North-South dialog is burdened with too many individual questions; on the other hand, it has not been possible up to now to include in the North-South dialog the very important subject of energy supply for developing countries. Moreover, the general subject of the dialogue has been dispersed among too many conference levels. And, finally, the dialog--insofar as it takes place at all conferences--has too much of an imprint of wholesale reproaches. I deplore all of these wrong developments, because I have stood up for this dialog for years.

The fact that the economic and financial position of many developing countries is today worse than 5 years ago is not due so much to wrong developments of the North-South dialog as to the multiplication of crude oil prices. This was intended primarily to hit the industrial countries, but it has burdened the developing countries to a much greater extent--the more so, the poorer they are. This bloodletting for countries of the Third World destroys much of what we arduously carried forward by means of development assistance.

Please consider: the crude oil bill which those developing countries which have to import crude oil must pay will be around \$40 billion in 1980; this is 10 times as much as at the beginning of the decade of the seventies. However, the public development assistance of the western industrial countries comes to only about \$20 billion. Even if it were possible for us to double this figure, we would at best be running in pursuit of rising oil prices. I am convinced that the North-South dialog without participation by major oil-producing countries will hardly achieve any effective results in the long run. However, the oil countries and the developing countries without oil first need to clarify their mutual interests.

[Question] What role should, what role can the FRG play internationally in economic politics in the coming decade?

[Answer] Certainly not that of a giant, as I hear occasionally. No doubt, however, that of a dependable country which does not solve its problems at the expense of its partners. We shall further play the role of a country which does not allow inflationary softening of its currency to occur; whose market is open to the world; whose economic and political goals do not include the production of surpluses in its balance of payments; which to the best of its ability contributes to the development of the Third World; which is ready for cooperation and compromises; which wants neither to rule over others nor to be ruled by others.

[Question] Finally, a look at the national future, key word Germany. You yourself said not long ago that the German question has not been tabled forever. Do you consider a development possible which would in the coming decade bring the subject of Germany back on the agenda?

[Answer] The desire of all Germans to live under one roof is alive and will remain alive. To that extent the German question remains on the agenda. Thus, I deem it all the more important that we persist in easing the lot of the many people who are immediately affected by the division of Germany by means of further agreements with the Soviet Union and the GDR. Not even occasional setbacks will dissuade us from this.

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## CITIZENS VOTE, BUT POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, INTEREST ARE LACKING

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Dec 79 p 1

[Text] Interest in politics has increased in the FRG, but not the readiness to participate actively in parties and associations. When the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research in June 1952 for the first time raised the question of whether the voting citizens were interested in politics, the replies "not at all" (a third) still outnumbered the affirmative replies (slightly more than a fourth). In the meantime, approximately half of the individuals surveyed indicate an interest in politics. In November 1978, three-fourths said that they vote regularly in Bundestag and Landtag elections. Eighteen percent replied that they supported a certain party or a certain candidate before the last Bundestag election or during other elections. But only 7 percent participate politically in a party, a club or association, and 5 percent say of themselves that they sometimes turn to a deputy, the authorities, or simply to the public.

The lack of activity has many reasons. The most important one is disquietingly normal: Those who are content do not get excited and therefore do not become involved. Fifteen years ago an international comparison (Almond and Verba, "The Civic Culture," Princeton, 1963), showed that the proportion of politically highly active voters in well-functioning democratic systems is small. In this country, above all those who regard themselves as being in the center politically may be considered to be satisfied. That is half of the population 16 years of age and older. The proportion of radicals on the right and left together comes to less than 5 percent. The left protest potential (which gathers not only around the left radicals) is figures at approximately 4.5 percent by the Munich Institute Infratest, that of the right radicals at 1.5 percent. One-fifth to one-fourth respectively labels itself as moderately left or moderately right.

Those who count themselves as belonging to the center more rarely have firm political convictions (to 35 percent), which they advocate vis-a-vis others, than those who classify themselves as left (to 62 percent) or as right (43 percent)--at least those are the figures from Allensbach. They also participate much less politically in a party, a club or association (2 percent) than the left radicals (12 percent) or the right radicals (9 percent).



The consequence of this is that many deputies of the people's parties no longer even belong to the center. They cause trouble and irritation for the party establishments which represent the center and compete for the mass of voters in the center. The difficulty thus consists less in the fact that too few citizens participate actively (if there were too many, there would be a chaotic rush). The problem is that the center remains inactive.

The second important reason for political inactivity is a paralyzing feeling of helplessness. Typically German and, therefore, appropriate from the standpoint of public opinion research is the question posed by Allensbach: "Do you have the feeling that as a citizen you have an influence on the decisions of the Federal Government, or are you powerless there?" Only eight percent state expressly that the influence of the citizen on the government is large enough. Objectively and politically this question, of course, is posed incorrectly; for in a representative democracy not every voter can sit in the cabinet and influence the federal chancellor. What should be asked is the question whether the citizen elsewhere finds a field for his energy. Fifteen years ago, the comparative study stated that, in spite of a formally well functioning democracy and a sufficient supply of "political infrastructure," there was hardly any chance for stronger political participation. Political participation in the meantime, however, has increased somewhat, although the infrastructure leaves more and more to be desired. It has become so bad because the security-conscious and equality-conscious citizens turned over more and more responsibility to the rule-hungry state. So we have, for example, a social state, and that is a good thing. But proliferating public welfare paralyzes the self-maintenance will and reduces private helpfulness. The dampening of private initiative is the arch-evil of our society. Instead "they" are organizing ever larger circles, ever larger administrations, larger courts, larger retirement homes, larger hospitals, larger schools, larger universities--and this constantly creates more distance to the citizens, constantly more anonymous, action-obstructing state presence.

Take the schools for example. With few exceptions, they are state-run in our country. The Laender, moreover, assign the teachers, and they also determine the lines of instruction, sometimes in detail. In Switzerland, by contrast, the voting citizens or other election bodies elect the teachers, the judges, by the way, too. That would be possible only in a small country? No. In London, too, every school has an authoritative body consisting of teachers and parents, which elects the teachers and Michael Ward, the London departmental expert for schools, who must confirm the employment of the teachers, says that this divided responsibility works very well. In Germany only the few private schools select their own teachers; they can even dismiss them. Their number should be strongly increased with financial support of the state, for private schools, after all, can be flexible in shaping the content of instruction. Instead, private schools are hindered or even prevented--and not only in Bremen.

## DKP AND 'NEW LEFT' LOSE POWER, ENGAGE IN INTERNAL FIGHTS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 5 Jan 80 p 8

[Article by Dieter Wenz: "The DKP Faces 'Liquidation'"]

[Text] The larger and smaller groups which, following the student unrest of the late 1960s and early 1970s had crystallized into the extreme left in West Germany, are in a whirlpool of decline. What had started so ambitiously, full of self-confidence and ideological radicalism, meant to be elitist, is today in the process of an internal and by now in part also an external disintegration. The decline of political organizations to the left of the SPD, which were rejected as too "reformist" and outside of the Moscow-loyal DKP, whose organizational and dogmatic rigidity had little attraction, goes hand in hand with what some of these groupings call "crisis of Marxism-Leninism" in West Germany; and they are talking about it elsewhere in Europe also. The decline of the "Marxist-Leninist movement" coincides with the rise of the Green, the Multicolored, and the "Alternatives." Even those affected acknowledge such a relationship.

## Contradictory and Confused

No political scenario in West Germany appears as contradictory and confused as that of the K groups. But the central organs' reading material and the relevant party literature can provide enlightenment: the DKP, after the student rebellion formed out of the DKP/AO (AO = construction organization) under the leadership of former SDS functionary Horlemann, today led by Christian Semler, also a well-known member of the German Socialist Students Association and until recently still staunchly Peking-oriented, stands before its decisive congress, the third party congress.

At present DIE ACHTZIGER JAHRE, central organ of the competition, the "Marxist-Leninists of Germany", are taking a position on it: "The DKP is faced with organizational self-dissolution." This is supposedly the result of "the political-ideological erosion," which has been spreading there for close to a year. The "liquidators" are the DKP's (Staus) politbureau's permanent committee and the editorial office of "ROTE FAHNE"

(RF), the party's central organ, which, so it is said, is striving for the transfer of the DKP to the "left-reformist camp." As proof are mentioned the most recent statements by the leading DKP cadres which are tantamount to a "refutation of scientific socialism and of the workers' movement." The "severance from the dictatorship of the proletariat" has already taken place and "instead of the working class, the intelligentsia and the petty bourgeoisie have been declared the progressive class." That is why now the "struggle against the liquidator-group" must be carried out "offensively and relentlessly."

The DKP does not deny that it is in the midst of an existence-crisis. The latest editions of the party paper RF hardly leave any doubt. At present, the DKP central organ lets virtually anyone who has something sufficiently critical to say about the party situation express his views in its columns. Thus, the party paper vendor R.B. is allowed to disclose: "In Dortmund, not a single issue of RF is currently sold individually to the public." The paper which gives the number of subscribers as 3,000, admits in several of its pages that it finds itself financially in a disastrous situation. In a letter to the editor by a certain Heiner Karuscheit it says: "What the DKP is practicing today cannot even be criticized as right-wing opportunism. For where does one draw the line whence one deviates to the right, when instability itself has become the line?"

The opinions most recently expressed by the party leadership and the party organ sound like a single howling and grinding of teeth. "The certainty of a world-wide revolutionary connection of workers' movement, national liberation movement, and socialist countries has vanished," the permanent committee says in a whole-page declaration "to the convocation of the third party congress." The result of the actual socialism in East Europe, the rape of peoples in the name of Marxism-Leninism ... all this induces in large parts of the revolutionary left, of which we are a part, only a limited readiness for a thorough discussion which would address itself fearlessly to historic realities," writes the DKP leadership, and it reaches the conclusion: "Not much has remained of the hopes for an uprising; almost all the organizations of the "New Left" which originated then (1968) witness today the failure of their early beginnings and proposed solutions: In spite of some cracks, capitalism has remained relatively stable in West Germany... The hope for revolutionary convulsions in Germany has not materialized; in our developed capitalist society, Marxism ... has remained without any influence worth mentioning; the left in West Germany is fragmented."

The decisive point in the new guidelines: "We are in favor of rapprochement of the workers' movement, which has been influenced by the left wing of Social Democrats, with the progressive forces of the Green-Multicolored movement and Marxists and communists."

The spokesmen of the RF comment further: "We must make clear publicly that we also start out from an assumption of a 'crisis of Marxism' and from the fact that the revolutionary movement does not have the actual development and perspectives under control." This as well as the problem of turning to ecologists and socialists "must be part of the clarification process before and after the party conference."

#### Always New Directions

To various groups of the dogmatic left, most of whom still see themselves in steadfast perseverance, as in a sort of exile, this seems uncanny. They refuse to recognize objective reasons for the DKP's difficulties. The charges against the DKP leadership are: reformism, subjectivism, opportunism. They are the worst that can be dished out by the extreme left. The MLD accuse Semler, Jasper, Steinhauer and vol Plato, the "gentlemen" who also otherwise are time and again named as responsible for the new course, of conscious destruction of the DKP. It is to be robbed of the principles it has adhered to up to now so that then, thoroughly softened, it can be led to the "petty bourgeois left." This camp appears to be gaining even more weight in the discussions. The "Marxist-Leninist movement" finds itself in danger of breaking apart.

No grouping of the left has in a few years changed its political direction as often and as radically as the DKP. The party, founded in 1970, with headquarters in Cologne, had no objection to being classified as "Maoist." After Mao's death, it followed the Hua Kuo-Feng line, contrary to the DKP/ML (Aust-Schubert group), which leaned more towards the Albanian model. Today--under the leadership of Semler, who succeeded Horlacher in 1977 at the second party congress--they are again talking about "contradictions" in China's "socialist construction."

From the outset, Moscow was labeled with the anathema "social imperialists," whose reach for world domination has to be resisted just as its "fifth column" in West Germany, the DKP, has to be fought against. The "danger of war" through the "conquerors and occupiers" in the Kremlin "has not materialized." Now they object rather mildly to an "orientation" of the KB [Communist League] towards the DKP.

At its first party congress in 1974, the DKP called for the forceful overthrow of the "bourgeois state machinery" in West Germany, and the anti-labor union RGO groups (revolutionary union opposition) were formed. At the Offenbach party congress (1977), (tactically opportune) "cooperation" in the labor unions was recommended which now at the third party congress was to be bestowed the highest praise. While in 1978, Semler still called proudly for the "dictatorship of the proletariat", it is true today that the DKP has "no support" in this "proletariat," in the working class.

Many in the K-group environment talk about the DKP not surviving the third party congress in the spring; although hardly any of them belong to it.



## JUERGENS: LOWER SAXONY FDP MUST MEET GREEN CHALLENGE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Jan 80 p 6

[Article by TGN: "Whoever Votes Green Will Reap Black"]

[Text] Hannover, 1 January. The FDP of Lower Saxony, which is not represented in the Landtag, in the opinion of its chairman, Juergens, must become more combative if it is going to have success with the voters during the 1980 Bundestag election year. He expects of all 9,000 party members "a heretofore unknown involvement," according to a letter written at the end of the year. The new year will be one of "most severe testing for political liberalism" in the FRG.

On the offensive, according to Juergens, the FDP must and the liberals in the Bundestag election must come to terms above all with two opponents: Strauss' CDU/CSU and with the "Green element." The liberal "trauma" of a government led by Strauss can only be prevented by the continuation of the SPD-FDP coalition in Bonn. From this point of view the FDP of Lower Saxony has the assignment to declare the planned candidacy of the CDU federal treasurer and finance minister of Lower Saxony, Kiep, at the top of the list on the CDU slate to be that which in reality it is: "window dressing" which should serve to keep the CDU electable in moderate circles "in spite of Strauss." The FDP of Lower Saxony will inquire again and again as to where Kiep, who had been "marketed as liberal" by the CDU, raised his voice when Strauss announced his "reactionary" school policy or when Minister President Albrecht went it alone in calling for a "destruction" of the public broadcasting system. It can, of course, be that Kiep spoke out against these things in the quiet of his own room, but no public criticism by him is known.

Just as its party will make clear that in 1980 not Kiep but only Strauss is a candidate for election proposed by the CDU, the FDP also wants to warn of the danger that Strauss could be heaved into the chancellor's seat by the "Green element." It does not matter whether it is a question of "Greens" of the environmental variety or of socialist inclination--they who could decimate the FDP's voter potential may expect no quarter from the FDP in the election campaign. He, Juergens, is convinced that whoever votes "Green" will reap "black."



With this observation Juergens followed the view of the FDP national leadership that the strategy of the CDU chancellor candidate must be to eliminate the "liberals," and that the voter potential attainable by the FDP will be heavily circumscribed by the "Greens." His hope for the FDP of Lower Saxony is that its relatively weak political position after a showing of 5.3 percent during the Europe elections can be improved upon by at least 1 percent during the Bundestag elections. He is convinced that this is the best way to remove the danger of again falling short of the 5 percent hurdle in the 1982 elections for the Landtag.

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## LOWER SAXONY SPD CONFIDENT OF 1980 ELECTION GAINS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Jan 80 p 6

[Article by TGN: "SPD of Lower Saxony Is Optimistic"]

[Text] Hannover, 1 January. The SPD of Lower Saxony, according to its chairman, the leader of the opposition Ravens, is passing under a favorable sign on its path toward the 1980 election year for the Bundestag. Ravens said in Hannover that its principal goal is to become the party with the most votes; with the establishment of a unified regional organization in November, which should allow one to expect increased political clout, the party has accomplished an important administrative prerequisite.

Ravens sharply criticized Minister President Albrecht, with whom he as principal candidate of his party wants to contest the office of chief of state in the Landtag elections of 1982. The self-aggrandizing way, according to Ravens, in which Albrecht pursued his broadcasting plans is only one example of the "rigorous exercise of power," which characterized the work of the one-party CDU government since last year. It is not the policy of Albrecht's government to harmonize the various interests of society. In accordance with his conservative view of government the prime minister is concerned with putting through an absolutely pure CDU policy. The announcement during the establishment of the government to maintain the previous course developed with the FDP has in the final analysis proven to be "empty speech."

The change of direction, according to Ravens, is evident not only in the intended "destruction" of the NDR [North German Broadcasting], but also in the plan to break up the metropolitan Hannover district, in the withdrawal of the state from the German Society for Peace and Conflict Research and in a substantial change in the law on schools which had at one time been commonly created by the SPD and the FDP. Relative to policy on broadcasting Ravens assured that the SPD will also fight in 1980 to see that the NDR remains a three-state operation and that public

broadcasting, which belongs to everyone, remains intact. He, Ravens, has not given up hope that the chiefs of state of Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg with regard to the NDR will return to the negotiating table and, in fact, without preconditions, rather with the genuine desire to reach an agreement.

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## BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG GREEN PARTY EXPECTS GAINS IN LAND VOTE

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 7 Jan 80 pp 22-23

[Article: "Black Harvest"]

[Text] Party leaders in Bonn and in Stuttgart firmly expect a fourth party--the Greens--to be represented in the Baden-Wuerttemberg Landtag following the upcoming elections. The FDP above all stands to lose votes.

Joerg Zink, 57, a Stuttgart priest, is the Wuerttemberg Evangelical Church's media expert; but that isn't the whole story. Sometimes Zink delivers the television sermon "A Word for Sunday," and now and then he appears on "Akzente," a religious television program.

As a nature pundit, Zink is given to preaching (if the world goes barren, man goes barren along with it) and he is almost constantly at work on some television film; he speaks at Evangelical and--what is a good deal less common--at Catholic gatherings and it stands to reason that someone like Zink is a prolific author of books, 40 so far, with a combined circulation of 6 million.

And now Joerg Zink, who is known as "our TV priest" among the Swabians, wishes to "show the flag" once again--this time as the spokesman and program coordinator of the "Greens" in Baden-Wuerttemberg. The ecology party "couldn't find a better man," as the SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG noted respectfully.

Without even counting the Zink factor, the Greens have gained more of a following in the CDU-governed southwest state than in any other Land. The Greens' charter expressly forbids double membership in another political party as well as the admission of members of "parties and/or organizations of the extreme left or right." They have thus far neither engaged in personal disputes nor in disputes about party goals and, when

they convene in Karlsruhe next weekend at their countrywide delegates' conference, they will be presenting themselves as a tightly knit organization, unlike most other ecological groups throughout the FRG.

Like the established political parties, they have formed an organization in every one of Baden-Wuerttemberg's 43 districts. And Green candidates will be on the ballot in all 70 election districts on 16 March. The party presidiums in Bonn and in Stuttgart are therefore saying that it is an almost foregone conclusion that the ecologists will be represented in the parliament of a large-area Land for the first time ever.

In the European Parliament election on 10 June of last year the Greens in the Southwest got 4.5 percent of the vote and in Stuttgart proper 4.9 percent. Last October, they put up candidates in just a few of the districts in which elections were held, but all of these can be considered representative samples, since they included both rural communities, well-to-do medium-sized towns and university as well as industrial cities. The Greens promptly made off with a total of 16 seats in six district legislatures.

The latest polls, commissioned by the major parties and conducted by "Infra-test" and "Infas," place average Green strength in the Land at 5.6 to 7 percent--which represents a high risk for the Free Democrats, who got 7.8 percent of the vote 4 years ago. For the SPD which has been in the opposition since 1972 it represents a handicap. The CDU would appear to be least affected; its 56.7 percent absolute majority can tolerate a bit of a loss in strength. CDU Land chairman Lothar Spaeth wants nothing to do "with those who now seek election as Greens, who have no responsibilities to bear, but live by rejection of the status quo." Nonetheless, the minister president is cautioning the voters by considering the possibility of a coalition "mixture composed of Erhard Eppler, the SPD, the FDP and the Greens."

This must sound downright cynical to the Liberals. An analysis of the European Election results for Stuttgart proved that the Greens drew on the very same reservoir as the Free Democrats for a sizable part of their vote: the 18 to 20 year-olds, high school graduates and college students, medium-level and senior white collar workers and civil servants, self-employed tradesmen and academics. A worried Juergen Morlok, the FDP Land chairman, has been telling the voters: "Those who vote green will reap a harvest of black."

But Erhard Eppler, the SPD chairman, still sounds confident. There is no reason for the Social Democrats to fear the Greens, he says, because of the "many green issues" the party itself has raised.

But many a party member now feels that it was backyard gardener Eppler himself who started it all by raising a hue and cry about threats to the ecology. Among the chancellor's entourage, for instance, they are saying



that Eppler went up and down the country peddling the ecology issue like an irresistibly delicious roast, whetting people's appetite; the only trouble is they will now be sitting down at the Greens' table to eat it.

Wolf-Dieter Hasenclever, 34, chairman of the Baden-Wuerttemberg Greens, is more subdued than the established parties in pleading the Green cause. As a matter of fact, he is full of compassion. "Much as I regret to say it," he says, a "trickle" of votes, particularly from the Free Democrats, is to be expected.

Hasenclever, a professor of physics and mathematics at the Tuebingen high school, headed the Land Social Democratic University Students Association in the late sixties and later was SPD chairman in a small rural community close to Tuebingen. Because of SPD "softness," as he sees it, he left the party in 1977 to join the Action Community of Independent Germans (AUD), which he subsequently led into the Green coalition.

Hasenclever, a Protestant, is trying to appeal to the educated classes above all with his brand of "ecological humanism and, in building up his party, he has set his sights on achievers, local matadors as respectable as can be--in short, men like Pastor Zink. Hasenclever's deputy on the presidium is Dr. Gisela von Canal, an agronomist and physical therapist of some renown, and the Stuttgart county chairman is Erwin Schueller, a German philologist and teacher at a local gymnasium.

The county chairman for Loerrach is Dieter Nestle, a professor of theology and ecologist, respected in this border region; and elsewhere there are physicians and lawyers, farmers and architects representing the Greens.

In the Land capital, the physicist Joerg Bracher and the former unionist Willi Hoss, a member of the Daimler-Benz shop committee, will be candidates on 16 March. Hoss was dropped from the Metal Workers Union in 1972 for putting up an electoral slate of his own, independent of the union. But it was the union that suffered. At the last shop stewards election at the Mercedes Works in Untertuerkheim the Hoss slate picked up almost 40 percent of the vote. Now, the rebel is supposed to find some votes among the workers, whom the Greens have not yet been able to reach too well.

There is no shortage of helpmates for the Greens--they have Hoss, the proletarian, on one end of the spectrum and Pastor Zink on the other. And, although they are really just starting, they can't complain about a lack of funds, either. They had an election budget even before the contributions began to come in. To run the European election campaign, the southwest German Greens received tax monies totaling DM 600,000 of which a half million is still left.

## LAMBSDORFF, SAUDIS SIGN TECHNICAL, SCIENTIFIC AGREEMENT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 9 Jan 80 p 11

[Article by K.B.: "Cooperation With Saudi Arabia Progressing"]

[Text] Riad, 8 January. The cooperation between Germany and Saudi Arabia is becoming more promising. After establishing this fact, Federal Economics Minister Lambsdorff and Saudi Arabian Economics and Finance Minister Aba al Kahil just finished their fourth session of the mutual economic commission. Lambsdorff said: "Something is happening here. Something is going on." Since the third session of the mixed economic commission, composed of government representatives and businessmen, about a year ago in Bonn, considerable progress has been achieved.

The technical and scientific agreement signed by Lambsdorff on Tuesday is to be implemented as soon as possible. Research projects are already beginning on desalinating sea water and irrigating agricultural land with waste water.

The Saudi Arabian Finance Ministry has signed an agreement stipulating that German experts will be sent to the Ministry of Planning in Riad as well as to other ministries and institutions. This agreement was signed at the conclusion of the commission meeting with the Organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), one of the development institutions of the country.

On Wednesday Lambsdorff flew from Riad to Kuwait and then on to the United Arab Emirates in order to continue his talks there concerning the tense international situation and world economic developments in view of the increased oil prices and political crises.

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CSO: 3103

## BRIEFS

BOURGEOIS ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP PROTESTS--Karlsruhe, 1 January (Reuter). The BBU [National Organization of Citizen Initiative for Environmental Protection] has protested against the deep drilling operation which begins this week to gain information on the suitability of the salt stock in Gorleben as an atomic waste storage area. BBU Chairman Schuhmacher said Tuesday in Karlsruhe that the deep drilling operations planned by the German Organization for the Reuse of Nuclear Fuels and the surface drilling, which is already in progress, constitute a provocation to all nuclear opponents. By allowing the drilling the federal government and the state government of Lower Saxony are pushing aside the desires of many citizens and the affected property owners--"and doing this with security measures, which remind one of past, evil times and bring the vision of the atomic state into terrifying proximity". Schumacher appealed to all environmentalists and to youth "to resist actively and through involvement the will of those who currently have political responsibility". He warned of a "completely false estimation of the ecological movement, which as a new political power will participate in the formation of the 1980's--particularly if it is distinguished by determination and solidarity. [Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Jan 80 p 6] 9485

GREENS RENOUNCE VIOLENT PROTEST--Kiel, 30 December. The Greens of Schleswig-Holstein have distanced themselves from the violence of a demonstration against the construction of a nuclear plant in Brokdorf on the lower Elbe. That demonstration was made in protest to the judgment rendered by the administrative court of Schleswig which declared the initial partial construction permit for Brokdorf to be valid. At the "Greens" of Schleswig-Holstein explain, they are in solidarity with the protest of the petitioners against the judgment: "Green" members, however, only took part in the demonstration during its "orderly and peaceful segment." The violence was started by outsiders. Such actions are "simply unrealistic," as the state protects "industrial interests with 10 times the force needed." Only forms of resistance which are free of violence are suitable to establish ecologically oriented policy; such is also the participation of the Greens in elections. In mid-January national solidarity of "Greens" should be achieved. [Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 31 Dec 79 p 1] 9485

MORE TRAVEL TO GDR--Bonn, 30 December (dpa). In the coming year as a result of improvements in inter-German travel, negotiated with the GDR, the federal government expects again an increasing number of GDR visitors from the FRG. 3.5 to 3.6 million such trips are expected for the current year. Thereby, at least, the previous year's results of 3.6 million visitors would be attained, among which there were 480,000 travelers for the immediate border areas. Additionally, the 1.2 million inhabitants of five districts near the border (Hannover, Soltau-Fallingb., Holzminden, Marburg, Main-Kinzig) can avail themselves of the possibility of border region trips in accordance with the recent agreements with the GDR, so that now 7.2 million inhabitants of the FRG are entitled to make day trips to border districts of the GDR during 30 days of the year. The consolidation of charges for use of the roads by cars, agreed upon in October with the GDR, also makes things easier. [Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 31 Dec 79 p 3] 9485

SPD RIGHTIST TREND OBSERVED--A rightist trend was observed at the Berlin elections of the SPD Executive Board, and now the Presidium elections have clearly confirmed that trend. Next to the born SPD members Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Wischniewski, Wehner and Bahr, the most votes were achieved by the candidates of the center right. With regard to its government responsibility the SPD has found stronger and stronger footing on conservative terrain, a development that has been supported by such a strong chancellor figure as Helmut Schmidt. The party has and has had to adapt in many respects to the chancellor, although the bitter term "chancellor's association" rather reflects the trend than accomplished facts. The forces that want to bring about changes are still alive. [Text] [DW300908 Frankfurt Hessischer Rundfunk Network in German 1800 GMT 28 Jan 80 DW] 1

FRG-GDR VETERINARY PACT--Berlin, 21 December (REUTER)--The FRG and the GDR agreed to cooperate in veterinary affairs in an agreement signed on Friday in East Berlin. The agreement, which was negotiated in approximately 2 years, among other things provides for mutual information concerning animal diseases and direct contacts for the purpose of preventing epidemics. In emergency cases, the veterinary service stations on the borders are to make direct contact. As in the case of earlier agreements, West Berlin has been included in the agreement. The director of the Permanent Representation of the FRG in East Berlin, State Secretary Gaus, during the signing pointed out the economic advantage of the veterinary pact, even though no spectacular step is involved. [Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Dec 79 p 1] 8970

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## KEKKONEN IN YEAR END SPEECH SEES DARK SIGNS IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Jan 80 p 10

[Text] President Urho Kekkonen described the current world political situation in gloomy terms in his traditional New Year's address carried on radio and television Tuesday. HELSINGIN SANOMAT here presents the president's address in its entirety:

This is a time when it is the custom to examine how the year just past has met our expectations and what hopes we have of the new year and the new decade.

If we think back to the mood of the early 1970's, it is easy to remember how widespread was the belief that economic growth would continue and that general prosperity would increase.

In international politics also, there was a characteristic feeling of trust. Relations between countries were built on a basis of consideration for even opposing viewpoints and a striving for mutual understanding. We could sit around the negotiation table with real intent and ready for productive work. The nuclear limitation agreement was signed and the SALT negotiations begun in Helsinki constituted the first really serious attempt since World War II to limit the proliferation of the most dangerous weapons systems.

The way was cleared for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and at mid-decade the highest political authorities of the participating nations signed a resolution in Helsinki which established a framework for strengthening security and cooperation in Europe. The way seemed to be open for a peaceful solution of the serious problems which threatened international security.

#### Middle East War A Turning Point

However, this auspicious beginning was followed by a distressing period. The Middle East war began a chain of events, the end of which is still not in sight. A technologically advanced world was startled to discover how



dependent it was on oil. In addition, the energy crisis revealed dramatically that confidence in mechanisms stabilizing the world economy had declined. The system created three decades ago does not seem to work any more, and we have not been able to come up with a better alternative.

Along with the economic repercussions, the political climate also cooled off. Detente slowed down, and the first CSCE assembly failed to come up to expectations. The arms race has accelerated furiously during the second half of the 1970's, and the show of force is replacing tact, objectivity, and restraint as a trademark of international relations.

There has been a particularly disturbing development in Europe, where detente originated. We Finns have stressed on many occasions that there are too many weapons on our continent, especially nuclear weapons. Getting involved in the arms race at this point would be most unfortunate, since all parties have expressed their basic willingness to negotiate all their differences. We must act quickly, because the chasm of distrust deepens with every passing week.

I have been describing the world political situation in very gloomy terms. I do not do this to increase pessimism, but rather in an effort to demonstrate the seriousness of the problems at hand.

#### Finland's Standing Is Sound

Finland's international standing remains sound and stable. The basis of our foreign policy has proven to be correct through both the cold war and detente. I believe that this foundation will also endure future developments. The situation is stable and peaceful elsewhere in northern Europe. It should be pointed out, however, that the preservation of northern Europe as a refuge for peaceful and harmonious politics is not self-evident. It must be worked on constantly and requires the cooperative effort of all the countries in the region. In the light of recent developments, it has become even more important that northern Europe be kept free of nuclear weapons.

#### Compliments On Economic Progress

Many difficulties notwithstanding, the decade just ending was kind to us in our internal affairs. Our common troubles have gotten the political parties, the interest groups and the citizenry to look at cold, hard facts and to learn from them. We have been reasonably successful in adjusting to changing circumstances and in responding to new challenges.

During the past year, our economic situation has been much better than was forecast. Even at Midsummer it did not seem possible to achieve more than a 5 percent increase in total production. But in the fall, the draft budget for the coming year spoke of 7 percent. In the light of year-end progress, even this estimate seems more cautious than optimistic. New

export records have been established. Inflation has been kept under the world average. Considering our situation, we have done reasonably well in the currency markets, which has encouraged economic growth and enterprise. Industrial production, which usually serves as a precursor of economic growth, has experienced an excellent rate of growth. However, we will not know how accurate the forecasts were until we receive a full year-end report.

### Only One Way To Prosperity

In addition to this optimistic picture, there are also some causes for pessimism. When we examine closely the prospects ahead, I am deeply concerned. I refer to the increasing difficulty of obtaining energy, high unemployment, and environmental protection. Extensive unemployment has made people suspicious about the state's ability to guarantee its citizens the means to earn a decent living.

No one has come up with a panacea for eliminating this curse, but we cannot let up. We must be able to eliminate or at least substantially reduce unemployment. Otherwise it is impossible for us to build a just and balanced society.

There may be only one way to guarantee our prosperity: that is by continually raising the level of our knowledge and skill. Therefore, we must reevaluate the contribution required of us in research and development. In 1978 we devoted only 1 percent of our national product to this area while our neighbor, Sweden, spent 7 billion marks compared to Finland's 1.3 billion marks. If we compare ourselves to other industrial nations, we find even greater margins.

### More Support For Research

I have followed with great interest the discussion of last fall on increased support for scientific research. While I feel that both basic research and applied research are equally significant, I wish to stress here the importance of research which increases our ability to compete internationally.

The government must use every means available to it to support the activities of the National Technical Research Center and the technical universities. In addition, it would be appropriate to determine if it is necessary to establish additional research units. If there is a need, we must act without delay. At the same time, I would assume that industry is prepared to invest additional capital as well as human resources to step up applied research.

My friends, Finland is the fatherland of all of us. Despite its small size and its limited resources, its spiritual and material achievements have lifted it to the front ranks of the nations of the world. This has been

made possible only by the cooperative effort of all of us. The quality of life in Finland during the coming decade depends on both external conditions and on us. I hope that each of us is willing to work toward these objectives, which, with effort, are within our reach.

I wish each citizen a good and happy and secure New Year.

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## FOREIGN MINISTER VAYRYNEN: EUROPE MUST RETURN TO DETENTE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Jan 80 p 10

[Text] According to Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen (Center Party), efforts in behalf of detente and disarmament must be stepped up during the coming year so that the course of world events might be turned to a positive direction.

In a statement given to Soviet news agencies TASS and APN, Foreign Minister Vayrynen emphasized that a speedy enactment of SALT II would improve the chances for negotiation. From Finland's point of view, it is particularly important that Europe move back towards detente.

Foreign Minister Vayrynen stressed that careful preparations should be made in all CSCE member nations for the next assembly in Madrid at year end and should work towards making it a step forward for detente. Progress must be made in European disarmament and inspection negotiations. The negotiations must involve the whole continent and all weapons systems, said Vayrynen.

Vayrynen hoped that the proposal of the Finnish government for a separate European disarmament plan would facilitate speeding up and streamlining the negotiations.

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## POLL SHOWS ONLY 16 PERCENT FAVOR MORE SOCIALISM

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Dec 79 p 7

[Text] Only 16 percent of all Finns of voting age are in favor of making the country more socialistic. More than twice as many, 34 percent, were in favor of moving towards capitalism. Nearly half of the country, or 45 percent, approve of the existing hybrid economic system.

The number of those in favor of more socialism has not increased much during the year; support for socialism appears to have declined by 2 percent compared to a poll taken a year ago.

## Current System Gains Approval

Gallup of Finland, Inc., conducted a poll for HELSINGIN SANOMAT on Finnish attitudes regarding the direction of social progress. The question was exactly the same as in a similar poll conducted in late 1978. The question was concerned only with economic systems: "Finland's present economic system is often called a "mixed economic system," in which the state partially regulates economic activity. How do you feel that conditions should be changed in the future: in a more socialistic direction, in which the influence of government would increase; more towards a market economy, in which the influence of government would decrease; or do you approve of the current situation in this regard?"

Approval of "the current situation" increased over last year among supporters of all four major parties (see graph). It was not a great change, but a very clear trend, according to Gallup of Finland.

A majority (61 percent) of Center Party followers approve of the current situation. One third hoped for movement towards a market economy.

Among Conservative Party supporters, the situation is reversed: a majority hope for progress towards a market economy while over one-third approve of the present situation.



Among Social Democrats, 47 percent like the way things are now, 29 percent would like to see more socialism, and 20 percent would like to move to a free market.

The biggest change was among People's Democrats. Last year, 62 percent hoped to see more socialism; this year, only 54 percent want a more socialist Finland. The present system is preferred by 31 percent, while 10 percent want to see more capitalism.

The poll was conducted by Gallup/Finland during November and December, 1979. The sample interviewed is highly representative of the voting population at large. A total of 135 pollsters interviewed 1,550 people from 108 different areas.

In the two-stage sample construction, the population was first divided according to the number of those 18 and up in each province, then into five different levels of industrialization. The municipalities included in the sample were chosen by Deming's zone selection. Those interviewed were selected by address, sex and age.

#### HOW SHOULD CONDITIONS IN OUR COUNTRY BE CHANGED IN THE FUTURE?

	Center Party		Conservative Party		Social Democrats		People's Democrats		Nationwide	
	1978	1979	1978	1979	1978	1979	1978	1979	1978	1979
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
More socialism	5	5	1	2	31	29	62	54	18	16
More capitalism	37	32	62	58	19	20	7	10	34	34
Status quo	54	61	34	38	43	47	24	31	42	45
Undecided	4	1	3	2	7	4	7	5	6	5

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## FINNISH ORTHODOX CHURCH MOVE TOWARD MOSCOW HAS POLITICAL IMPORT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 9 Jan 80 p 3

[Article by Karl-Alfred Odin: "Moscow's Claim to Leadership of the Orthodox Groups"]

[Text] Finland's Orthodox Archbishop has challenged the honorary chair of the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople on the question of orthodoxy. Up to now, the autonomous Finnish minority Church (80,000 members) has been under the jurisdiction of the ecumenical patriarch. The Evangelical press service reported that in a magazine article Finnish Archbishop Paul has asked Patriarch Demetrios of Constantinople to renounce his honorary supremacy over orthodoxy.

Since the end of World War II, the Moscow Patriarchy has been trying to renew the Russian protectorate which the Russian rulers enjoyed over orthodoxy until the assassination of the last Czar. This attempt to gain precedence has brought the patriarch in Moscow into conflict with the ecumenical patriarch.

There are between 150 and 200 million Orthodox Christians. The exact number is now known because there is uncertainty about the number of members in the Russian church. After World War I, the emigrant churches from the former Czarist empire largely subjected themselves to the supremacy of Constantinople. Since then the Russian patriarchy has succeeded in regaining a few of these churches, primarily in France and the United States.

From a legal point of view, the position of the Orthodox churches is complicated. There are autonomous churches. They are completely independent. They are only tied to the pan-Orthodox Council, which has not met for centuries. The ecumenical patriarch, as the successor of the eastern Roman emperor, is the honorary head among the leaders of the autonomous churches. Even during the Council of Constantinople in 381, the Byzantine bishop was directly below the Roman bishop and above the patriarchs from

Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem in rank. In subsequent centuries they became the leading bishops in the East after the old Christian areas fell to the Arabs.

Some of the Orthodox churches are autonomous but are under the jurisdiction of either Constantinople or Moscow. To some extent, jurisdiction is disputed. The tensions between Constantinople and Moscow are old. They can be explained by Moscow's notion of itself as the third Rome, bringing great fortune to all of mankind: according to this myth, the first Rome fell because it arbitrarily changed dogma and introduced unleavened bread onto the dinner table; the second Rome, Constantinople, fell after the Turks captured it in 1453 because it betrayed true faith (Orthodoxy) at the Union Council with Rome (1438/1439); the third Rome, Moscow, therefore, maintained true faith in its pure form, sometimes by force, and closed itself off from the West.

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the ecumenical patriarchy contributed to the revival of the eastern Churches: it brought the Orthodox groups and the other dispersed eastern Churches together; it paved the way for the objective of a total orthodox synod; it belonged to the founders of the Ecumenical Council; it promoted the idea of reconciliation with Latin Christianity, the Roman Catholic Church.

The conflict brought about by Moscow's claim to leadership became visible primarily on the question of who was supposed to negotiate with Rome. The more intense the plight of Christians in Turkey became as a result of the Cyprus conflict and renewed Islamization there, the more arduous became the conflicts with the Moscow patriarchy. Patriarch Athenagoras, an energetic, charismatic Church leader, held off the Russian attempts. He even refused the invitation of Russian Metropolit Nikodim to go into exile in the Soviet Union if the patriarchy is driven out of Istanbul. At the time, hope was still placed on an invitation from de Gaulle to the patriarch from Constantinople. Athenagoras' successor, Demetrios, is a weaker man.

The fact that the Finnish archbishop is now asking the patriarch from Constantinople to renounce his honorary rank indicates support for the Russian claim for leading the orthodox Christians. This is not only of religious but also political importance.

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CSO: 3103

## DEFENSE POLICY SCHOLAR URGES RETURN TO EMPHASIS ON GUERRILLA TACTICS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Dec 79 p 2

[Article by Jussi Raumolin]

[Text] What challenges do world developments present to Finnish defense policy? That is a very appropriate question at this time, when the third parliamentary committee on defense has just been appointed. Jussi Raumolin, who holds a degree in political science, here gives some advice of his own to the defense committee in this examination of Finnish defense policy.

While serving his military duty, Raumolin worked as a researcher with the National Defense Information planning commission in the defense ministry. Currently, he is working on an international project considering development options, in connection with which he is writing on problems in Finnish economic development.

A defense revision committee established after the war based its 1949 report on the all-encompassing nature of modern war as experienced in World War II: war extends its influence throughout society and the civilian population is increasingly subject to the effects of war. In national defense planning, the challenges of modern war had to be considered.

Following the establishment of the defense council, Finland undertook a comprehensive reorganization of the national defense in such areas as citizen defense, economic defense, civil defense, administrative defense and defense of the national spirit.

Security-political doctrine gave foreign policy absolute priority over defense policy. A growing national economy did not seem to come up with more than minimal funds for the various national defense efforts, even though the Finnish economy and society became more and more vulnerable to international crises.

## A New Tactic

The superpowers raced to build nuclear strike forces and the ability of a small nation to defend itself began to appear negligible. Also, conventional weapons technology, such as military aircraft and tanks, advanced rapidly and unit prices of weapons climbed at a dizzying pace.

When it became apparent that Finland could not keep up with advancements in arms technology and since appropriations for national military defense were so skimpy, the defense establishment adopted a regional defense organization in the late 1960's. The armed forces assumed that they could not stop an invasion at the borders by an aggressor employing conventional warfare and equipped with modern arms technology, but that the aggressor's stamina would have to be worn down gradually in regional defense combat taking advantage of the peculiarities of Finnish terrain. The adoption of a regional defense tactic meant that, should war occur, battles would be fought deep within Finnish territory, including the concept of guerrilla-type battles against an invader.

Early in the 1970's, the first parliamentary defense committee completed its report approving the military's new tactical defense plan. However, it did not deal with the substantial civilian defense problems raised by the new tactics. In the mid-1970's, the second parliamentary defense committee wrestled primarily, as its predecessor had, with problems of military materiel development, but problems brought on by the oil crisis diverted the committee's attention to deficiencies in crisis legislation.

## Flexible Defense

The Vietnam war and the 1973 Middle East war, the increasing cost of new weapons systems and continuing developments in weapons technology present new challenges to tactical defense. Swedish General Nils Skold stated in his 1974 essay "Varnplikt och Folkforsvar" (The Military and Citizen Defense), that Sweden could shift to a regional defense configuration in which even the local units would be equipped with effective weapons based on modern missile technology.

In 1976, Austrian General Emil Spannochi dealt with similar problems in his monograph entitled "Verteidigung ohne Selbstzerstörung" (Defense Without Self-destruction). Colonel Guy Brossolet of France wrote in his 1976 essay, "Essai sur la non-bataille" (The Theory of Avoidance of Battle), that the French military bureaucracy could be dispersed by creating a regional defense system based on highly mobile and effectively armed units which he called "modules."

Horst Afheldt, a scientist at the Max Planck Institute, in a 1976 work entitled "Verteidigung und Frieden, Politik mit militärischen Mitteln" (Defense and Security, Militarily Supported Politics), adapted the ideas of Spannochi and Brossolet to West Germany. He says that the West German army



should be based on "techno-commandoes" equipped with effective defense weapons. Such units would be difficult to destroy and could inflict great losses on an aggressor.

The objective of Brossolet and Afheldt is to search for a flexible tactical defense which could prevent the country from being taken over by an invader using conventional weapons and which would, at the same time, prevent the conflict from escalating into a disastrous nuclear war.

### Credibility

In the dialogue arising in Sweden over Skold's writings, it became apparent that going to regional defense would require that citizen defense programs such as civil defense and public information programs must be improved considerably. When Swedish economic and social vulnerability became apparent, Sweden began to emphasize the importance of citizen defense.

Even though Finland established its regional defense system clear back in the 1960's, Spannochi does not say a word about Finnish tactical defense. He uses Switzerland and Yugoslavia as examples. When General John Hackett of England discusses the third world war in his controversial book published last year, he describes Finland as an unobstructed transit zone with absolutely no defense forces. Is there something about Finland's current defense arrangement which tends to lower its credibility?

Skold, Spannochi, Afheldt and Brossolet all describe regional defense tactics based primarily on an effectively armed infantry. Arms technology has made expensive airplanes and tanks vulnerable to precise rockets.

### The Advantage Of Falling Behind

The Finnish infantry's arsenal consisting largely of assault rifles, grenade throwers and mine throwers, is too light and too slow-moving for modern warfare. If and when an adversary had an air advantage plus weapons capable of firing accurately from a distance and inflicting great damage, the Finnish infantry as it is presently equipped would suffer heavy losses.

To improve the Finnish infantry's combat capability and to raise the credibility of Finland's defense system, the infantry should be equipped with effective anti-tank and anti-aircraft rockets. It would be better to get such rockets than airplanes and tanks which are expensive and easily destroyed. As a matter of fact, there may be a certain advantage in having fallen behind, in that we have not and could not sacrifice massive resources in vulnerable tank and aircraft weaponry.

If it is to achieve credibility, Finland's tactical defense requires an efficient civil defense program. For example, if the civilian population were unable to get out of the battle zones because of a lack of shelters, what impact would that have on the army's fighting spirit?

## Finland's Dependence

Another question arises: What requirements does Finnish tactical defense policy place upon economic and social structures? Since Finland is so dependent on imported energy and upon exports, are we not subject to economic pressure? Reserves to cover a few months' consumption will not help much. If the population is concentrated in a few centers in southern Finland, how would regional defense work?

Those who oppose the development of Finland's defense preparedness often point out that, under the terms of the mutual friendship and assistance treaty, Finland would receive help from the Soviet Union in case of an emergency. From a purely military point of view, it would be to the Soviet Union's advantage to allow Finnish troops rather than Soviet troops to be expended in combat. If Soviet troops landed in Finland, that might be the factor which would draw Finland into the great, destructive vortex of a major war.

In such a situation, it would be very difficult for Sweden to maintain its neutrality; if Sweden were to become involved in the conflict, Finland's position and support would be endangered. If Finland were drawn into a war between the major powers, it would mean the total mobilization of Finnish resources for military purposes.

In case of conflict, the Baltic could be easily closed off to maritime traffic through the Straits of Denmark. Considering the Soviet Union's agricultural and industrial difficulties, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union could give generous economic aid to other countries in a military conflict. It is more likely that the Soviet Union would need economic aid itself.

As in the case of all highly developed industrial economies, Sweden's economy is highly vulnerable. Sweden's wealth would shrink rapidly in the event of an international economic decline.

It would be in the interest of every Finn that Finland is able to stay out of potential conflicts between the major powers. Finland's defense capability must be credible and economic defense preparation must be highly developed.

## Instructions For The Committee

The new parliamentary defense committee must finally deal with the overall requirements of a regional defense system. The problems of citizen defense must be outlined. In addition, we must determine what challenges recent developments in defensive missile technology impose upon our regional defense system.

In current talks on Western European tactical defense, the growing significance of combat helicopters in defense is being emphasized. Finland ought

to consider how much of a helicopter force ought to be acquired so that it would have a clear role in the regional defense system and in peacetime rescue work.

Civil defense experts have often commented that there are obvious deficiencies in our present state of readiness. In the construction of civil defense shelters, there has been no awareness that the civilian population could be caught in battle zones, and there are no shelters in rural areas. To eliminate the worst shelter shortages, we must consider using the unemployed in a shelter construction program and training draftees with health deficiencies and also national service draftees in civil defense jobs.

The defense committee should adopt a concept of total national defense and it should determine which economic and social institutions would be more or less likely to survive a crisis. For instance, is the present course of economic internationalization and specialization which is being pushed by high government and industrial leaders advisable, considering the requirements of economic national defense? If this is the direction we must go, conforming to current realities, shouldn't we still leave intact in the production structure a durable substructure which could survive future crises?

#### Self-sufficiency

Now that some leading nations have begun accumulating reserves to cover one year's consumption, how far ahead should Finland, situated at the far end of the Baltic, prepare for against hard times in foreign trade. Stockpiles should be built up in locations scattered around the country, since industrial centers are particularly vulnerable in modern warfare.

All sorts of local and regional self-sufficiency measures in energy production systems and human activities would be sound economic defense and would safeguard democracy.

At one time there was a notion that vigorous economic growth automatically resulted in increased defense capacity. This kind of thinking ignores the dangerous susceptibility to crisis which accompanies growth. Emergency preparedness legislation will not eliminate a built-in susceptibility to crisis. The more vulnerable the economy is, the heavier preparedness legislation bears down upon the necks of the people.

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## AIR FORCE TRAINER COMPLETES FIRST TEST FLIGHT SUCCESSFULLY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Dec 79 p 5

[Text] The first of a group of Vinka primary training planes ordered by the Air Force was test-flown at Kuorevesi on Saturday. Test pilot Major Jyrki Laukkanen, who is also an engineer, flew above the factory airfield for only 24 minutes because of poor weather. Due to the low cloud ceiling, the Vinka did not climb above 200 meters.

"During the brief flight, there was only time enough to test the power, electrical and fuel system equipment. Everything worked fine," said Laukkanen. "Because the cloud ceiling was at 250 meters, the plane's maneuverability could not be thoroughly tested," he added.

The Vinka will not be put through a 9-10 hour test flight routine, during which the plane's characteristics will be tested briefly for possible modifications. After that, the plane will be subjected to the actual flight testing. The test flight routine used for the Vinka is the American FaR-23 light plane test flight routine.

"FaR-23 has a detailed duplicated flight program which the pilot goes through step by step. Then the buyer can determine whether the plane meets the terms of the contract. In the beginning, we plan to test every plane in the FaR model approval flight program," said Laukkanen.

## Some Flights Elsewhere Than Kuorevesi

Part of the Vinka flight test program cannot be performed at Kuorevesi because the field there does not have an instrument landing system. Tampere, Turku and Jyvaskyla have the necessary systems. Five test pilots will fly the Vinka at Kuorevesi.

Only five fuselages and wings for three planes were saved from a fire which destroyed the manufacturing plant at Kuorevesi a week ago. Pekka Kaipio, materials supervisor at Valmet's plant in Kuorevesi, says that a second Vinka may be ready for test flight in a month. Kaipio estimated that the three Vinkas which were saved from the fire will be ready by early spring. In 1977, the Air Force ordered a total of 30 Vinkas from Valmet. A prototype of the Vinka, which was called the Leko, was flown in mid-1975.

## IMPACT OF CRISIS ON INTERBLOC RELATIONS ANALYZED

LD280739 Paris LE MONDE in French 24 Jan 80 p 8 LD

[Article by Bernard Guetta: "Aggravation of Tension Between Superpowers Worries Eastern Bloc Countries"]

[Text] Vienna--The ultimatum issued by Mr Carter is likely to be more severely felt among the Soviet Union's European allies than in Moscow. Indeed at least three of the Eastern Bloc capitals, Bucharest, Warsaw and Budapest, had for several days made no secret of their fears that the rapid aggravation of tension between the two superpowers might lead first to a deterioration of their own relations with the United States and then of relations among all the countries in the two blocs.

Since the U.S. President's statements this danger of an unavoidable spiral has become real. By forcing states and nations to come out for or against carrying on with the Moscow Olympic Games Mr Carter has just placed the USSR's allies in the position of having to condemn Washington directly, whether willingly or unwillingly and whatever the method and tone chosen. That is obviously quite a different matter from espousing Moscow's ideas in the Afghan affair. Even for those who did so loudly (Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia) or warmly (the GDR, which is preparing to receive Mr Schmidt) the nuance is considerable. For those (Poland and Hungary) which merely gave routine approval, the difference is clear. Finally, for Romania--torn since 27 December between its principles of national independence and a caution which prevented it from being alone in condemning Moscow and taking part in the UN General Assembly vote--the margin for maneuver has been further reduced. In addition to the delicate diplomatic game imposed on Bucharest it is the credibility and future of a 15-year-old foreign policy which are being called into question more each day by the present situation.

Apprehension, although varying in degree, is now general in Central Europe for three reasons. First, because the expansion of Moscow's sphere of influence is extremely costly, in the true sense of the term, to its European satellites. They are already obliged to aid Vietnam and have for several months been under strong pressure to give aid to the new Cambodian regime with which Prague signed a cooperation agreement 10 January, and they are now likely to be forced to make a financial contribution to consolidating the government installed in Kabul. It is no secret in Warsaw that the bloc's defense budget will be increased in the near future and Moscow will



not be alone in this effort which, moreover, will receive little publicity. The announcement of such a measure could in fact arouse definite unrest in several of these countries which are all experiencing a serious economic crisis with falling or stationary living standards.

#### Sharing the Sacrifices?

Second, if relations between Moscow and Washington were to show no rapid improvement and if the United States did not lift its embargo measures, their effects would be bound to be felt in the other socialist countries eventually. At the moment the block on supplies of American oil-extraction equipment intended for medium- and long-term projects has no direct economic consequences and the block on grain supplies benefits Poland which can now obtain supplies on Western markets more easily and cheaply. However, if this situation were to continue, really aggravate the Soviet economic problems and prevent Moscow from implementing its oil-extraction programs for the eighties its allies would feel the consequences severely. Indeed in that case the Soviet Union would have no reason not to demand that the sacrifices be shared, especially since its population still has harsher living conditions than the populations of its fraternal countries.

Third, and this is a hypothesis which is haunting the Warsaw leaders at the moment. The West could be tempted to stir up social problems in the people's democracies should the tension continue. Two of these people's democracies in particular--Hungary and Poland--are very dependent on trade with the West and Western technology for their economic recovery. All are dependent on the West in varying degrees, especially the GDR. It just took a headline in a British daily last week announcing--unfounded rumor or discrete warning--that British and American banks might tighten their credit policy toward the socialist countries for everybody to look worried in Poland which has debts amounting to almost \$180 billion.

At present it is difficult to imagine that the United States could launch into such a policy of destabilization which would be particularly dangerous and in which the West would lose a great deal financially. However, it is a sign of the times that many people in the East fear that this might happen. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the people's democracies, especially Poland, are closely and hopefully following Bonn's caution and Paris' strong reservations with regard to President Carter's new tough line. Commentaries on this dissension among the Western countries tend to take up almost as much space in the East European press as reports on the "return to the ideals of April" in Afghanistan.

CSO: 3100

## CARTER NOT TRUSTED; MUST ACT ON 'BRAVE WORDS'

LD291557 Paris L'AUREOLE in French 25 Jan 80 p 1 LD

[Article by Ricardo Paseyro: "Action by Carter Is Now Awaited"]

[Text] Carter has conducted American foreign policy in such a disastrous manner that one rightly hesitates to trust him.

His "State of the Union" message yesterday was impressive because of its firm language and its solemnity. One would like to believe that this time the president will at last be able to impart a real content to his brave words.

This is not a generally held opinion.

John Connally has accused him of repeating himself and another candidate to the White House--Phil Crane--sees his speech as a remarkable example of rhetoric but, he adds, it was a question of words, words and more words....

This very widespread skepticism as to his ability to do the necessary to stop the triumphant progress of Russian imperialism is one of the most handicaps which Carter has to overcome.

First, at home. Stung to the quick by the humiliations suffered and worried by the threat whose obviousness no one any longer dares to deny, the American people are waking up and seemed prepared to pay the price which a forceful attitude will necessitate. A skillful and resolute attitude supported by its public opinion would enable Washington to safeguard peace and freedom. Therefore, everything depends on the capricious and disunited team which advises Carter and which often behaves in an amateurism manner.

Nor does Carter enjoy great prestige abroad. To face up to danger, "front line" countries--whether in the Far East, around the Persian Gulf, in Latin America or in the East Mediterranean--need large-scale concrete and adequate aid. Above all, they must feel sure that they will in fact be defended militarily. It is fashionable to poke fun at the late Foster Dulles' "pactomania," but let us observe that the USSR has never attacked any nation bound to the United States by a military alliance as long as that alliance remained operative. Therefore, the collective security of the noncommunist world demands a system of guarantees established in black and white and capable of making Moscow think twice.

For, unfortunately, it is the Kremlin that the president must convince of American determination first of all. Following so many retreats, Carter has to move far and fast in the implementation of his new doctrine. Otherwise, the USSR will resume its march forward sooner or later.

Only a powerful show of force can persuade the new tsars to stop in time.

The State of the Union message has initiated a policy which must now find its expression in accordance with the realities of events.

CSO: 3100

## COMMENTS ON CARTER'S NEW MILITARY STRATEGY

LD301313 Paris L'AUREOLE in French 26-27 Jan 80 p 6 LD

[Article by Paul-Marie De La Gorce: "Carter's New Strategy"]

[Text] The real question raised by American reactions to the events in Afghanistan--which followed events in Iran--was this: What conclusions will President Carter draw from them with respect to U.S. military policy? The American President's speech and the indications which accompanied it have provided an answer to this question. It consists of two parts--the first part concerns nuclear armaments and the second conventional forces.

As far as the first point is concerned, there has been no surprise, at least on the face of it. The MX surface-to-surface mobile strategic missile will be developed to compensate for the vulnerability of the "minuteman" missiles which represent a considerable proportion of the American nuclear arsenal and which, stockpiled in silos, are now believed to be very vulnerable to the Soviet "first strike" counterforce using SS-18 missiles. As in the case of keeping operational all B-52 strategic bombers, some of which were to be withdrawn from the American military apparatus, it is up to President Carter to show that the United States wants to "lead" in its race against the USSR with respect to both the number and the power of strategic nuclear arms.

For, contrary to what fashionable propaganda may suggest, America continues to "lead" in this race. At a symposium recently organized by LE FIGARO around General Haig, General Gallois recalled that over a 6-year period the number of targets that a particular side has the ability to destroy has quadrupled for the Americans and trebled in the case of the Soviets. However, the Soviets have achieved greater progress with respect to the number of megatons which their vehicles can launch. The advantage retained by the Americans is due to the fact that they have taken a considerable lead with respect to the "mirving" of their nuclear warheads, that is, with respect to the number of independently targetable nuclear charges which can be incorporated in the warheads of any missile. However, this lead is being gradually reduced.

In 1972, the Americans had three times as many operational nuclear warheads on strategic missiles as the Soviets (7,200 against 2,400) whereas in 1979, the ratio was about two to one (9,000 against 5,000). According to

figures mentioned in Defense Secretary Harold Brown's most recent budgetary document by 1985 this ratio will be 1.2 to one (11,500 against 9,500).

However, President Carter has made his most significant decision in another sphere, taking into account a fundamental factor which has been confirmed by the entire history of the post war period--below the level of any major East-West conflict, which the risk of mutual destruction has made almost unthinkable, limited wars are possible and even probable wherever areas of influence are either uncertain or challenged. This presupposes that you must have means to either engage in them or influence their outcome.

The Russians gave way at the time of the 1962 Cuban crisis because they would have been unable to resist any American attempt to invade the island and one of their principal negotiators then told his American interlocutors: "You will never again put us in this kind of situation." This was when the USSR began its formidable efforts to develop its naval, air-and-sea and air-and-ground forces which have enabled it to insure the supply, at the required rate, of materiel needed in Angola, Ethiopia and, probably, Indochina, in short, wherever crises erupted far from the Soviet Union but where the Soviets were henceforth able to act.

What has just been announced in fact indicates the main concern of the American military policy. The United States must acquire forces able to intervene, in faraway conflicts and demonstrate their superiority there. This will presuppose an effort in the naval and air transport spheres, which will be extremely costly, and also with respect to ground forces and marines on which the outcome of action taken will depend.

As soon as the Iranian crisis erupted President Carter announced that a 100,000-men quick reaction force would be created. In fact, there already is a 110,000-men corps which is in principle earmarked for overseas action. Furthermore, there are 804 military transport aircraft which would transport these men, plus 300 civilian cargo and passenger aircraft which could be used immediately. However, these figures must not deceive anyone. Neither the speed nor the operational range of these aircraft is always consistent with rapid large-scale operations and the high command complains about the fact that neither the organization, nor the training nor the arms of the units to be transported are what they should be. The United States is faced with the following difficulty: It is situated some 15,000 kms from the Near East and the Indian Ocean areas and, consequently, has to resolve formidable logistic difficulties.

Hence a first problem--that of permanent implantation in the region in which crises are most likely to erupt. The concentration of a powerful naval, sea-and-air and air-and-ground task force in the Indian Ocean will assume a permanent nature. The number of ships in the area has increased from some 15 to 30 and, above all, three nuclear aircraft carriers, only one of which is to go back to the Far East next month, are there. The Indian Ocean Fleet will become equally important as or even more important than the famous 6th and 7th fleets in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific.



[LD 801315] But what purpose will these forces serve? There can be no doubt about it--they are to be used for interventions overseas with a view to resolving crises in accordance with interests deemed essential by the American Government. The lesson learned from the events which have taken place in recent years is clear. In a number of countries--Angola and Mozambique in 1974-1975, Vietnam and Laos in 1975, South Yemen in 1976, Ethiopia in 1977 and Afghanistan in 1978--major political changes have occurred through coups, popular uprisings or civil war and, perhaps preferring to forget about the mistakes it made in every case, the American Government wants to insure that nothing similar occurs again without it being able to intervene militarily to prevent the Soviets from extending their area of influence and preserving it as they have done in Afghanistan, by military force if necessary.

At any rate, to insure that this is clear, President Carter let it be known after his speech that decisions to intervene will not necessarily depend on whether another foreign military intervention takes place but, possibly, on whether any local revolution occurs.

These decisions not only foretell a possible resumption of limited wars, which have in fact never ceased, but also indicate that the United States will henceforth participate in them as it did in the 25 years between the Korean War and the fall of Saigon.

CSQ: 3160

## CARTER'S CREDIBILITY IN SOVIET EYES QUESTIONED

LD291605 Paris LE FIGARO in French 25 Jan 80 pp 1, 5 LD

[Article by Patrick Wajzman: "Carter: Hero or Loudmouth?"]

[Text] God be praised, Jimmy Carter seems to have ended his long hibernation. He thunders; he speaks loud and strong; he lets everyone know that America is no pathetic, unarmed giant; he takes measures designed, theoretically, to stun Soviet imperialism. In brief, the leader of the world's foremost democracy has finally decided to be.

Too often have I raged in this column against his diplomatic torpor and his military apathy not to hail such a change.

However, my satisfaction is incomplete, imperfect, for a very simple reason: even when Carter lashes out the Russians do not really take him seriously. The constantly increasing Red Army presence in Afghanistan is, alas, the most striking and infuriating illustration of that.

Internationally, it is less important to draw up your battalions than to make your opponent believe you are capable of using them. Less important to bellow threats than to arouse fear. In a word, it is less important to be strong than to be credible. And Jimmy Carter, I repeat, does not possess this essential quality, at least in Moscow's eyes.

When, in 1946, Truman quietly announced to Gromyko that if Soviet troops did not leave Iran in 48 hours the United States would regretfully be forced to make the USSR experience the pleasures of the A-bomb...the Soviets backed down. Truman was credible.

When, during the 1959 Berlin crisis, the Soviet ambassador revealed Khrushchev's demands to De Gaulle, the General impassively replied: "Well, Mr Ambassador, we shall die together!" Noone dared smile. De Gaulle was credible.

When, in 1970, Richard Nixon enjoined the Russians to dismantle the nuclear submarine base they were secretly building in Cuba his threats were immediately effective. Nixon was credible.

But when, in protest at the "Kabul coup," Carter resorts to the food weapon; refuses to sell the USSR the advanced technology he had promised; swears to high heaven that U.S. athletes might well boycott the Moscow Olympics; arms

Pakistan; negotiates naval facilities with Oman, Kenya and Somalia; sends his war fleet on maneuvers on the Persian Gulf approaches; sets about forming a rapid intervention force of 100,000 men and shamelessly plays the China card...the Soviets are not impressed and permit themselves the luxury of deriding "the panic and bellicose frenzy suddenly seizing yankee imperialism."

Is the master of the White House unlucky? Is he victim to a pernicious fate? I do not believe so. If the U.S. President cannot convince Brezhnev of his determination, this misfortune will in no way be due to chance but to his own inadequacies.

First, the Russians are convinced that Carter will not accept his own challenge. This belief, admittedly, does not appear groundless. One recalls, in fact, that after forcefully declaring in September 1979 that he would not tolerate a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, the chief of the U.S. Executive quite pitifully played down the magnitude of this affair just one month later. He even declared himself extremely satisfied with Moscow's--meaningless--"assurances" and affirmed, without the least trace of humor, that, after all, "this brigade did not warrant a return to the cold war!"

Consequently, the Soviet masters reconsider the U.S. Number 1's view of history so simplistic that he will be easy to fool. Again I fear they are right. In February 1979 Carter declared: "There is no doubt in my mind: The USSR wants peace." One year later, scalded by the Afghan invasion, he candidly admits: "My opinion of the Russians has changed more in 1 week than in 3 years of office." Thus it could respectfully be pointed out to the president that the October revolution occurred in 1917 and that it is regrettable that his commendable, sudden realization took so long to appear. But never mind.

Finally, the Kremlin is convinced that the White House chief does not have that mastery of diplomatic bargaining in which Henry Kissinger excelled. Does one need proof that this view is well-founded?

When Carter prayed for a prompt SALT II ratification, he did not hesitate to coerce the more reticent of his senators by maintaining that rejection of the treaty would cause the United States to lose its label as a "peace-loving nation." This was absurd because, knowing the Soviet interest in SALT, the president should have seized this advantage and bargained hard with it. Absurd, too, because by mercilessly casting the anti-SALT lobby in the shameful role of enemies of peace, our ingenious head of state offered himself up in advance to the Russians.

This can be seen now. In fact, when Carter asked the Senate a few days ago to defer SALT ratification in protest at the Red Army's entry into Kabul, the Soviets were quick to turn his words against him: "You said yourself," they remind the U.S. President, "only those unconditionally in favor of SALT are for peace; now, you have just postponed the implementation of this treaty indefinitely; therefore, you are for war!" Just thinking about it was enough.

Having said that, no weakness is irreversible. And Carter, although devalued by 3 years of indecision, softness and long-winded idealism, can still compel the Russians' respect and contain the Bolshevik party. But for that he will need to stop thinking that his recent shows of force are in themselves victories, and to stop thinking his mission complete when he commits himself to protect "the next victim" of the Red Army. What would be the good of the U.S. leader's famous "awakening," drummed into us daily...if the Soviet masters continue sleeping peacefully?

In the West's interests I would not like it to be said later about Carter that he was basically a loudmouth disguised as a hero.

CSO: 3100

## PCF PREPARATIONS FOR 9-10 FEB 80 MEETING ON INTELLECTUALS

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 12 Nov 79 p 5

[Article by Guy Hermier]

[Text] Resolution

The Central Committee decided to convene on 9 and 10 February 1980 the National Council of the Party concerning intellectuals, culture and the fight for democratic progress toward socialism. In accordance with Article 7 of the bylaws adopted by the 23rd Congress, it has decided to open a forum of discussion in the party's press on the draft resolution to be published in early December. Ivory, 8 November 1979. (This resolution was passed unanimously.)

The purpose of this report is to inform the Central Committee of the progress made in implementing our decisions of 21 June concerning: preparations for the Central Committee meeting on culture and party activity among intellectuals; the establishment of a new weekly publication to replace FRANCE NOUVELLE and LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE.

First a few words about the preparations for the Central Committee meeting on culture and intellectuals.

As you know, to initiate preliminary consideration of the draft resolution, during the summer we requested the opinions of hundreds of communist intellectuals on the basis of a short document listing the main issues which we must address.

It is important to inform the Central Committee of the principal observations derived from the many contributions which we received.

1. Almost all the replies provided valuable information concerning the extent of the effects of the crisis and of Giscardian policy on cultural activities and on the millions of men and women engaged in intellectual professions.

What is striking is the seriousness of the situation developing in education and professional training, universities, scientific research, artistic creation,



health and lifestyles; the seriousness of the constant ideological campaign to oppose irrationalism and end-of-the-world ethics with confidence in scientific knowledge and the possibility of social change. This strategy of cultural decline has serious consequences for social life in general and the country's very future, which leads us to consider these problems a great issue of national interest concerning intellectuals, of course, but also the entire popular movement and consequently the entire party.

In the face of this situation, campaigns are developing, particularly at our instigation or with our active participation. They are occasionally growing in size and making it possible to obtain results. But as we pointed out at the 23rd Congress, nothing can occur spontaneously with regard to campaigns. The breakdown of leftist unity, the seriousness of the crisis and government efforts have changed many intellectuals' vision of the prospects. Without this vision, discouragement will tend to prevail over combativeness and attitudes of apathy, withdrawal or avoidance will tend to defeat the initiative of the campaign for unity. This situation is accentuated and used by Giscardian politics of determining the consensus, which finds its counterpart in the attitude of the Socialist Party. This shows the importance of our political and ideological campaign and of our mass work with concrete goals and with the specific aspects that these efforts may have among intellectuals.

2. The contributions received also show that the Vitry meeting and the trade union federation meetings which extended it, the 23rd Congress, the decisions of the Central Committee in June and their initial applications have had very positive effects. We are beginning to take the offensive. Other political forces, from Giscard d'Estaing to the Socialist Party, definitely feel it and are trying not to lose ground.

The progress which we have made is a direct result of a better understanding of the answers provided by our 23rd Congress to the great questions concerning the nature of the crisis and its outcome, our assessment of socialist countries, conditions for stronger unity and democratic party life. We must continue in this direction to help to fully understand what the 23rd Congress means as a new way of implementing our strategy and as a springboard for the development of campaigns.

The contributions received also confirm what we said at the 23rd Congress: it is necessary to properly assess the changes which have occurred in recent years in the division of material and intellectual labor and the effects of the crisis on the situation and behavior of those working in intellectual professions, in the process of significant change and diversification. It is actually these changes which have given rise to the many questions regarding the intellectual concept and, more broadly, of an alliance, as well as the hesitance to face new problems and to launch campaigns in which alliance is a correct watchword, but one without any real effectiveness.

Finally, almost all of the contributions raised the question of the role and place of communist intellectuals in the party. They direct our entire attention to the need for more participation of communist intellectuals in the

general activity as well as the specific tasks of the party, at all levels, particularly at the level of trade union federations.

#### National Council Meeting on 9 and 10 February

All of these remarks confirm our need to resolutely implement the position defined by the 23rd Congress and the decisions made in June by the Central Committee in order to give our activity involving culture and intellectuals a new impetus and dimension. The Central Committee meeting will help us to do so.

To examine all of these matters, we suggested that the Central Committee call a meeting of the National Council of the Party for 9 and 10 February 1980.

As we have decided, this meeting will be prepared on the basis of a draft resolution which is in the process of being drawn up. At that time we want to assess cultural and intellectual problems to their full extent by seriously analyzing new issues and developments in progress and by evaluating our achievements and our shortcomings, with the goal of making the protection and promotion of culture and the development of research, innovation and creation a major national issue, to win over the mass of intellectuals to the democratic fight, to give the alliance its strategic significance and to deal with the issue of the role and place of communist intellectuals in the party as a component of its democratic life and a condition of its influence and effectiveness.

Naturally, this draft resolution cannot be comparable to that adopted by the 23rd Congress. Its purpose is not the same. It cannot call into question the political position democratically defined by the 23rd Congress. On the contrary, it is a question of proceeding on the basis of that position to provide the required specific answers to the great questions of culture and alliance, which I mentioned initially. This draft resolution therefore does not call for the same procedures of publication and clarification. That is why we decided in June that it would be drafted under the supervision of the Political Bureau, submitted for the discussion of all communists and subsequently only for the deliberation and approval of the Central Committee. We propose that this draft resolution be published in early December and that a small group of comrades be assigned to organize the discussion and to draw up the respective report for the National Council.

The Central Committee has actually decided that in accordance with the new provisions of our bylaws, all interested party organizations and militants should be included in drawing up the draft resolution and that this discussion should be published in L'HUMANITE, FRANCE NOUVELLE and LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE. Thus during the 2 months following public notice of the National Council meeting, the draft resolution will be submitted for the consideration of the entire party and we will receive the opinions, views and remarks of everyone wishing to provide such. We urge Central Committee members to see that trade union federation leaderships and the largest possible number of leaderships of party organizations and divisions in which there are many intellectuals thoroughly discuss the draft resolution. Finally, we suggest that, without

making it a general rule, trade union federation leaderships examine the possibilities of organizing study days or weekends so that all communist intellectuals, who are often scattered, can take an active part in preparing this important meeting of the National Council.

#### New Weekly: Stage of Solid Preparation

I now come to the reports concerning the establishment of the new weekly publication to replace FRANCE NOUVELLE and LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE.

We have now entered the stage of solid preparation for this project.

In mid-October, at the time of the press conference following the first meeting of the editorial staff, we clearly stated the general political orientation of this new weekly publication. We want it to be a press medium, a means of political campaigning and a forum of expression, debate and research for those men and women who reject the Giscardian view of cultural decline and who wish to contribute to democratic progress toward self-managerial socialism. In a word, the weekly publication of a new strategic plan for France, that proposed and defined by our 22nd and 23rd congresses. That includes the discussion and pluralistic contributions regarding all questions raised by the implementation of that strategy. Not debate for its own sake or to change our policy, but serious, constructive debate, debate to enrich our strategy with new contributions, debate in order to advance. As we have already pointed out, such a concept means that this new weekly will not be an official organ of the Central Committee. This experiment, made possible by our 23rd Congress, is unique and unprecedented in many respects. That is why, in the face of suppression of the media and the ideological pressure exerted by socially conservative forces in the government, we must have the ambition to fully utilize the possibilities which this weekly publication will offer us to intervene combatively, specifically and personally in French political, ideological and cultural life.

On these bases, we are currently working to complete the staff and to work out the format of this publication, a format that will reflect a profound change in comparison to FRANCE NOUVELLE and LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE. We in fact intend to create a true weekly, closer to current events, with more reports and commentaries on such events and more in touch with the movement and clash of ideas. We want to devote more room to culture, lifestyles, the diversity of regional events and international problems, whether they pertain to contemporary world developments, events in socialist countries or Eurocommunism. Thus we intend to respond to the concerns and needs of everyone who is pondering the major issues posed by our strategy and the historical changes of our society and our times. This means that such a weekly publication should interest current readers of FRANCE NOUVELLE and LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE as well as tens of thousands of intellectuals and militants of the party or of the social movement, whom we must persuade to read it.

A few more remarks about the developments which we expect to make in this project.

At the end of November, after a second meeting of the editorial staff, we will publish new information concerning the weekly's title and format, among other things. We will launch the subscription drive at that time.

#### Subscription Drive

At the same time, we intend to set up in each trade union federation a staff to organize this subscription drive and to make preparations for regular sale of the weekly. This staff could be headed by a comrade participating, as much as possible, in the federation leadership, communicating with the official in charge of working among intellectuals and working in close contact with the secretary for propaganda. The purpose of establishing these staffs is to accordingly relieve the leaderships of trade union federations. We recommend that meetings be held within the federations to organize the work of these staffs and we are scheduling a national meeting of their leaders in January.

Also in January, we will publish a manifesto in which we intend to include several hundred figures, communist or otherwise, from the worlds of politics, culture and associations and representatives of every region of France. This manifesto will to some degree represent the act of founding the new weekly publication and we will solicit the support of all men and women wishing to lead such a weekly publication to success, the first issue of which is to appear in late February 1980.

I will add one more brief remark. The announcement of the first reports about the new weekly naturally aroused several reactions. First of all, as expected, certain commentators were bent on describing our project as narrow and "closed-minded," as they said. They therefore did not hesitate to falsify facts and to invent stories, pure and simple. Their negative attitude only serves to strengthen us in our undertaking.

Furthermore, at the time of considering the new publication's editorial staff, there was concern about the agreement of our approach with that of the 23rd Congress. This overlooks the appeal made by Georges Marchais, in his closing speech to the Congress, to "implement (all together) the policy which we have just formulated and which has unanimously been adopted by the Congress. This is the concern of every communist, without exception."

Therefore! It is in this spirit, with the intention to advance seriously in the direction outlined by the 23rd Congress, that we are working to set up the new weekly publication.

In conclusion, I want to stress that preparations for the National Council meeting and the subscription drive for the new weekly, like assistance to communist activity in disputed areas such as research, education and medicine, or more recently the magistracy, all require that trade union federation leaderships rely on those assigned to work among intellectuals and that they themselves devote the attention necessary for these matters. Obviously, this is also the responsibility of the Central Committee.



## FISZBIN CONTRIBUTION TO FEBRUARY PCF MEETING ON INTELLECTUALS

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 7 Jan 80 p 11

[Contribution by former Paris Federation leader Henri Fiszbin, cell administration secretary, Jaures Section, 19th District, Paris, to L'HUMANITE Discussion Forum on Intellectuals: "We Have Not Yet Learned All Lessons"]

[Text] I wish to make my contribution to the discussion on "the intellectuals, culture, and the democratic advance toward socialism" on the basis of the experience I have been able to gather in my twin capacity as militant of worker origin and as leader of the Paris Federation.

It is true that an examination of all of the issues tied to the party's activities aimed at the intellectuals is now urgently necessary. This is a necessity in terms of our responsibilities toward the intellectuals and also toward the working class.

The entire history of the worker movement bears witness to that. For the working class this is a vital issue, from the viewpoint of its class interests, that is to say, to acquire the capacity for building alliances without which it is incapable of prevailing.

There was a time when the problem, according to the remarkable formula by K. Marx, was to avoid a situation where the working class solo would not become a funeral dirge. Today we have ambitions which are differently conquest-oriented. The time has come to fight for a democratic advance toward a socialist France, a struggle to push exploitation and oppression back. This is a struggle designed to enable the working class to gain a place in the management of the country's affairs in keeping with the place it occupies in the nation's life. The question of the alliances of the Working class thus is extremely timely.

From that viewpoint, the demonstration deriving from the resolution draft seems essential to me. The rapid growth in the number of those who today are involved in intellectual activities and the growing importance which those various categories have in economic, social, and political life, create a situation where their alliance with the working class becomes a more capital affair than ever before.



No less important seems to me to be the new in-depth development of our analysis on what the intellectuals presently are and mean within the framework of French society and its evolution. The draft precisely outlines the examination of the objective situation of the mass of intellectual workers in terms of their diversity and presents a refined analysis of the subjective perception which they have of their experience. With unprecedented force, this study brings to light the fact that all of the social, economic, and ideological factors activated by the crisis work toward a convergence of the interests of the workers and the intellectuals. Struck by austerity, they are objectively united. This obviously is a decisive finding because it confirms our entire strategy. This represents a possibility of the transition of the mass of intellectual workers to the fight for self-management socialism which enables us to hope for the triumph of this perspective which was opened by our 22nd and 23rd congresses.

The resolution draft quite correctly calls on us to tackle these big problems not in a generally abstract fashion but on the concrete grounds of action at the grass roots. In this one could, day after day, on the correct class positions, build the alliance between the working class and the intellectuals.

The draft shows that this movement does not in any way resemble a triumphal march. The entry of the intellectuals into the fight for change encounters new obstacles springing from the aggravation of the crisis. The gap between the experience of the intellectuals and the awareness which they have of it is still often rather big. This finding should not surprise the Marxists. It underscores the importance of the problems to be resolved so that the party's intervention may be raised to the necessary level, both in terms of content and in terms of range.

These analyses of the resolution draft mark a new and important step forward on the road of the party's reflection. They give us the means we need in order to implement the decisions of our 23rd Congress in practice, enabling our commitments, adopted by Georges Marchais, during the meeting with 400 intellectuals at Vitry in December 1978, with a view to studying the criticisms, to correct the shortcomings and to remedy the insufficiencies of our activities, so that we may be able to create the conditions for a new offensive to win the mass of intellectuals to the democratic fight and to win tens of thousands of workers among them over to the party itself.

This offensive is one of the party's main tasks. This is why it seems indispensable to me--so that we may be able to work on this to the fullest extent--that the discussion of the resolution draft should take into account the years of struggle which the party has gone through and should, without complacency, examine all of the problem's dimensions.

Fortunately, we are not starting from scratch. It would be unfortunate to try to give the impression that the resolution draft marks the year 1 of the party's thinking about the problems of the intellectuals and of culture.

That would mean forgetting that it was preceded by the Central Committee meeting of Argenteuil, in 1966, the Champigny Manifesto in 1968, the speeches of Roland Leroy and Georges Marchais on the 25th anniversary of LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE in 1972, the 22nd Congress in 1976, and finally the speech of Georges Marchais to the intellectuals at the Sheraton Hotel in 1977; that would deprive us of any possibility of coming up with a serious analysis of our prior procedures.

I believe in this regard that the resolution draft is correct in mentioning the delay in grasping the new and important facts that influence the conditions in the fight for the alliance. Our analyses on everyday activities were delayed and this gap has made itself felt on the battlefield of ideas and the mass struggle of the party among the intellectuals.

On the other hand it does not seem to me at all satisfactory to have to say that all of the inadequacies of our work in this field can be cleared up together and right away.

In my daily activities as federation leader I experienced the difficulties that came up in recent years as a result of the hesitation in sticking firmly to our alliance policy at the moment when the class conflict became tougher. In the difficult situation created by the decisions of the Socialist Party, everything happened as if--contrary to what the 23rd Congress was to affirm later on--we considered that the intellectuals would inevitably have to pick the right or the Social Democrats and that it would therefore be a good idea to stop trying to implement our alliance policy. This sprang from attitudes which I worried about many times in talking to the Central Committee and this also represented a de facto renunciation of fighting the political and ideological battle among the intellectuals.

Among other examples of this practice L'HUMANITE, on a full page, on 6 March 1978, published the text of an appeal issued at Lille by the party's secretary-general to all workers and working women throughout the country, where even the word intellectual was absent from the lists of social categories on which everything depended and which we are calling upon to vote communist. The response which the federation secretariat got from this move, which it made to alert the party leadership as to the feelings triggered by these "instances of forgetfulness" showed that this was certainly not an involuntary omission.

According to all evidence, we suffered a certain weakness in our resolution at that time in that we considered the alliance policy to be a permanent and incontrovertible basic fact, regardless of the circumstances and the difficulties encountered in getting our class positions to prevail among the mass of intellectuals.

Who could say that we did not make the mistake of believing that our efforts toward the intellectuals would above all be profitable to the Socialist Party and that it therefore was wiser for us to turn rather toward the

workers and the most disadvantaged? Who can say that we did not confuse priority and exclusivity in dealing with the most popular categories?

Prior to March 1978, it was indispensable for us to make every effort to reduce poverty. It was indispensable for us first of all to address ourselves to the workers and the categories most seriously affected by the cumulative effects of inequalities. It was indispensable for us to point up the primordial importance of social justice for culture and therefore the necessity to get out of the crisis and to enable society to evolve, to change above all the situation of the most exploited and the poorest.

But experience showed that it was a mistake to believe that, under these extremely complex circumstances, our earlier analyses had lost their value and that, in spite of setbacks, considered more or less inevitable among the intellectuals, we could progress sufficiently among the popular categories to maintain our influence in spite of everything.

The election results, especially in Paris where the intellectual workers are particularly numerous, showed the inane of such a hope. It would be harmful to let anybody believe that these were just simple mistakes when it came to implementing something. I think that it is necessary, on the contrary, for the entire party to be informed, without reticence as to the decisions which the National Council will be made to adopt, so as to cast light upon the causes of this insufficiency and not to leave in the shadows the political incomprehensions which permitted this and which are still heavily represented in the party

Along these lines, I think that it is entirely wise to call upon the intellectuals, as the resolution draft indeed does, to realize that there is no way out just for themselves and for the activity to which they are devoted, outside of the alliance with the working class. Nobody can do the thing that is necessary here in their place.

I am on the other hand worried about the unilateral character of our reflection on that score.

As a communist party, we have a great responsibility to assume in order to contribute to the difficult transition of the intellectuals from revolt to political awareness.

We are convinced of this responsibility toward the working class, the white-collar employees, and all other strata of the working population.

I believe that we would only gain if we were fully to take into account this duty toward the intellectuals also and if we were to reflect upon the two-way relationship which this move implies. In its relations with the intellectuals, the party of the working class has much to contribute and it also has much to receive.

The progress of our ideas among the intellectuals will be all the faster if we manage to demonstrate our capacity to understand and integrate their aspirations and their questions.

We will achieve that only if we rid ourselves of a vision which beautifies our reality entirely too much. It is, for example, quite optimistic to proclaim that the working class has already adopted as its own the struggle for science and culture and that it has consequently taken into account the fundamental interests of the intellectuals. That, it seems to me, boils down to crediting all of the working class with the positions of its vanguard party and, by the same token, it means seriously underestimating the need for a permanent struggle to win the working class over to a correct position on the fight for the union.

I must also say that I am worried about what recently appeared to me like a dangerous resurgence in the party of that old fault inherent in the French worker movement which we call workerism. It is not good for viewpoints deeply rooted in workerism to have been able to express themselves in public without any thorough refutation by the party leadership. It seems to me harmful that the draft, to be adopted, ignores this essential issue.

It is well known that workerism and anti-intellectualism ceaselessly keeps springing up in the worker movement under the pressure of bourgeois ideology. These irregularities are a big help to the adversary in the ideological war which he fights against us. The intervention of the Communist Party has long been aimed at repelling these narrow tendencies by giving the working class the historical understanding of its needs and interests. This struggle seems to me to continue to be necessary. To a certain extent, it determines the party's ability to grasp instruments which it is in the process of perfecting with a view to conducting its move on the complex but capital terrain of the alliance and implement, in everyday life, with the necessary audacity and perseverance, the enriched theoretical heritage which it will have after the National Council meeting.

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## CPSU-PCF JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON GEORGES MARCHAIS USSR VISIT

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 11 Jan 80 pp 1,12

[Article by Max Leon]

[Text] Moscow, 10 January. The French Communist Party [PCF], led by Georges Marchais, who has been visiting Moscow since Monday evening, today held a final meeting with the Soviet Union Communist Party [CPSU] delegation, headed by Leonid Brezhnev. The representatives of the two parties have adopted a joint communique which undoubtedly, will be considered a document of paramount importance, and not merely in the history of relations between French and Soviet Communists. It deals, in fact, with the vital questions of our times.

During the 3 days devoted to meetings and conferences, they attacked every problem and made them the subject of an indepth discussion.

The two parties "believe that the differences in their positions and the divergencies which exist should not constitute an obstacle to their co-operation on all the major joint objectives which in particular involve the struggle for peace, disarmament, international cooperation with Communist Parties and all national and social liberation forces."

On leaving Moscow, Georges Marchais will broadcast live on French Television I at 13:00, this Friday.

After visiting the Atomach plants in Volgodosk and the City of the Cosmonauts, the PCF delegation will return to Paris on Saturday.

From 8 to 10 January 1980, conferences were held in Moscow between the CPSU, led by Leonid Brezhnev, secretary general of the CPSU Central Committee, president of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the PCF delegation, headed by Georges Marchais, PCF secretary general.

The CPSU delegation is composed of M.A. Souslov, member of the Policy Board of the CPSU Central Committee, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; B.N. Ponomarev, alternate member of the CPSU Policy Board, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Z.M. Krouglova, member of the CPSU Central



Committee, chairman of the presidium of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; V.V. Zagladine, alternate member of CPSU Central Committee, first deputy chief of the international section of the CPSU Central Committee.

The PCF delegation was made up of Maxine Gremetz, secretary of the PCF Central Committee, member of the Policy Board; Francette Lazard, member of the PCF Policy Board; Jean-Paul Magnon, member of the PCF Central Committee; Daniel Monteux, member of the PCF Central Committee.

These conferences, which took place in a friendly and frank atmosphere, were the occasion for a broad and fruitful exchange of ideas which dealt with the major problems of the international situation and the relations between the two countries. They exchanged information on the situation existing in each country and the respective activity of the two parties. They also discussed the cementing of relations and cooperations between the two countries.

#### A Profound Change in the Human Race

On terminating these conferences, the two parties came to the following conclusions: the world today is the scene of tremendous confusion. The human race is undergoing a profound change. It is a matter of progressing from the old to the new, from the world built on ignorance, violence, exploitation, oppression and war, to a world founded on knowledge, awareness, the emancipation of the people, freedom and peace. Our era is one of transition from capitalism to socialism. This is indeed what is at stake in the struggle now in progress on the international level.

This struggle is outstanding for the significant advances the social, national and human forces have achieved. Every development in the international situation these past 10 years goes to prove it.

Socialism has progressed from the realm of hope to that of its practical accomplishment, and from now on wields considerable weight in the world. Workmen and democratic struggles have been so successful that in a number of capitalist countries far-reaching political changes are daily on the agenda. Formerly subdued peoples now make their voices heard and demand control over their development. The craving for liberation is assuming an unprecedented intensity.

#### The Change in Ratio of the Forces in Favor of Peace, Independence and Socialism

The PCF and the CPSU hold that the fundamental idea in the present world situation is indeed the change in ratio of the forces in favor of peace, independence and socialism. It is here that there lies a powerful incentive for the development of class struggles throughout the world.

Within this framework, imperialism can no longer act as in the past. For all that, it is making use of every means at its disposal to maintain its

positions and is endeavoring to check the advances of the forces of progress. For this purpose, it is promoting an extensive operation on the economic, political and military level. It is lending its support to the most reactionary regimes and is meddling in people's affairs. In some countries, to set up a barrier against significant political changes, it has resorted, with ever increasing frequency, to social democracy. It is conducting an intense ideological warfare, it is caricaturing the Communist Parties' activities and initiating slanderous campaigns against socialist countries and the national liberation movement. We must zealously counteract all these ventures.

Imperialism is engaged in a mad arms race, which is a challenge to the development of the world situation and is generating international tensions. Moreover, the arms race considerably deprives us of the means of promoting the people's well-being. Even in peacetime, it leaves man wounded and maimed. Also, the strengthening of peaceful coexistence, which is the only way it can become the social and political status quo, is assuming a major importance. For a flagrant contradiction exists between the peaceful coexistence program and political detente and the incredible accumulation of arms.

Now, there exist possibilities of blocking the arms race and opening the way to their progressive reduction. French and Soviet Communists are fighting and will fight uninterruptedly in favor of this important objective which is one of the most significant of our activities' goals. With this in view, the approval of the SALT II agreement--which public opinion should enforce--would constitute a significant step.

Political detente should accompany military detente and the two parties involved in proposing concrete and realistic measures, should be moving toward this goal.

Progress on the road to disarmament depends on the activity of every peaceful force, of every nation and every government.

### Security for Europe

This refers particularly to continental Europe. Europe, in fact, on several occasions, has been the theater of the most murderous and the most devastating attacks known in history. It is still the one region in the world where accumulation of arms is the most impressive.

NATO's decision to produce and set up new American rockets on European territories poses a threat to the people's peace and security. Should they be carried out, they would make it possible for American imperialism, which is trying to attain military supremacy, to turn the European continent into an atomic battlefield and place nuclear arms at FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] disposal. It is therefore imperative to intensify our efforts aimed at preventing the enforcement of NATO's decisions, and the lessening of tensions, in order that the nations on the European Continent may enjoy a lasting peace, with equal security for all and an increasing cooperation.

In this respect, the socialist countries constructive proposals, especially the latest ones, constitute so many objective and positive steps in this direction.

The rescinding of the NATO decisions to produce and set up new American rockets in Europe, or the permanent suspension of their preparation, would make it possible to enter into effective negotiations on the question of intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

#### Sovereignty, Independence and Non-Interference

The CPSU and the PCF consider it absolutely necessary that all participating states strictly enforce the final Act of the Helsinki Conference. They attach great importance to the preparation for and the holding of the coming Madrid meeting and reveal the joint wish to contribute to this meeting's submitting new proposals to advance the cause of security and cooperation on the continent. As experience long since acquired goes to prove, further steps forward will depend on the energetic efforts of all the democratic and peaceful forces of the great majority of the populace.

They mean to avail themselves of the opportunities for joint action which may arise with Socialist and Social-Democratic Parties for definite objectives pertaining to the people's interests and to peace, and also with forces representative of the Christian masses.

The necessary improvement in the climate of international relations implies respect for the principles of national sovereignty, independence and non-interference in domestic affairs. Each nation, regardless of its size, should be in a position to take active part in solving international problems. A resolute action should be taken to pass over political blocs and to disband military blocs.

#### Franco-Soviet Relations

Within the European context, relations between France and the Soviet Union have always constituted an inherent peace factor. Nowadays, cooperative and friendly relations exist and are becoming stronger. This is an actual, significant fact. However, it must be noted that they do not always avail themselves of all the possibilities presented. Furthermore, in France, they are carrying out campaigns to hinder the expansion of Franco-Soviet cooperation. This is running counter to the interests of the two countries and the two peoples.

This explains why the two parties are working and will continue to work for the development of a more balanced, more dynamic cooperation between France and the USSR in the political, economic, technical and cultural fields, a cooperation constructed on a lasting foundation.

In this sense, the strengthening of French and Soviet Union relations by an act of the two countries insuring mutual security, would be a positive one and would contribute to security and detente in Europe.

## For a New International Economic Order

The democratization of international political and economic relations constitute one of the most important problems which the world as it nears the end of the 20th Century has to face.

Colonial domination established the disparity of relations among nations. Resulting from this were serious and lasting consequences throughout whole regions of the earth. Underdevelopment, hunger, retardation, illiteracy prevail over untold areas of the globe. Millions of women, men and children are living in extreme misery. This constitutes an intolerable injustice in this century of signal advancement, of scientific and technical progress and the social emancipation of humanity.

The demand for more harmonious, more tolerable and more equitable relations between state is therefore being made with greater insistence. The non-aligned countries' movement expresses justifiable ambitions, is playing a positive part and exercises influence in the international arena.

The CPSU and the PCF support these countries' enterprises undertaken in particular for the control of their own natural resources and their economic development. Justice, equality, democracy are the major principles on which a new international order should be founded. This would serve the best interests of all countries and peoples.

## Socialism and its Diversity

The demands for a new and more just society are leaving a deep mark on our era. Capitalism is indeed incapable of coping with it. A system of oppression, it conceals widespread unemployment and chronic inflation. It breeds waste and allows a minority to flaunt a blatant luxury amid destitution and the realities of an ever-present poverty. It places the burden of a depression on workers, obliges millions of families to live haunted by insecurity, drives youth to despair. It gives rise to the progressive breakdown in human relations and sells off human values in the name of gain.

In contrast to this system of exploitation, there is another system--socialism. A continually expanding reality since October 1917, in its actual practice it shows its superiority in its progressive solution of the tremendous problems which mankind is constantly encountering. It appeared as a consequence of those calamities which are the scourge of capitalist exploitation: hunger, epidemics, illiteracy. It has made possible enormous economic strides, a significant improvement in the people's level and standard of living by ensuring workers of their basic rights, namely, the right to work and to relax, to health, to education, to culture.

It has supported the assertion of national identity. It is now pursuing its advancement toward the solution of the problems it encounters in this immense and difficult task of social and human liberation.



On the international level, the socialist contribution to mankind also includes the decisive role it has played against fascism and war, the effective action it is today pursuing for peace and disarmament, the contribution it is making toward the expansion of the armed campaigns against imperialism, for national independence and social emancipation.

Socialism is being established in many countries on the earth under a diversity of forms. The roads leading to it are also diverse, and some new countries are moving toward socialism by original and unprecedented routes. Traditions, peculiarities, situations differ from one country to another, and the solutions to the problems posed also differ. This diversity, which will become still more marked, bears witness to the fact that socialism is emerging and spreading to a people's or a country's specific needs. This explains why the establishment of socialism precludes any predetermined plan, any imitation of other people's experiment.

Many throughout the world today are the forces which are combating imperialism. The strengthening of cooperation, the development of concerted actions--while respecting the differences of opinions, philosophical and religious beliefs--constitute a significant factor in the struggle for social progress, independence and peace.

The scope and acuteness of present international problems and the new possibilities which follow from the advanced position of the revolutionary and progressist movement call for a strengthening of solidarity among all the forces which make up the movement.

#### Relations Between the PCF and the CPSU

Fraternal relations of friendship and internationalist solidarity based on independence, equal rights and non-interference, exist between the French and Soviet Communists.

The two parties hold that the differences in their positions and the divergences which exist could not be an obstacle to their cooperation in all the major objectives which they hold in common and which in particular involve the struggle for peace, disarmament, international cooperation, internationalist-liberation forces.

The PCF and the CPSU are pleased with their meetings' profitable results and with the character of their conferences. They declare their mutual desire to develop their cooperation for the common good of the working classes and for the peoples of France and the Soviet Union.

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CSO: 3100



## HIGH MILITARY APPOINTMENTS CONFIRMED

Paris LE MONDE in French 4 Jan 80 p 9

[Text] On a motion by Defense Minister Yvon Bourges, the Council of Ministers approved, on Wednesday 2 January, the following appointment and promotions in the armed forces:

THE ARMY COUNCIL -- APPOINTMENTS: Vice President: General Jean Lagarde; Voting Member: General Jean Richard; Members: General Claude Vanbremeersch, Lieutenant Generals Jacques Bley, Jean Bourdis, Jacques de Barry, Michel Duval, Roger Hotton, Bernard Lemattre, Pierre Brasart and Jean Augier; Major Generals Philippe Sabouret, Jeannou Lacaze and Alfred Maitre.

THE NAVY COUNCIL -- APPOINTMENTS: Vice President, Admiral Jean Lannuzel; Voting Member: Admiral Jean Tardy; Members: Vice Squadron Admirals Philippe de Gaulle, Jean Accary and Charles de Bigault de Cazanove; Vice Admirals Maurice Sabatier, Claude Pieri and Gerard de Castelbajac.

THE AIR FORCE COUNCIL -- APPOINTMENTS: Vice President: Air Force General Guy Fleury; Voting Member: Air Force General Marie Fleurot; Members: Air Force Lieutenant Generals Jean Grenet, Jules Auffray, Philippe Archambeaud, Michel Forget and Paul Vaujour; Major General Jean Saulnier.

Air force -- Colonel Roland Nentre was promoted to wing commander. Wing Commander Nicolas Fevre was appointed chief air force signals officer.

ORDNANCE -- Ordnance General 1st class Robert Fleury was appointed mission chief to the deputy general for ordnance; Ordnance General 1st class Roger Guenode was appointed engineering branch director of naval air service programs; Ordnance General 1st class Gaby Felles was appointed deputy director of international affairs in the technical directorate of naval air service construction; Ordnance General 2d class Andre Pinchon was appointed deputy to the chief of the engineering branch for construction and naval ordnance; Ordnance General 2d class Michel Bergoumioux was appointed director of the engineering branch of telecommunications and aircraft equipment; Ordnance General 2d class Jean Herry was appointed deputy director of the engineering

branch of telecommunications and aircraft equipment; Ordnance General 2d class Jean Sandeau was appointed deputy director of "industry" plans and programs in the technical directorate of naval air service construction; Ordnance General 2d class Jeanbert Beringer was appointed director of production, price and maintenance headquarters; Ordnance General 2d class Michel Deforges was appointed deputy of the engineering branch of naval air service programs.

ARMED FORCES GENERAL SUPERVISION -- Armed Forces Comptroller Yves Artru was promoted to General Armed Forces Comptroller.

9330

CSO: 3100

## 'AKROPOLIS' SEES CREDIBILITY IN CARTER WARNING TO SOVIETS

AT261725 Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 26 Jan 80 p 2 AT

[From the "Laconic" Column: "They Will Not Dare"]

[Text] At last, the United States has decided to use the only language Soviet imperialism understands and respects, the language of strength. Do not try to advance your forces toward the Persian Gulf, because we shall react with all means, President Carter warned Moscow, and the warning was categorical; it left no margin for doubt. Certainly the U.S. president would not have expressed the warning had he not been determined to act accordingly. If it was a "bluff" it would be the greatest mistake of his political career. The Soviets did reply through the TASS News Agency. They could not possibly appear to be frightened by the U.S. warning. On the contrary, they should display self-confidence and complacency and present the United States as a threat to the Persian Gulf, but their cynical and provocative reply does not at all mean that they are determined to remain truly complacent. They should know from the Cuban precedent--when they attempted to install missiles on the island--that the White House is not joking when it issues such warnings. U.S. warships had surrounded Castro's country then and had forced the Soviets to "pack up" and leave. Since then Moscow has not dared make another attempt at the installation of a nuclear bridgehead on the American continent. Let them now question the U.S. right to be interested in the fate of the Persian Gulf. The United States can do the same about them. The Persian Gulf is a strategic area and its fate concerns the western alliance at least as much as the eastern alliance. After all, other areas about which Moscow not only manifested an interest but also placed under its control are no less distant from the Soviet Union than the Persian Gulf is from the United States. The issue is whether the Soviets will risk a confrontation with the U.S. military machine, and we can take it for granted that they will not dare.

CSO: 4908

## CARTER MESSAGE ESCALATES COLD WAR; SOVIET ACTIONS CRITICIZED

AT251637 Athens I AVGI in Greek 25 Jan 80 p 6 AT

[From the I AVGI column: "Carter's Message"]

[Text] Yesterday's message by President Carter to the U.S. Congress reflects very clearly the dangerous orientations for international peace of the U.S. leading circles, and at the same time it constitutes one more step toward the escalation of the cold war, the world's return to the logic of confrontation among great powers, a logic which considers people mere composite parts of one or the other "sphere of influence." On the other hand, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has been the USSR's "contribution" toward the same direction, regardless of the strategic-political calculations that dictated it and the "internationalistic" reasons that were put forth to justify it. Throughout the postwar years, U.S. imperialism has been exercising an aggressive policy which—even when it abandoned verbally John Foster Dulles' doctrine of "Brinkmanship"—has had as its more profound content the people's forced submission under the threat of war. The people of the world replied to this policy by developing the struggle for the disposition of the atmosphere and principles of peaceful coexistence, and the direction of Soviet foreign policy after 1956 contributed decisively to this reply. The policy of peaceful coexistence is not confined to the agreements between the USSR and the United States. By struggling for peaceful coexistence and its principles the people become the decisive factor in international developments, a factor which refuses to accept the logic of the spheres of influence and the picture of a world whose fortunes are judged or will be judged by the confrontation of the two "poles," the two greatest powers of our era. This gigantic setting in motion and activation of the people throughout the world to impose the principles of peaceful coexistence—the central position among which is occupied by the principle of nonintervention of foreigners into the internal affairs of the various countries—has constituted a very strong barrier to the plans and aims of U.S. imperialism, and has tangibly shown its contribution to the great revolutionary change of the world that is taking place in our era. Therefore, when President Carter now asks for the establishment of a very broad anti-Soviet bloc from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, when he

clearly threatens a new world war should imperialist interests in the Middle East and the Pacific Ocean be imperiled. When he declares the need for the intensification of the arms race and announces the imposition of mandatory military service by the United States, he does nothing other than promote permanent plans for the aggravation of the international situation and elimination of the "bogey" of peaceful coexistence as a way out of the deep and multilateral crisis of modern imperialism and the United States' leading position in it. However, it should not escape our attention that this attack against the atmosphere of detente was objectively facilitated by the USSR's alienation from the basic principles of peaceful coexistence and its orientation for an answer to the imperialist provocation that would be based not on the inspiration and activation of popular movements throughout the world, but on recourse to the logic of military confrontation and the guarantee of strategic spheres of influence. The culmination of this orientation was the intervention in Afghanistan which, precisely for this reason, constitutes a tough blow at detente and the peoples' struggle for the imposition of peaceful coexistence. It is not at all accidental that President Carter is intensely utilizing this intervention to ideologically condition both the American and the other peoples of the world to minimize their resistance to the escalating imperialist provocation that again trumpets the old, well known sounds of the anti-Soviet crusade. In view of this escalation which is returning us to the most dangerous days of the cold war, only the active struggle of all the people--outside the false dilemmas of antagonism between the great powers--and the intention to impose a more general settlement through negotiations on the critical international problems with due respect for the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of both Afghanistan and any other country, can stop a very dangerous development, restore and develop the atmosphere of detente and peaceful coexistence. Yesterday's message by President Carter, despite [words illegible] status for all people and necessitates an intensification of efforts here in Greece for an active policy of peace, together in particular with all peaceloving and progressive European forces that are fighting against the logic of confrontations and blocs and for a more general understanding.

CSO: 4908



## GREECE

### SPLIT IN EXTREME LEFTIST ORGANIZATION REPORTED

Athens ANDI in Greek 4 Jan 80 pp 18,19

[Text] The Maoist groups' territory, which has changed in our country since the crisis in the communist movement and the analogous western European phenomena, entered into a new period of splintering after 1976. In addition, each of its offshoots tried to delimit a new pole of reference for its "anti-revisionism" to complex and contradictory post-Maoist developments. Thus, we have seen heretofore OMLE [Organization of Marxist-Leninists of Greece] split into KKE/ml [expansion unknown] and ML/KKE [Greek Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist], various smaller groups (EEAM [Greek Revolutionary Liberation Front], Proletariat Struggle, etc.) disappearing from the forefront and, for several months, a crisis developing in EKKE [Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece] between those faithful to each successive Chinese leadership and others who feel betrayed by the change in affairs.

After passing through the "necessary" phase of "suspicious" persons being reciprocally named, the crisis led to the expulsion of EKKE Politburo members and the political independence of many of the AASPE [Antiimperialistic, Antifascist Student Faction of Greece] organizations from the leading mechanism; it appears that it will end with the coalition of the remaining EKKE faction with ML/KKE (whose voice is the newspaper LAIKOS

DROMOS) which has identical opinions on Chinese developments. (The "official" EKKE united with the ML/KKE bloc in the Polytechnic march.)

Following is the text issued by those expelled from EKKE. Despite the reaction one may have to the text's "antirevisionist" verbalism which makes it seem that its authors' political perceptions have not matured--particularly on issues of the Greek movement--as regards the philology on Sino-Soviet disputes, one can probably view as positive the fact that some, although a minority and with great difficulty, are finally beginning to disentangle themselves from the logic of barren ideological attachments and to touch ground in the difficult reality of Greek problems.

We who have signed this text, former members of EKKE and its youth movement, address ourselves to the communists, leftists, democrats, every worker and employed person in order to denounce the EKKE Central Committee for its revisionist and subversionist ideology and actions, make known the real reasons compelling us to divorce our position from this organization, among whose lines we have been struggling for years, and proclaim our decisive and irrevocable decision to depart from it.

For over three months, we fought intensely in EKKE against infringement of the most rudimentary meaning of democratic centralization. Recognizing the crisis through which EKKE and the Marxist-Leninist movement is passing, which became clearer with the revisionist turn in the Chinese Communist Party and the effort of one of the oldest leadership cliques to drag us onto its team, and seeking ways to overcome this crisis, we fought for the equal and open waging of the ideological battle on matters of principle concerning the political and ideological characteristics of EKKE, its organizational structure and functioning, as well as its actions.

These issues have occupied for some time not only the majority of EKKE members, but also many of the organization's sympathizers.

The intervention of two of the Politburo comrades, Petros Stangos and Anna Mikhalitsianou, gave a new dimension to the EKKE crisis and helped to generalize the comrades' opposition.

We fought for the disengagement of EKKE from dogmatism, subjectivity, haughtiness, megalomania and the refusal to see the problems and crisis. We fought for an end to copying foreign models and fruitlessly and mechanically applying "formulas" which relate to other lands and other years; we fought for an end to constantly avoiding scientific analysis of Greek reality.

We rejected the renunciation of the fundamental principle of support for our forces and its replacement with servitude to the Chinese Communist Party. Indeed, at the moment when a revisionist turn is being realized in the Chinese Communist Party and there is an abandonment in words and actions of basic principles--the continuance of revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and the class struggle as a principal link for the development of production--the EKKE's servitude to the Chinese Communist Party's revisionist turn at the same time means an abandonment of proletarian internationalism, an abandonment of the battle against every new and old revisionist current.

We defended: steadfastness to the historic role of the proletariat and its party against modern revisionism whose center is the Soviet Communist Party and the Greek Communist Party Exterior in our country; inner-party democracy as a prerequisite for the correct application of democratic centralization, counter to the reactionary bureaucratic centralization of the Central Committee; the conception of working out a revolutionary political line based on Greek reality and the class struggle against the rightist line of submission to the bourgeoisie; and the search for and application of methods and a working style which aims at emancipation, not leading the comrades and masses by the hand.

We defended the international contribution of Mao Tse-tung and the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution to Marxist-Leninist theory.

With a goal of revolutionary unity and a wish for these fundamental differences to be solved productively, the majority of comrades in Athens and Piraeus called for the convening of the Second EKKE Congress. In response to all these issues, however, the EKKE Central Committee, guided by the Khristos

Bistis, Anna Filini and Dimitris Kalligeropoulos clique, continued the tactic of willful blindness and postponing the confrontation of the ideological battle on matters of principle with the battle without principles, with the exclusive criterion being the maintenance of its "power." It called for subordination and an end to the ideological battle and, even before this began, it applied a series of socialistic-fascistic inspired measures such as "punishments" of temporary suspension and expulsion; it used insults, personal revenge and defamation and it attacked party offices in order to polarize and transfer the ideological battle from questions of principles to questions of "fractionalism," "Trotskyism," etc., consciously and methodically leading to the entirety of EKKE members staying away from the second congress and, in the end, leading to splintering.

The height of the clique and Central Committee's reactionary revisionist ideology and practice was the subversionist, preplanned expulsion of Politburo comrades Petros Stangos and Anna Mikhalitsianou and the characterizing of comrade Petros Stangos as a "spy" and "security agent." The Central Committee, demonstrating its bottomless cowardice, dared not openly present to the movement such disgusting defamation, which brings to mind the worst moments of the movement.

We denounce in totality the Central Committee's decision ("EKKE Central Committee communique on the expulsion of two of its members" LAIKOI AGONES No. 228), the subversionist expulsion of two Politburo comrades which only revealed the crisis in EKKE, the Central Committee's definitive revisionist turn and its irrevocable decision to decisively end, by this method, the ideological battle.

At the same time, we consider it our obligation to declare to the movement and end our own responsibilities for the procedure and mistakes of EKKE, particularly those among us who were in leadership positions.

We who have signed this text decisively condemn the Central Committee's revisionist ideology and practice which betrays the EKKE's name and struggling traditions which were counter to the clique's revisionist ideology; we declare that we are no longer members of this organization.

At the same time, as communists with a consciousness of the crisis through which the Marxist-Leninist movement in Greece and internationally is passing, we want to contribute decisively to the ideological and political quest for paths which will reestablish from within the movement the principles



of Marxism-Leninism, by promoting its theory. We wish to contribute to the scientific analysis of Greek reality as a tool for the question of the working class and the people.

In this attempt of ours we will derive forces from our people's struggles; we will find support in dialogue, unity and common action in the movement with all those political forces, Marxist-Leninists and strugglers who are concerned with and seek paths for the revolutionary surpassing of the crisis in the Marxist-Leninist movement.

Supported on the general truth of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought, and rejecting the ideological dependence on foreign centers, we will fight for all the forces and efforts to be unified in a common journey, with the predominant goal being building the communist party which will incarnate the aspirations of the working class and the people for social progress, national independence and the revolution and victory of socialism.

The text closes with the statement that: "The majority of party members in Athens and Piraeus have left EKKE. More than 60 of these (members and cadres of EKKE and its youth party) have signed the communique-denunciation with which they declare their reasons for leaving and denounce the EKKE Central Committee."

Signed: Andreas Danos, Maria Ioannidou, Alexis Kapopoulos, Anna Mikhalitsiancu, Thanasis Balatsos, Eleni Papamiltiadou, Katerina Petrakou, Andreas Sambatakakis, Petros Stangos and Giannis Frangakis.

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## POLITICIANS PROPOSE CHANGE OF ELECTORAL LAW

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 5 Jan 80 pp 1, 3

[Text] Former Democratic Center Union [EDIK] leader G. Mavros and Democratic Socialist Party [KODISO] chairman I. Pasmazoglou gave lengthy statements to the press on the domestic situation. The statements were based on different evaluations by the two leaders. Pasmazoglou called for an early election while Mavros asked for an end to the "frenzied pre-electoral climate" through a clarification of the government's intentions with regard to the date the future elections will be held.

Both the KODISO chairman and Mavros agreed on two points: that the domestic situation has worsened and that the electoral system of simple proportional representation should be introduced.

A government spokesman, asked to comment on the Mavros and Pasmazoglou statements, repeated the previous statement that a) the government has no intention of modifying the existing electoral law and b) the present Chamber of Deputies will complete its 4-year term and the next election will take place normally in the fall of 1981.

## Mavros' Views

Upon leaving the presidential mansion (where he had been received by the president of the Republic) Mavros made the following statement:

"I presented to the president of the Republic my views on the country's domestic and external problems. I took the opportunity to present to the chief of state the agony we all feel at the recent deterioration of the international situation. The New Year's messages by the president of the Republic and the premier do reflect those worries but they do not offer even a clue as to what measures the government is contemplating taking in dealing with the crisis.

"The world is going through an exceptionally critical period. The president of the French Republic in his own New Year's message did not rule out the possibility of a military confrontation between the two power

blocs. But the Greek problem is above all domestic and primarily political. In the last 50 years Greece has never been in a more difficult position. Our country is beset by a wave of instability, uncertainty and confusion of unprecedented dimensions. While the clouds are thickening on the international horizon and the world elsewhere is almost on a war footing, here we walk uncertainly in a climate of confusion and lack of seriousness in dealing with our great national problems.

"I suggested to the president of the Republic, who shares these worries as shown by his New Year's message, to call the Council of Ministers under his chairmanship as the constitution provides after obtaining the views of the leaders of the various parties. Under Article 38, paragraph 3 of the Constitution, "the president of the Republic may, in exceptional circumstances, call a meeting of the Ministerial Council under his chairmanship." What other more critical circumstances are needed to put into effect this role of the chief of state as defined by the Constitution?

"Without further delay we must restore domestic tranquility, end the feverish pre-electoral atmosphere now prevalent in the country, and secure national unity to deal with the great crisis besetting our country. The two most urgent measures are:

"1. Immediate enactment of the simple proportional representation as the country's electoral system. This is the system which, under difficult conditions such as the present, will function as an active and effective means for defusing the current climate. It is also the electoral system acceptable to all opposition parties.

"2. The government must clarify its intentions on the timing of the next election and on the other political developments. This is the time for the chief of state to exercise the powers vested in him by the Constitution."

#### 1. Pasmazoglou's views

In a strong electoral-like statement, KODISO chairman I. Pasmazoglou presented to the political reporters yesterday a "cluster of proposals" by his party relating to the electoral system and the financing of the political parties. He appears almost certain that the Chamber of Deputies will not complete its 4-year term.

Pasmazoglou bases his view on early elections on his assertion that the present Chamber of Deputies is in evident disharmony with the public sentiment while at the same time the government is unable to find solutions for the current critical problems.

In the context of Pasmazoglou's assertion that "the election is the only solution to the problem," the Democratic Socialism Party proposes:

a. An early understanding among the parties of democratic opposition on the position they will take on the election of the new president of the Republic. This understanding should relate basically to the definition of the criteria to be used for the selection of candidates to assure the greatest possible safeguards "for the stability and strengthening of the democratic institution."

b. Enactment now of the simple proportional representation as the country's permanent electoral system with elimination of the "preference check mark (vote)" among candidates.

Pesmazoglou, predicting that the next election will not result in the election of a political party with sufficient majority [in the Chamber of Deputies] to form its own independent government, again voiced support for the solution of coalition cabinets which have proved to be stable and productive in critical moments of our national life.

c. State financing of the parties' campaign costs. According to KODISO estimates, the expenditures (approximately 90 million drachmas) will not exceed 0.25 percent of the state budget. Pesmazoglou admitted that the opposition parties disagree on the question of state auditing of these expenditures but he added that these disagreements should not be used by the government as an excuse for not introducing this measure.

d. Establish an upper limit and audit of the electoral expenditures by parties and candidates to erect a barrier to the orgy of wasteful spending.

e. Establish within reason by the state-controlled mass media ways for genuine communication and public comparison of programs and a genuine dialogue among authorized party spokesmen.

f. Amend the rules of the Chamber of Deputies to accord equal rights to all party groups. Speaking on the economic problems, Pesmazoglou exhorted the government to bear full responsibility for the poor economic conditions which are the result of lack of planning and consistency, the rise in tax evasion and the chaotic conditions which prevail in the state bureaucracy.

Pesmazoglou predicted that the Greek economy will be seriously weakened in the immediate future due to stagnation, unemployment and disturbing increases in the balance of payments deficit.

The KODISO chairman attributed this pessimistic outlook to the inefficiency of the government, the poor functioning of the state bureaucracy and the "shameless public spending" related to partisan policies.

Speaking on the world situation, Pesmazoglou stressed that the recent developments are related to the potential of a serious war threat.

"The gravity of the situation especially in the Middle East and the looming threat of wider conflicts and complications in connection with the continuing threat against our country by the Turkish expansionist circles have created serious new problems for our foreign relations. The possibility of wider conflicts underlines the serious stabilizing role of a United Europe and the correctness of our country's European orientation. The government bears heavy responsibility for not taking full advantage of these ties, and so do the Panhellenic Socialist Movement and KKE for fighting against them in ways which are harmful to our national interests."

Speaking more specifically on Greece's European orientation, Pasmazoglou clarified that "the political benefits from Greece's induction into the Common Market are primarily economic. But these benefits will depend on cleansing our domestic economy first; otherwise, the political benefits from the induction will be weakened."

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'PASOK' ANNOUNCES FORMATION OF COUNCIL ON PARLIAMENTARY OPERATION

AT231725 Athens TO VIMA in Greek 23 Jan 80 p 6 AT

[Text] A council of parliamentary operation has already been formed in implementation of a resolution by the Fifth Session of PASOK's Central Committee. The council is already in operation. Jurisdictions and responsibilities both of the council and its four deputy-members have been established. The new composition of the KTE-PASOK [PASOK's Parliamentary Sectors of Work] was also announced.

Council on Parliamentary Operation

A) General:

The Council on Parliamentary Operation established on the basis of the resolutions of the Fifth Session of the Central Committee, will be responsible for establishing PASOK's tactics within the Chamber of Deputies and will also coordinate the work of the KTE-PASOK.

It will enforce the decisions of the chairman; of the central committee; of the executive office and of the parliamentary group and will implement the tactics of the movement within the Chamber of Deputies both on general and specific issues.

This council will meet every 15 days or when convened by the chairman or by the parliamentary representative and its meetings will be chaired by the chairman of the movement who can be deputized by the parliamentary representative.

B) Members and groups of KTE-PASOK

1--The council will have eight members and will be made up of the chairman; the two parliamentary representatives; four deputies and DYKO [Director of Operation of the Parliamentary Group]

2--All members of the council will be members of the movement's central committee.



3--The KTE-PASOK groups under the responsibility of the four deputies will be the following:

First Section: Group A under Deputy Apostolos Kaklathanis will be made up of the KTE for the ministries of: Labor, Education and Religion, Interior, Culture and Sciences.

Group B under Deputy Menios Koutsogiorgas will be made up of the KTE for the ministries of: Ministry to the Prime Minister, Justice, Foreign Affairs, National Defense and Public Order.

Second Section: Group A under Deputy Giannis Papaspyrou will be made up of the KTE for the ministries of: Coordination, Finance, Industry Social Services and Merchant Marine.

Group B under Deputy Giannis Skoularikis will be made up of the KTE for the ministries of: Agriculture, Trade, Public Works, Communications and North Greece.

C) Duties and jurisdictions of the four deputies, members of the council.

1--The four deputies, members of the council, who will head the groups of KTE-PASOK will supervise, control and coordinate the operation of the KTE of the group which they head.

2--They will cooperate with the secretaries and speakers of each one of the KTE for planning the operation of each KTE and they will supervise implementation of these plans.

3--They will follow the meetings of each KTE under them after first and directly they cooperate with the secretaries, speaker and DYKD--before every meeting--and they prepare a program for regular sessions also making provisions for special sessions. At the same time they will also call KTE special sessions informing the parliamentary representative and DYKO whenever there is a special reason.

4--They will follow the examination and discussion of positions to be adopted by the movement during debate of bills and interpellations under the jurisdiction of each KTE and in every instance they will inform the chairman and the parliamentary representative.

5--They will attend chamber of deputies meetings during debates on bills which come under the jurisdictions of the KTE under them.

6--They will approve interpellations and questions as well as reports on personal matters as well as matters which must be urgently raised within the chamber.

7--They will be responsible for the proper preparation of the various speakers on the bills under debate, informing the chairman in writing on every bill to be debated and on every interpellation under discussion.

8--They will cooperate closely with the secretaries of the movement's various committees and bureaus informing the council on every issue.

9--They will arbitrate on possible issues which may arise during selection of speakers on the various bills and on various interpellations to be raised in the chamber.

10--They will solve any differences which may arise between the secretary and the speaker of one of the KTE or between deputies over issues of their jurisdiction in accordance with the regulations for the operation of the parliamentary group.

11--In case of a disagreement with a secretary of one of the KTE the issue will be resolved by the chairman or by the parliamentary representative.

They will prepare compulsory monthly reports to the council in which they will report in detail on the following:

A--If meetings are held regularly on scheduled days.

B--If the selection of speakers on bills, proposals or interpellations or questions submitted in the chamber was conducted in accordance to the regulations for the operation of the parliamentary group.

C--If secretaries and speakers of the various KTE regularly attend chamber debates at least during discussion of interpellations.

D--If there are differences between the secretary and speaker of each KTE or between deputies on issues having to do with their jurisdictions in accordance to the regulations for the operation of the parliamentary group.

E--A name roster of deputies present at every KTE meeting and every meeting of the parliamentary committees of their jurisdiction in the chamber of deputies.

#### D) Discipline

The Committee on Parliamentary Function, provided for under the regulations for the operation of the parliamentary group will cease to exist. The Council on Parliamentary Operation will replace this committee in all its functions as they are defined in the regulations for the operation of the parliamentary group.

Members of the KTE-PASOK will be as follows:

First Section:

Ministry of Public Order: Deputies--Nikos Athanasopoulos, Alekos Derivianakis, Anastasios Karras, Merkoyris Kyratsous, Dimos Botsaris, Georgios Serpanos, Thanasis Skoulas, Ilias Katzoplakis, Dimitris Kondro-koukis.

Ministry of Justice: Deputies--Nikos Athanasopoulos, Stathis Alexandris, Konstandina Giannopoulou, Alekos Derivianakis, Dimosthenis Dimosthenopoulos, Giannis Zafiropoulos, Levteris Kiosklis, Anastasios Peponis, Spyros Plaskovitis, Ilias Katzoplakis.

Ministry of National Defense: Deputies--Vasilis Agorastis, Alekos Damianidhis, Agamemnon Koutsogiorgas, Dimos Botsaris, Aris Bouloukos, Panagiotis Papayeorgopoulos, Georgios Perrakis, Georgios Serpanos, Giannis Karalambopoulos, Dimitris Kondhrokoukis.

Foreign Ministry: Deputies--Stathis Giotas, Melina Merkouri, Sifis Mikheloyiannis, Kostas Nikolaou, Dimos Papadimitriou, Karolos Papoulias, Anastasios Peponis, Angelos Perdihouris, Amalia Fleming, Giannis Karalambo-poulos.

Ministry of Labor: Deputies--Levteris Verivakis, Konstandina Giannopoulou, Stathis Giotas, Dhimosthenis Dhimosthenopoulos, Khristos Karayedryiou, Georgios Katsimbardhis, Irini Lambraki, Georgios Moraitis, Stefanos Tzoumakas, Dimitris Tsovolas.

Ministry of Interior: Deputies--Vasilis Agorastis, Stathis Anthopoulos, Giannis Zafelropoulos, Anastasios Karras, Ilias Katrivanos, Merkouris Kiratsous, Georgios Moraitis, Panagiotis Papageorgopoulos, Georgios Papadimitriou, Georgios Perrakis.

Ministry of Education: Deputies--Levteris Verivakis, Apostolos Kaklamanis, Giannis Koutsokheras, Elrini Lambraki, Sifis Mikhelogiannis, Dimos Papadimitriou, Vasilis Papadopoulos, Angelos Perdikouris, Kostas Spiliopoulos, Stefanos Tzoumakas, Mandlis Khatzinakis.

Ministry of Culture: Deputies--Ilias Katrivanos, Lefteris Kiosklis, Giannis Koutsokheras, Melina Merkouri, Georgios Papadimitriou, Spiros Plaskovitis, Thanasis Skoulas, Kostas Spiliopoulos, Amalia Fleming, Manolis Khatzinakis.

Ministry to the Prime Minister: Deputies--Stathis Alexandhris, Stathis Anthopoulos, Alekos Damianidis, Apostolos Kaklamanis, Khristos Karageorgiou, Georgios Katsimbardis, Agamemnon Koutsokheras, Kostas Nikolaou, Vasilis Papadopoulos, Karolos Papoulias, Dimitris Tzovolas.

#### Second Section:

Ministry of Industry: Deputies--Giannis Alevras, Kharalambos Atmatzidis, Sifis Valirakis, Panagiotis Kritikos, Stavros Marinidis, Khristos Olkonou, Dimitris Papaioannou, Giannis Pottakis, Dimitris Pitsioris.

Ministry of North Greece: Deputies--Kostas Amanatidis, Kharalambos Atmatzidis, Dimitris Vradelis, Vasilis Intzes, Kharalambos Kiripidis, Dimitris Kefalidis, Markos Nartzinas, Thanasis Xanthopoulos, Kharalambos Stamatopoulos.

Ministry of Merchant Marine: Deputies--Nikos Akritidis, Petros Valvis, Grigorios Kasimatis, Panagiotis Kritikos, Giannis Papaspirou, Kallimakhos Papakhrastos, Dimitris Sapoutzis, Thanasis Philippopoulos, Asimakis Fotilas.

Ministry of Public Works: Deputies--Dimitris Arkhos, Kostas Aslanis, Moskhos Gikonoglou, Vasilis Kedikoglou, Akhilleas Koliouris, Alekos Liakokapis, Markos Natsinas, Thanasis Xanthopoulos, Stefanos Tsaparas.

Ministry of Agriculture: Deputies--Kostas Amanatidis, Dimitris Vradelis, Moskhos Gikonoglou, Kharalambos Karipidis, Dimitris Kephallidis, Dimitrios Papaioannou, Spyros Rallis, Giannis Skoularikis, Kharalambos Stamatopoulos.

Ministry of Trade: Deputies--Nikolaos Akritidis, Nikolaos Vgenopoulos, Anastasios Intzes, Vasilios Intzes, Grigorios Kasimatis, Alekos Liarokapis, St. Panagoulis, Spyros Rallis, Vangelis Staikos.

Ministry of Social Services: Deputies--Nikos Vgenopoulos, Maris Kipriotaki-Perraki, Khristos Olkonomou, Stathis Panagoulis, Kallimakhos Papakhrastos, Xenophon Peloponnisis, Dimitris Sapountzis, Thanasis Philippopoulos, Giannis Floros.

Ministry of Finance: Deputies--Andonis Georgiadhis, Manolis Dretakis, Panagiotis Katsaros, Stavros Marinidhis, Giannis Papaspyrou, Xenophon Peloponnisis, Georgios Petsos, Giannis Pottakis, Khristos Rokofillos, Asimakis Fotilas.

Ministry of Communications: Deputies--Kostas Aslanis, Petros Valvis, Sifis Valirakis, Akhilleas Koliouris, Maria Kipriotaki-Perrakis, Giannis Skoularikis, Vangelis Staikos, Stefanos Tsaparas, Giannis Floros.

Ministry of Coordination: Deputies--Giannis Alevras, Dimitris Arkhos, Andonios Georgiadis, Manolis Drettakis, Anastasios Intzes, Panagiotis Katsaros, Vasilios Kedikoglou, Georgios Petsos, Dimitrios Pitsioris, Khristos Rokofillos.

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## INCREASE OF EMERGENCY OIL RESERVES PROPOSED

Athens O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 27 Dec 79 p 13

[Article by Giannis Dimitriadis]

[Text] Premier Karamanlis' trip to China constituted the logical ending to a new multi-dimensional foreign policy. One could say that the big surprise was his visit to Baghdad. Even though he had been invited and had accepted this invitation some time ago, the rush of announcements and denials in recent days had given this visit an air of anxiety and had turned our thoughts to oil.

The same was true of the various announcements about [Minister of Coordination Konstandinos] Mitsotakis' trip to London. It was announced that he was negotiating the purchase of British oil, coal and shares in coal mines.

This practice of "silence" used by the government as a form of institutionalized policy for solving all national problems was also used for coping with the problem of oil imports to Greece. It was announced a few months ago that the problem had been solved by a number of bilateral agreements with Libya and Iraq. Yet, the recent press reports speak of a stagnancy in the procedures for oil purchases.

In view of the fuel shortage the question arises as to what the situation is regarding "national security stocks."

#### 1. The 'Security Stock'

When we speak of oil "security stocks" we refer to the oil quantity the country would need in order to cope with an emergency situation--usually a conflict--for a considerable period of time. In this case the necessary stock should be such as to supply the country's military machinery and also to allow the economic activities of the country to function.

Naturally, the level of the "security stock" depends on two different factors: First, on the overall national defense planning and the expected duration of the operations and, second, on the possibilities of importing and transporting oil during the period of conflict.

Another factor related to this problem but not being under the absolute control of any government is whether the oil producing countries are



willing to sell oil during the conflict and at what price. But before we consider the oil situation in Greece let us see how two other Western countries, the United States and France cope with the problem.

In assessing its "security stock" the United States has taken into consideration the following factors:

- a. That the conflict will last for a period of 6 to 8 weeks.
- b. That it will develop on many fronts (this concerns oil transportation).
- c. That it imports 40 to 50 percent of the oil needed.
- d. That during the conflict it wishes to keep the rate of its economy at normal levels.

On the basis of these factors, President Carter has fixed, with the unanimous agreement of the National Security Council, the level of the "security stock" at 150 megatons at a time when the annual oil consumption of the country reaches 850 megatons.

France, on the other hand, has fixed its "security stock" at a quantity equal to a 3-month consumption or to three times the quantity of oil being shipped at any given moment toward French ports. According to French experts this stock is sufficient to fully meet the needs of the country's armed forces and part of the French industrial force for 3 to 4 months.

## 2. Whence We Import, How Much and what Are Security Conditions During its Transportation

Greece's energy program depends mostly on oil and less on coal and water. However, the maintenance of the armed forces in a state of readiness and their operational capability depend strictly on oil and its derivatives. As is the case with other countries, for Greece also oil is the backbone of our defensive armor. It is clear, therefore, that the country's oil need is not only connected with its economic development but also and literally with the maintenance and defense of its independence.

The annual oil stock consumed by Greece reaches 9.5 million tons which are totally imported at lavish prices (see table). The table shows that the total Greek oil imports reach a level of 10 million tons, thus allowing for 500,000 tons for surplus or "security stock." The "security stock" quantity raises many questions concerning the government policy on this crucial problem because this quantity does not last more than 3-4 weeks in contrast with the programs of other countries which provide for a "coverage" of at least 3 months. Moreover, the fact that in recent years our country has been experiencing crucial periods and tensions in its relations with Turkey renders the problem more serious.

## GREEK OIL IMPORTS IN 1979

Country	Tons (in millions)
Soviet Union	1.2
Libya	0.5
Iraq	1.5 state purchases
Saudi Arabia	2.5
	4.3 multinationals
Total	10.0

The situation was overemphasized early this year following the events in Iran and the panic that followed in the international oil market. The government--the main oil importer--had given the private companies wide margins for oil imports and refining on the basis of the supply that existed in the international market. But with the shah's fall and the shut-down of the oil wells by the militant strikers everything "went to hell," according to a government official. At that time a number of reports referred to a "dangerous drop in oil reserves" and the impact was adversely felt by the car owners.

There followed the trips by Mitsotakis and by the premier to the Middle East which were of course prearranged. Their aim was to strengthen the Greek prestige in the countries of the area and thus strengthen both the prospering technical companies which have undertaken large construction projects there and the Greek exports of agricultural and industrial products.

On the contrary, however, these trips gave the impression of a beggar country. The government was looking everywhere for oil for its survival and the government media took care to persuade us about...the achievements of securing as of next year fuels from the national reserves of Saudi Arabia or Libya!

We have reached the present level for two reasons. First of all, because at this crucial stage the government has allowed the private sector to participate in the purchase of crude oil. Second, because of a feeling of slight indifference with which the ministers coped with the problem. The companies were not in a rush to buy in order to get good prices and the government did not concern itself with the substance of the problem before it surfaced. A glance at the table of the countries supplying us with oil shows that in their majority they are opposing the alliance to which we belong: NATO. In the event of a conflict, what role will their political ideology play, especially if we assume that at a certain moment we will not be opposing the Turkish but the Warsaw Pact forces?

Now that the trend is to get oil from the Soviet Union especially after the recent agreements, it is useful to point out that as long as "we belong to the West" for defensive reasons we would do well to decrease, as far as our vital needs are concerned, our dependence on opponent camps. The

same can be said, of course, in the event of a conflict with Turkey. The question arises: How much can the Moslem countries help us, especially after the recent upsurge of Islamism?

Finally, the role of transportation is important in getting the needed oil stock--a role which is accentuated during a period of tension or conflict when, that is, the question of transporting oil emerges.

For Greece, a country which is literally surrounded by sea and which does not accept any inflow of oil from bordering countries,, all transportation is done by ship--by a means, that is, which is militarily vulnerable both because of its size and because of the standard lanes of shipping, a means which for the most part depends on the possibility of passing through the [Dardanelles] Straits or the Suez Canal.

If we mention the possible transportation difficulties during wartime and even if we over-stress them slightly, we do so in order to make more conscious the need for increased "security stock."

### 3. Energy Needs and Defensive Planning

Despite our entry in EEC, our important national problems remain unsolved and no possible solutions are in sight. Our main dispute with Turkey--as a result of the Turkish expansionist policy--do not exclude the possibility of a conflict in the future. With such a possibility in mind, the need looms large for filling the fuel gap and for establishing a large "security stock." This immediate need will be met either through new purchases or through the reduction of energy consumption. It is also useful to chart our defense energy needs. This may mean some sacrifice in the rate of the economic development or in the free and uncontrolled consumption.

In this context, the need becomes more imperative for fast extraction and use of Greek oil and for an effort to find new deposits. Also, when it comes to the defense of the country the existence and use of domestic oil--even in small quantities--is of much greater importance than one or two dozen tanks.

Another aspect of the problem is the effort to find sources which would not be affected by the political ideology of the country during wartime and which would continue to supply us with fuels.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, it should be understood that the oil is not simply a means of economic development or a product for consumption by 1 million Greek automobile owners but also a strong national defense weapon. For this reason the government must plan its future energy policy more carefully so that we will not find ourselves in the position we were 8 months ago as concern our "security stock."

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<sup>1</sup>An example would be the British oil, for which our government, according to reports, recently discussed conditions of sale in London.

## THEOLOGY SCHOLARS DISCUSS CHURCH UNIFICATION

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek 6 Dec 79 pp 39-45

Text On the occasion of the meeting of Pope John Paul the Second and Patriarch Dimitrios the First of Constantinople, EPIKAIRA is presenting a comprehensive assessment: First, theology Professor Vlasia Feidas gives a vivid description of the problems related to unification and the dialogue. Second, journalist V. Lambropoulos presents the opposing views. Finally, our reporter on church matters on the long-range objectives of the Papacy.

Within fifteen years, the primates of Christendom's two major confessions of faith, the Pope of Rome and the Ecumenical Patriarch and Bishop of Constantinople and New Rome, met for the fourth time, joining hands not in a simple gesture of courtesy but as a substantial act in the quest for the unity of the two churches.

The recent meeting in Constantinople between Pope John Paul the Second and Ecumenical Patriarch Dimitrios the First is the fourth in the series and the most important. Three authoritative sources testify to this:

The most senior hierarch, Metropolitan Meliton of Khalkidon, states: "The fact that the Pope in the midst of his great initiatives thought of making his first visit outside of the Catholic domain to a non-Catholic Church has very deep significance. This visit to Fanari takes place at a critical juncture in the life of the two churches since the preparatory work for the beginning of the religious-theological dialogue has been completed.

"...The Pope's visit has wider meaning because it takes place at a strange period when we are facing a new religious fanaticism. The meeting of the two church leaders, however, will tell the world that the Christian Church follows the way of Christ and is determined to hold a dialogue with all demoninations, all those who believe in God.

"...As a church we are ready to bring the Christian message to today's humanity and carry God's word to a world wracked by anarchy."



Meliton's very carefully worded statement offers a counter-message to the religious fanaticism of Islam and indirectly warns the Christian world against its presence under a political cover.

The [Turkish] newspaper CUMHURİYET, shortly before the Pope's arrival in Ankara, asked in an editorial whether the visit which aims at the unity of the Catholic and the Orthodox Church "is an affront to Islam which is in a state of unrest." Nevertheless, Bishop Ramon Cascade Torrela, the Curia's delegate on Christian unity, insisted on the significance of the visit, defining its meaning:

"This is the Pope's first ecumenical journey exclusively devoted to the search of Christian unity." The Ecumenical Patriarchate set the tone of the meeting when it said that the visit will inaugurate the theological dialogue whose preparation has been completed.

Let us recall the previous meetings:

1. In January 1964, following secret contacts for several years, Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras and Pope Paul the Sixth met and exchanged an embrace of love in Jerusalem where Christ taught and Christianity was born. The world press hailed the meeting as the greatest event since the Second World War.

2. In July 1967, the Pope announced that he would visit Fanari. It was the second trip and received wide attention. All believed that the meeting should take place in Rome. The meeting between Athenagoras and Paul in Constantinople set the foundations of the theological dialogue and the beginning of the unity of the two churches. At the same time, the Pope through his visit declared his respect for the Orthodox Church, a fact criticized by the conservative Catholic elements.

3. In October 1967, Rome received Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras in a magnificent ceremony with extensive popular participation. In Rome's Saint Peter's Cathedral, Athenagoras and Paul declared Christianity's love and unity. The conservative Orthodox elements rejected the meeting as unacceptable and the inauguration of the theological dialogue as heretical. Athenagoras received and has continued to receive since 1964 their fire and exhortations. They charged that since the Eleventh Century the western Christian world has been responsible for the misfortunes of the [Greek] nation and the loss of the Byzantine Empire. They charged also that the Catholics caused the schism that changed the political history as well. They accused [Athenagoras] of surrendering to their demands, changing the spirit of Orthodox Christianity.

Whenever this question was raised, Athenagoras retorted: "We discuss, we do not surrender." This meant that the two churches have a duty to discuss their differences and to remove them in the interest of Christendom. Recently, Meliton, the Metropolitan of Khalkidon, shortly before the



Pope's arrival in Fanari underlined that the Great Church of Christ knows very well how to interpret the spirit of Christ's teaching for love and unity. It moves forward in this historic task with wisdom.

Evangelos Theodorou: "The two Churches are Sisters."

The vice-rector of the University of Athens, Professor of Theology Evangelos Theodorou, spoke categorically on the need for reconciliation and unity between the two churches.

"The meeting of Pope John Paul with Ecumenical Patriarch Dimitrios, which took place with the blessings of all Orthodox Churches, is indeed a milestone in the history of the two churches. Certainly this meeting advances the task of conciliation and unity which was initiated by the great pioneers Pope Paul the Sixth and Patriarch Athenagoras.

"The reconciliation and the restoration of brotherly love have tremendous importance for the restoration of unity between the two churches since the causes of their separation were not so much theological as they were historical and psychological.

"I believe that the restoration of unity between Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism could be achieved quickly if we were to take into account that the two churches have the most essential elements common to both and only in the trivial elements do they present a variety of forms, which for the most part are legitimate and not contrary to the ancient church tradition.

"It is time to wake up from the age-long sleep and to realize that the two churches, even with cooler relations in the past, are sisters and profess almost the same faith in the holy tradition, in the apostolic succession of bishops, in the seven mysteries, and the seven ecumenical synods of the first eight centuries. Both churches have the same respect for the Virgin Mary, the saints, the martyrs, the monastic institution, etc.

"By gaining a vivid awareness of these common elements which bind the two churches, one could see from a new viewpoint their differences and disagreements. In this way the motto 'either this or that' could be replaced by the motto 'both this and that.'

"In our dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church we must take into account that both the positive and negative theology depend on the dimensions of the possible, which could lead to new--anthropomorphic in each case--positive or negative formulations or to an understanding of certain related formulations of the Roman Catholic Church, which correspond to different thought structures or scope of understanding and to various historical, cultural or linguistic conditions. The church history testifies that the church does not rule out pluralism in theological formulations which do not undermine dogmatic truths and do not negate the unity of faith. This pluralism which is an expression of the church's universality accepts

different formulations but does not degenerate into a mere patching up of irreconcilable differences."

#### Serafeim: Reservations and Skepticism

By contrast, Serafeim, the Archbishop of Athens and all Greece, is very reserved and prefers not to comment on the Pope's visit to Constantinople or on the question of unity.

"This is a subject being handled by the two primates, the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Pope," he said, laughing. Of course, the official position of the church on the 'concordatum' is negative. Serafeim reaffirmed this position during our interview, while noting that the visit of the Pope to Constantinople is one thing, while diplomatic relations between Greece and the Vatican is another.

The head of the Church of Greece, in any event, sees with skepticism every movement by the two churches and without commenting he waits to see "if the events will bear out the positive results."

The Catholic Archbishop of Kerkyra Andonios Varthalitis says that "this trip has the highest significance for the Christian world. Those who attached a political connotation to the trip are wrong. The visit was a brotherly visit: 'Peter of Rome visited his brother Andreas of Constantinople.'"

#### Attacks on the Papacy

But at the same time, we have open reactions both among the clergy and among the theologians. On 20 November, 2 days after the announcement that the Pope was to visit Constantinople, Academician-Professor I. Karadiris, speaking at the Academy of Athens, strongly attacked the Papacy, saying:

"...Our Orthodox Church, faithful to its age-old tradition, rejects the papal primacy, the politico-religious 'state' of the Vatican as well as any diplomatic relations between the Greek state and the Vatican..."

Florina Metropolitan Avgoustinos Kandiotis does not support the Pope's visit to Constantinople. He also disagrees with the significance the meeting has on the unity of the churches.

"The Papacy (not the western church) is not only an anti-Christian but also an anti-Greek system, as shown by the sad events of the past. The Papacy harbors an inexorable hatred of Greece as the foremost Orthodox country.

"The Papacy, as shown by recent statements from the Vatican, remains unchanged in its positions. Greece will not be saved with the help of the Vatican but only through the unity of all its children around the Orthodox Church which has been and continues to be the source of salvation for our nation in difficult times."

University of Athens Theology School Professor Kon. Mouratidis is also categorically opposed:

"With the ability which characterizes papal diplomacy, the most ancient and most important in the world--an ability of easy adaptability to each situation--and with the utmost criterion of the Jesuit dogma 'the aim sanctifies the means,' the Pope decided to adjust the extremely dangerous situation facing the Papacy by using purely 'ecclesiastical' means.

"Indeed, as it is generally admitted by the Roman Catholics themselves, the Papacy faces probably the most serious crisis in its history, even greater than that resulting from the upheaval of the Reformation.

"Today searing questions are posed on a wide scale about the papal institution by distinguished Roman Catholics, cardinals, bishops and theology professors. They go so far as to question the validity of the infallibility of the Pope, the papal primacy and power, as well as the Pope's secular authority. It is clear by now that in spite of the continuing brilliance and glamor of the Papacy its structure and internal foundations are tottering and its unhealthy and false religio-political edifice is threatened with collapse. The situation is becoming all the more dangerous for the Papacy since many Roman Catholic professors of theology have begun not only to be influenced but to exceed even the Protestants in liberalism, talking about the theology of the 'Death of God' and considering the Christian truth primarily as a male-centered social system.

"Facing this threat, the Papacy made a 180 degree turn toward the Orthodox Church. It came to realize, even though it does not admit it, that only the Orthodox Church has kept pure and immaculate the heritage of the ancient and indivisible church."

. . .

In Constantinople, however, Patriarch Dimitrios the First left no margin for misunderstanding or misinterpretation with regard to this "dialogue of love."

"All Autocephalous Orthodox Churches are united through the common faith and the common confessions of this faith which reaches its highest point in the joint mass celebrated by their primates. But in the great questions of Orthodoxy, under the initiative and coordination of the Patriarchate, they act jointly and give the precious joint testimony of the Orthodox Church to those outside. All the dialogues conducted today by the Orthodox Church with other Christians are conducted with the support and participation of all sister Autocephalous Orthodox Churches. This applies also to the formal theological dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church which begins now with the prayers and hopes of all of us and is to be launched with the meeting in Fanari."

## Vlasios Feidas: The Dialogue of Unity

The relations between the Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church are being restored after nine centuries of disagreements and feuds which poisoned with deep bigotry the faithful of the two churches. When the late Athenagoras was Ecumenical Patriarch great strides were made toward a rapprochement and a warming up of relations between the two churches which in spite of theological disagreements could improve even further through mutual understanding.

The mission of Orthodox observers to the Second Vatican Council, the meeting of Athenagoras with Pope Paul in Bethlehem (Christmas 1964) and the mutual lifting of the 1,054 excommunications in 1965 were matched by the formal resolutions of the first three Panorthodox Conferences (1961, 1963, 1964) which encouraged the motto of Patriarch Athenagoras for a "dialogue of love" with the Roman Catholic Church, by deciding to prepare the Orthodox Church in order to proceed with the theological dialogue "on an equal basis."

Ten years after the lifting of the mutual excommunications the two churches set up Technical Theological Committees to prepare the official theological dialogue which would follow the "dialogue of love." These Technical Theological Committees working side by side have reached certain specific conclusions which will form the basis for the official theological dialogue which will be announced during Pope John Paul's visit to Constantinople.

If the motto of the "dialogue of love" was "let's forget the past," the theme of the theological dialogue will be the hope for restoring the unity of the church. With this hope which calls for overcoming the theological differences the interest for the theological dialogue is rekindled. Its aim is the ultimate union of the churches.

But, the realization of this vision which has been before the church for over nine centuries will pass through many transitional stages because it is necessary to overcome the theological differences which have separated the two churches for so many centuries. We must keep in mind that these theological differences are at the heart of the question concerning the relations between the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Churches.

In any event, what can one expect from this theological dialogue? One cannot give a direct and conclusive answer to this question because the answer depends on the real intentions each church holds as it enters into the dialogue. But the real intentions, in spite of the unquestionable support of both sides for unity, cannot be determined in advance because no one declares his intentions in advance on the theological differences which will be the subject of discussion by the Theological Committees. But the two churches have had these theological differences for almost a 1,000 years, have been the subject of discussion many times in the past and will occupy the theologians again in our time and therefore one may



risk an analysis of the real difficulties of the theological dialogue whose success can lead only to the union.

On the basis of the principal differences which are related to the origins and the exercise of the papal authority (papal primacy) and the source of the Holy Spirit, any forecast for the progress of the theological dialogue could be based on certain considerations. On these two subjects the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Church have developed an age-old tradition of radical disagreement which will be difficult for either church to overcome painlessly through the theological dialogue. On these two subjects the churches are the captives of their own past which is not irrelevant to our time. One cannot make an optimistic prediction with regard to the ability of the two churches to overcome these two differences because on these differences they have based their own distinctive structures. It would be difficult, if not theologically unthinkable for the Pope, for example, to give up the papal primacy, or for the Orthodox Church to accept it without risking the external unity and identity of each. These difficulties were clearly recognized by the Theological Commissions for the preparation of the theological dialogue and for this reason they agreed to start the discussion on the points which unite and not on the points which divide the two churches. With this, the theological barrier for an impasse is avoided at the outset, but this process creates the serious danger of bringing to the fore other serious theological differences between the two churches. Nevertheless, eventually the time will come for the discussion of the great theological differences on which the two churches show lack of flexibility and refuse to make concessions.

What will happen in the event the two churches, standing on their traditional theology, refuse any theological concessions? One can be certain that this will push further into the distant future the realization of the vision of the union of the two churches. There is, of course, the possibility of bypassing the differences as unimportant and finding a compromise solution which will allow a declaration for the union of the two churches. Such a compromise solution could take the form of an agreement that each church will retain its own tradition with a minimum of expedient interpretation, and on the basis of this minimal interpretation accomplish the union of the churches. The latter prospect is preferred by the Roman Catholic Church but it will create enormous if not insurmountable internal problems for the Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, certain Orthodox circles favor a compromise solution along those lines, which probably holds the only chance for the success of the theological dialogue, since any other prospect is unthinkable following the decisions of the Second Vatican Council.

If, then, one is to rule out a genuine theological discussion on the differences and a true theological union of the two churches, the only way, they argue, is to declare the union in spite of the theological differences. Such a solution is in line with the "intercommunio" of the two churches, which is unacceptable to the Orthodox theology, and



which is bound to be rejected by a major part of Orthodox faithful and is likely to lead to terrible internal schisms. By contrast, the Roman Catholic Church has nothing to lose because it applies the same solution in its relations with other churches or Christian denominations.

It is easy to understand that these internal dangers for the Orthodox Church, resulting from a hasty and theologically ill-considered union, might well lead in the future to a breakdown of the theological dialogue. But the administrative structures of the Autocephalous Orthodox Churches and the difficult conditions under which many of them live will create problems of unity among the Orthodox even in the case of a breakdown in the dialogue since there is no assurance that they will all agree to such a breakdown.

But the problem of the theological dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church is not limited to the question of union but extends to the aftereffects of the union as well. If one is to assume that the only possible form of union is to be achieved through the preservation or at least the compromise interpretation of the theological differences, then the next stage will be the actual implementation of the union into the life of the church. Here the problems are more difficult because they are administrative in nature. That is, what will happen to the Orthodox people who live in Western Europe and in America? According to the internal Canon Law of the church some might claim that the Orthodox believers in the West should come under the administrative jurisdiction of the Vatican while the Roman Catholics of the East will come under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Patriarchates and the Autocephalous Churches.

Such an administrative arrangement would deprive the Ecumenical Patriarchate of the support of the Orthodox diaspora in the West and would turn over, for all practical purposes, to the well-organized Catholic communities the old Patriarchates in the East. This solution which would weaken the spiritual ties of the Orthodox diaspora to the mother church would certainly clash with national political objections which cannot be ignored since many governments take advantage of the national diaspora in their foreign policies. On the basis of these considerations, one could say that a more acceptable administrative solution will be the one that will allow the members of each church, regardless of locality, to retain their liturgical identity and their administrative relationship to the Patriarchates and the national centers. Nevertheless this solution is likely to lead to a revival of propaganda among the various ecclesiastical communities under the cover of church unity.

These problems associated with the dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church cause many reservations and a great deal of skepticism as to its positive results especially in the Greek Orthodox Church which is the only Orthodox Church with free theological thought but also the only one that has felt the painful consequences of compromise solutions in matters of faith. The Greek Church is one of the major targets of the Vatican's eastern

policy as it appears from the subject of diplomatic relations between Greece and the Vatican, which rekindled among church and theological circles the traditional sensitivity of the Greeks on the intentions of the Vatican.

"Unia and Propaganda"--A Commentary by  
EPIKAIRA's Reporter on Church Matters

A revealing document on the ultimate goals of the  
Vatican with regard to the Russian Church.

The Latin propaganda in the days of the Turkish domination over the Balkans was connected with the institution of the Unia Unitarian Church which under the guise of protecting the Orthodox liturgical forms and ecclesiastical traditions imposed the Latin innovations of the papal primacy and the "filioque" through the means of constitutional repression. The first Panorthodox Conferences on the island of Rhodes put as a condition for any dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church the dissolution of all Unitarian Churches. But the Roman Catholic Church rejected such a commitment and the Orthodox Church had to give in. The Church of Greece, although the Unitarian Church in Greece is virtually nonexistent (it has no more than 2,000 members), for reasons of theological and ecclesiastical custom regards the dissolution of the Unitarian Churches as an essential condition for the theological dialogue. The difficulty for the Roman Catholic Church on this subject is related to the survival of the significant Unitarian communities in the Patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, as well as in the Slavic countries.

The sensitivity of the Orthodox Churches is explained by the fact that the Unia was and continues to be in most areas an instrument of liturgical propaganda whose survival will be destructive to any serious theological dialogue and any genuine effort toward unity. The purely theological position of the Greek Church toward the Unia will poison any effort to promote the union of the churches because all Orthodox Churches share these reservations although they do not say so openly.

It is certain, however, that on the question of the Unia the Roman Catholic Church is not going to give in because the Unitarian communities will play a serious role in the event the union of the churches is proclaimed, since they will try to overpower the Orthodox wherever the two exist side by side. In this case, a characteristic illustration is the scandalous action by Pope John Paul the Second who in a letter dated 19 March 1979 to the Unitarian Archbishop of the Ukraine, Cardinal Joseph Slipy, recognized the Unitarian Community of the Ukraine as the most authentic expression of the Russian Church. This papal move provoked the immediate reaction of the Patriarch of Moscow through a letter by Metropolitan Juvenalius of Kroutitsa and Kolomi, chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations of the Russian Church, on 4 September 1979, and the conciliatory intervention of the chairman of the Secretariat for the Unity of Christians Cardinal

John Willebrands with his letter of 22 September 1979 to Metropolitan Juvenalius. In his letter Russian Metropolitan Juvenalius points out the major contradiction between the papal letter and the decisions of the Second Vatican Council on the relations of the Roman Catholic with the Orthodox Churches and adds:

"In the /Pope's/ letter to Cardinal Slipy it is re-affirmed that the Unia continues to be an important means for the restoration of unity in the church, and that the 'union of Brest has maintained until today its ecclesiastical and religious power...the Apostolic See always attributed great significance to this union...' This excerpt gives the impression of a change in the ecumenism line of the Holy See in its relations with the Orthodox Churches as well as in the ecumenical friendship between the churches. We do not refer to certain points which in our view are historically inaccurate and which could be the subject of discussion...

"Personally, I do not wish to allow the publication of my church's official reaction before I receive accurate information from you on the real meaning of the /Pope's/ action. My strong desire to avoid useless polemics or a misunderstanding about the relations of our churches has made me write this letter..."

Cardinal Willebrands sent this "conciliatory" reply:

"...I presented your letter to the Holy Father and I talked personally with him about the contents and the meaning [of your letter]. He was also presented with the thoughts I am to express below. I am writing to you in his name. The Holy Father had no intention of expressing [in the letter] his views on the relations between the Church of Rome and the Orthodox Churches... To prevent an interpretation of the Pope's letter which the author of the letter did not intend, I would like to remind Your Eminence of the ecumenical objectives of the Roman Catholic Church... The Pope...had no intention whatever of presenting the union of Brest as a model for our relations with the Orthodox Churches today or as a model of the unity which we must seek in the future... Pope John Paul the Second asks for an accurate evaluation of what took place in past centuries toward restoring the unity of the church. These efforts made under conditions which were different

from our own today, inspired by a theology which is different from that of our own today, lead to the birth of the unitarian Catholic Churches. Their existence allowed the Christians to express according to the demands of their conscience their communion with the Church of Rome.

"...With this letter I wish to assure you that the Pope writing to his Excellency Cardinal Slipy wanted to address himself to a church and its faithful who, due to the miseries of history and even up to the present, have suffered because of their loyalty to the See of Rome. They are getting ready to celebrate 1,000 years of history, a fact important for their history and for your history. Indeed, the Pope even without stating it in his letter, recognizes without hesitation the Orthodox Church of Russia, as an heir of the glorious tradition of Saint Vladimir and of the ancient Church of Kiev, which is the basis of faith and endurance for your Christian people."

The letter is a good illustration of the way the Vatican drafts even its "conciliatory" documents. With a single imprecision of expression, Cardinal Willebrands denies to the Orthodox Church of Russia the unquestionable privilege of the only heir of Kiev. In the sentence that the Pope "recognizes without hesitation the Orthodox Church of Russia as an heir (une heritiere) of the glorious tradition of Saint Vladimir," he implies that the Orthodox Church of Russia is not the only heir because the other heir to this glorious tradition is the Unitarian Church of the Ukraine.

Even this case alone shows the real difficulties for a sincere dialogue and the extent of responsibility that falls on the theologians who will undertake the theological discussions and the drafting of the official documents of the theological dialogue, as well as the difficulties which also will emerge during this dialogue.

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## LIKELY PASSAGE FORESEEN FOR MOST OF GOVERNMENT'S 1980 BUDGET

Stockholm NORDISK KONIAKT in Norwegian No 14, 1979 p 949

[Text] The principal items in the government's 1980 budget will likely be approved again this year. Some of the proposed items will not get the required majority vote, but there will be no major changes in the government's 1980 budget. The government is "running slalom" between various party groups, gathering support here and there.

As we already mentioned, the government can expect defeat of some budgetary items, but there is no joint opposition to the government's budget proposal. The three opposition groups are supporting separate alternatives.

Following the Finance Committee's recommendation and laborious committee hearings on the budget last fall, a brief survey of the situation reveals the following:

There is wide support for the government's proposal to allow commercial and savings banks to finance 6,000 home loans that would otherwise be financed through Husbanken. Only the Socialist Left Party (SV) opposes this change in home financing.

A proposal to reduce the area subsidy to homeowners is being debated in the Municipal Affairs Committee. It is not yet clear whether the proposal will pass.

The Joint Finance Committee, including members of the Labor Party, is opposed to the government's proposal to reduce the hourly production subsidy to the textile, canning and glass industry.

Passage is expected of the government's proposals to raise excise taxes on automobiles and gasoline as well as fares on all means of public transportation.

There is majority opposition to the government's proposal to appropriate an additional 400 million kroner in capital for Statoil. The Socialist Left Party (SV) will vote for an increase of up to 210 million kroner, which means that the company must borrow approximately 200 million kroner for capital expansion.



The government's proposed state tax for private taxpayers in 1980 will pass with the support of SV. The three nonsocialist parties on the Finance Committee have submitted a joint capital tax proposal, but they stand divided on the income tax. The Conservative Party and the two middle parties--the Center Party and the Christian People's Party--each have their own proposal. The three parties want to broaden the arrangement concerning tax-exempt savings.

The Conservative Party wants to reduce taxes by 1.16 billion kroner. This proposal means there will be no automatic tax increases as a result of rising prices.

The Conservative Party also wants to reduce food subsidies by 700 million kroner and compensate for that by raising the family allowance as well as tax deductions for children and minimum pensioners.

The Conservative Party also wants to lower the tax on investments from 13 to 12 percent and proposes a reduction in government spending, except for defense.

The Center Party and the Christian People's Party want to reduce taxes by 335 million kroner. They suggest raising the family allowance by 300 kroner per child and the special minimum pension allowance by two percent.

The two parties also want a substantial tax increase on tobacco and alcohol.

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CSO: 3108

## CENTER PARTY SEEKING ELECTORAL ALLIANCE WITH LIBERALS

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 28 Nov 79 p 7

[Reportage by Per-Arne Bjerke]

[Text] "The Center Party considers it only natural that nonsocialist parties weigh the possibility of an electoral alliance in the 1981 parliamentary election. Nonsocialists could easily lose mandates and we should discuss the possibility of strengthening nonsocialist representation," said Center Party Chairman Johan J. Jakobsen at a press conference yesterday following the party's central committee meeting.

The Center Party leader felt it would be natural to form an alliance with the Liberals and pointed to the fact there are representatives in Parliament today who were elected on similar two-party ballots.

Jakobsen also referred to the center parties' strong independent positions in the budget debates. He characterized that as a follow-up to the signals given at the party's National Assembly earlier this fall.

"There is no new orientation on our part, but a continuation of the center cooperation which gradually developed during this session of Parliament," said Jakobsen. He felt the center had helped to strengthen the nonsocialist alternative. Jakobsen considered the cooperation between the Christian People's Party, the Center Party and the Liberal Party an advantage, even though the Liberal Party clearly said "no" to a broad nonsocialist cooperation that would also include the Conservative Party.

"I do not want to discuss which we shall choose, the Conservative Party or the Liberal Party. The Center Party is determined to provide the basis for a different government than what we have today. The Liberal Party will have to decide for itself whether it wants to be part of that government. Our goal is to establish the broadest possible nonsocialist cooperation and we do not want to exclude any party."

Jakobsen felt the nonsocialist parties would try to coordinate their positions relative to a long-term program. Even though the Liberal Party is not represented on the Finance Committee, which would deal with a long-term program, Jakobsen figured the Liberals could be kept continually informed of the negotiations. This would be a repeat of the cooperation between the Liberal Party, the Center Party and the Christian People's Party during this year's budget debates.

#### Not Pleasant

The Center Party has steadily declined in public opinion polls since the election, a matter which the party was confronted with at the press conference. Secretary General Svein Sundsbø admitted that this was not a particularly pleasant development. But," he added, "the party is at the same low level it was prior to the election. This could mean that public opinion polls give us less support than we actually have."

#### Nuclear Dispute

The Center Party is also split on the issue of modernizing Europe's nuclear weapons. As was discussed in ARBEIDERBLADET yesterday, the central committee turned the decision over to party representatives in Parliament. At the press conference Jakobsen said that Norway should not oppose a NATO resolution if those countries receiving the weapons are in favor. Neither did Jakobsen agree that Denmark's position should determine Norway's final decision.

The party's top leaders are also involved in the nuclear weapons dispute. Anna Kristine Jahr, party vice chairman, who strongly opposes the issue, feels that the party "strongly supports" her position. At the press conference Jahr pointed out that we must try to negotiate instead of reaching a decision on rearmament.

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CSO: 3108

## LABOR PARTY BEGINS PLANNING FOR 1981 ELECTIONS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Nov 79 p 3

[Commentary by Terje Svabo]

[Text] The Labor Party is already planning its offensive, organizationally and politically, in connection with the 1981 parliamentary election. At a meeting yesterday and today, the national committee discussed its strategy, which is aimed to win the election by a clear majority. However, in a conversation with AFTENPOSTEN, the party vice chairman, Gro Harlem Brundtland, did not rule out the possibility of a coalition with one of the middle parties should the political situation call for it. She stressed that the party will concentrate on policies for the 1980's, including debates on programs and principles.

The 3-day national committee meeting at Lillehammer was marked by the controversy over modernizing NATO nuclear weapons in Europe. Nevertheless, most of the time was devoted to group work and plenary discussions on the party's approach to the important parliamentary election in 1981. It has been established that the party is gaining support again, according to public opinion polls, but that it has far from enough support to win by a clear majority. Parliamentary representative Gro Harlem Brundtland told AFTENPOSTEN that the Labor Party could realistically expect the same support it received in 1977. At that time the party was only a few hundred votes short of winning 78 seats and thus a clear majority.

Asked if the Labor Party would consider a coalition with one of the middle parties, the vice chairman said that the party's most important task was to establish a workable platform that would adequately reflect the party's program. "Beyond that we must be willing to weigh different alternatives, including a government coalition," she said.

Mrs Harlem Brundtland stressed that the national committee debate and the experiences from the last election should show the party how important it is to acquaint members and party representatives with policy matters before they become public.

"We have many political resources within our party organization who can formulate and explain issues and policies. We know that a vital and committed membership is fundamental. It is important to strengthen the link between the central leadership and local representatives," she said.

In that connection Gro Harlem Brundtland pointed out that local politicians have been given a far broader area of responsibility than before. New county government tasks will naturally mean greater responsibility for local politicians. She feels that the Labor Party must follow up on this, organizationally too, and develop that political resource as a natural link between the central party organization and party representatives on the local level.

The party chairman said in his opening speech that the Labor Party does not have sufficient contact with youth and new occupational groups. How will the Labor Party change that?

"Let us begin with youth. We know that youth are more responsive to political trends than the rest of the population. Therefore, it is not so strange that conservative trends are in evidence among youth. However, let me point out that this is not a permanent phenomenon and we intend to change it. That requires effort on our part. No doubt, the Young Conservatives and the Conservative Party have been successful in their active and deliberate work among youth over a number of years.

The "new" occupational groups, which have gradually become the dominant ones: the service industry, the functionaries, the education and health sector have not been sufficiently recognized by us. In the future we shall concentrate on debating programs and principles that will form the basis for party policies in the 1980's. Conservative movements cannot respond to these challenges.

Individualistic attitudes do not hold the solution to future problems; the solution lies in collective ideas and solidarity. There is a growing recognition of the need for solidarity, but the concept itself changes as new tasks emerge.

The individualist cannot solve the problems we face today. Challenges connected with new technology, work for everybody, global problems, environmental and resource policies and the need to maintain decentralized residential settlements cannot be solved by conservative policies, but by recognizing the need for collective solutions and solidarity," said Gro Harlem Brundtland.

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## SOCIALISTS MULL OVER ELECTORAL SETBACKS

## National Committee Members' Resignations

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 29 Dec 79 pp 1, 16

[Text] The appearance of a collective stand taken by nine members of the PS [Socialist Party] committee in the meeting held last weekend was the politically most important event in that meeting.

Alberto Oliveira e Silva, Aquilino Ribeiro Machado, Edmundo Pedro, Eduardo Pereira, Fernando Barroso, Maria Rosa Gomes, Mario Cal Brandao, Mario Sottomayor Cardia and Torres Couto, all belonging to the so-called "moderate" sector within the party, signed a collective letter of resignation from their posts on the PS Executive Committee. Contrary to what was published by some of the mass media, this letter was based on the political consideration of a need for a change in the executive bodies of the Socialist Party.

Besides, Mario Soares reacted adversely to the submission of a request for collective resignation. He maintained that this stand should be taken in individual letters from each of the signers of the collective letter.

## Acceptance or Rejection of Bipolarization

The spokesman of this moderate group, so to speak, was Mario Sottomayor Cardia who expressed the opinion, in a well-thought-out speech, that the crucial problem raised by the results of the elections on 2 and 16 December was the problem of the choice that the PS should make between accepting the country's bipolarization or fighting against it by means of establishing a central bloc. This would entail basic changes in the party's political leadership, which should have its left wing but also its social-democratic right wing that would enable it to win votes in the joint area with the Democratic Alliance.

The speech by Sottomayor Cardia raised a strategic problem that did not give rise to any criticism by the other members of the National Political Committee.

## Curto Versus Gonalha

In addition to Cardia's presentation, an important point in the PS National Committee meeting was the debate that took place on the party's labor union policy.

Marcelo Curto attacked this policy, as did Manuel Alegre.

Maldonado Gonalha pointed out, in an especially moderate speech, several decrees approved by Marcelo Curto when he was minister of Labor, and he especially tried to separate the emotional political attitude that seemed to require a radicalization to the left by labor unionists now from the labor union strategy strictly speaking.

Then Torres Couto made a strong speech that gave rise to a minor quarrel with Manuel Tito de Morais.

On the whole, the basic stand approved in Congress was not questioned and there even appeared a motion in support of the UGT [General Union of Workers], signed by about 30 members of the National Committee among whom UGT leaders themselves were not included. This motion was not read by the chair. Mario Soares, by the way, regarded it as not pertinent to the agenda of business.

Moreover, it seems that Maldonado Gonalha's position has been strengthened as the result of a meeting of socialist labor union militants held yesterday and in which the policy of PS in the field of labor unionism was discussed.

## Joaquim Mestre: Reorganization Proposals

Another important speech was the one made by Joaquim Mestre, who submitted several proposals for starting a reorganization of the PS with a view to 1980 elections, after making a detailed diagnosis of the political significance of the results of the 2 and 16 December elections.

In addition, Jose Manuel Galvao Teles, who conducted the work of the National Committee together with Antonio Arnault, suggested that a working group should be set up responsible for evaluating the political competence of district federations, with the possibility of replacing their executive bodies in case they should incur a negative judgment.

The proposals by the two former IS [Socialist Intervention] members did not succeed in obtaining approval in the National Committee meeting, in spite of the fact that their speeches had been listened to attentively and even appreciated.

## Problem of the Secretariat's Resignation

The National Committee decided by secret ballot whether or not to accept the resignation of the National Secretariat, whether to accept the resignation request submitted in the collective letter signed by nine of its members and whether or not the Technical Electoral Committee [CTE], chaired by Almeida Santos, which prepared for the last two election campaigns, would resign.

Only about 30 percent of the voters approved the resignation of the National Secretariat and about 40 percent voted in favor of accepting the resignation of the signers of the collective letter.

On the other hand, 80 percent of the voters favored resignation of the CTE. This gave rise to some demonstrations of sadness, especially by Jose Luis Nunes, who referred to the antifascist fighter profile of Almeida Santos.

In addition, Almeida Santos submitted his point of view in an extremely proper letter.

These three issues were subjected to a single secret ballot under the terms of the party's statutes and in accordance with the stand taken by the moderates and also by Antonio Guterres.

The moderates had openly supported the resignation of the National Secretariat and of the PS Executive Committee, with the establishment of an ad hoc committee consisting of four members selected from the outgoing secretariat and four members appointed by the outgoing executive committee.

This proposal was submitted to the chair, but Jose Manuel Galvao Teles did not read it because he believed that its spirit was covered by other proposals under discussion.

The National Secretariat agreed to submit, in the next meeting of the National Committee to be held in Oporto at the end of January, a proposal for the party's reorganization, which, therefore, will not call into question the composition of the National Secretariat itself.

## Analysis of Proceedings

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 29 Dec 79 pp 2, 3

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa: "Aftereffect of an Election Defeat or Lesson of a National Committee"]

[Text] 1. In Search of a Scapegoat

A careful, calm analysis of the last PS National Committee meeting is especially important so that an evaluation can be made of the aftereffect of

the recent defeat of the Socialist Party in the elections, in other words, of the way in which an attempt was made to determine responsibility for the defeat as well as the steps taken for a change in the party's strategy and organization in 1980.

The first point that was, as was to be expected, a topic for discussion by the National Committee was the one pertaining to possible responsibilities for the failures that occurred in the interim elections and in the local government elections.

Thus, two large types of "scapegoats" emerged for the results obtained: the party's stand on labor union issues and the activity of the Technical Electoral Committee, chaired by Almeida Santos.

Another cause suggested by a group of members of the National Committee was added to these large causes: the overall strategy and the composition of the PS leadership bodies, especially the National Secretariat and the Executive Committee.

In the opinion of the "traditionalists," everything is explained by the erroneous labor union policy decided on and carried out by the party, supporting the UGT and the compromise with social-democrat labor unionists. Both points explained the lack of success in urban and suburban areas, more industrialized and with more firmly established labor unionism.

Therefore, there was a discussion of the so-called labor union issue, whose chief protagonists were Marcelo Curto on one side, and Maldonado Gonelha on the other side.

Although Marcelo Curto resolutely presented the reasons, in his opinion, that restrict the labor union growth of the PS because of spurious compromises on the right, Maldonado Gonelha pointed out calmly that the general political situation is one thing and the labor union situation is something else. Therefore, he would appreciate very much seeing the content of the moderation requests that the PS National Committee itself would have made to the socialist labor unionists (as it has already done in the past), if, instead of having been defeated, the PS had been the winner in the 2 December elections.

The outcome of the debate on the labor union issue was a draw. In other words, the "traditionalists" did not succeed in convincing the National Committee persuasively. This became definitely clear with the signing of a motion in support of the party's labor union policy and of the UGT. That motion gathered over 30 signatures, but none of them was of UGT labor union leaders.

This motion, supported among others by Teofilo Carvalho dos Santos himself, was never read by the chair, in spite of the urging by its signers. Mario Soares limited himself, already at the end of the meeting, to saying that the chair had a motion whose content he did not specify, but that it was not on the agenda of business and therefore would not be recognized.



Therefore, a tie "contest" between the attackers and the defenders of the PS labor union line.

Another cause, much more general, was submitted to explain the party's lack of success in the elections: its erroneous overall political strategy and the composition of its leadership bodies, especially the National Secretariat and the Executive Committee.

This stand was supported in a collective letter signed by Mario Sottomayor Cardia, Mario Cal Brandao, Torres Couto, Eduardo Pereira, Aquilino Ribeiro Machado, Alberto Oliveira e Silva, Edmundo Pedro, Maria Rosa Gomes and Fernando Barroso.

This collective letter submitted a request for resignation from their posts on the Executive Committee, based on the need for change in the membership of the PS leadership bodies. The same group submitted, in addition, a proposal for the total resignation of the National Secretariat and of the Executive Committee that never came to be read by the chairman of the National Committee in the belief that it was incorporated in the spirit of the summary proposal.

This stand was not approved by the National Committee either, inasmuch as, by secret ballot, almost 70 percent of the members declared themselves against resignation of the National Secretariat and close to 60 percent of them also believed that the nine signers of the collective letter should not request resignation.

The fact is probably significant that, for the first time, determination of a certain trend or, at least, independent political and strategic feeling different from the "traditionalists," the former IS members and the so-called "technocrats" -- a feeling headed by Sottomayor Cardia -- appeared visibly.

Thus, once the stand of making a "scapegoat" of the PS labor union policy had been rejected, thus, once the stand of the responsibility of the party's overall strategy and national leadership had been rejected, the obviously more simple stand won out: the whole responsibility lay with the Technical Electoral Committee, which was faulty in its planning of the election campaign.

By secret ballot, the members of the PS National Committee declared themselves, by about 80 percent of the votes, in favor of resignation of the CTE. This voting may be interpreted as an expression of political criticism of the activity of Almerida Santos and his associates.

This third alternative was the simplest one. No one had to lose by making the CTE a scapegoat for the defeat of the PS, neither the "moderates," nor the "traditionalists," nor the former IS members, nor the "technocrats," nor a large number of members of the National Committee who chose a soft situation, in other words, the least possible change.



In this way, political responsibility for the lack of success by the PS in the elections was settled. Neither the party's overall strategy, nor its National Committee, nor its labor union policy was to blame. It all resulted from the mistakes made in planning the campaign. At least in terms of political and personal responsibility of someone in the party, although not in terms of a diagnosis of the situation.

## 2. Putting the Secretariat in a Difficult Situation

Another important feature of the PS National Committee meeting was the lack of acceptance deserved by eight sheets of proposals by Joaquim Mestre. They were interpreted as summarizing the position of the former IS members and they contained a series of organizational changes to be adopted by the party immediately with a view to correcting the mistakes made during 1979.

Joaquim Mestre made a detailed analysis of the lack of success in the elections (much more detailed and exhaustive than the "scapegoat" found by the laying of political responsibility on the CTE by the National Committee), but it involved the establishment of various committees whose task in the future would be as or more important than the task of the National Secretariat itself.

These proposals did not win approval of the members. This means, in the final analysis, victory of the convenient position of "washing hands" with regard to the future, putting the National Secretariat in a difficult situation with regard to its political activity in 1980.

To tell the truth, on the one hand, the National Committee reiterates with a majority vote its political confidence in the party's National Secretariat.

On the other hand, it forgoes approving any guidelines with regard to a reorganization of the PS, placing that responsibility on the National Secretariat, in order to remain conveniently, with free hands, in a position to criticize, more or less persistently, the proposals that the secretariat has promised to submit at the end of January in Oporto.

Under other circumstances, this attitude would be exclusive proof of full confidence in the members of the PS National Secretariat.

Under the concrete conditions in which this attitude is placed, it is not only the easiest one, because it commits less, but it also is the one that makes it possible, in the future, to blame the party's National Secretariat for everything.

When it is time to settle responsibilities, no one wants to be left with "hot potatoes" in his hands. Everyone wants to throw them into the hands of his partners.

That is why, although the proposal by Joaquim Mestre, basically, might have made possible a more rapid dissemination of former IS members in the committees whose establishment was proposed, it had as its central idea a much clearer objective of not releasing the National Committee from its statutory role and of an immediate start of the party's reorganization, which the spirit of convenience and the inertia of the majority of the National Committee members refused to approve.

### 3. The Real Basic Issue

A third important feature of the meeting of the PS National Committee deserves mention: the noteworthy speech by Mario Sottomayor Cardia.

In a speech listened to in silence by his peers and that was not refuted by anyone, Cardia stated that the real basic issue was very simply a matter of political and strategic option: is the PS for or against bipolarization in Portugal?

If the PS is against bipolarization, then it has to support the establishment of a central bloc minimally viable in the future with all that this entails: alteration of its external image, change of leaders, reorganization, unprejudiced acceptance of the importance of a moderate social-democratic wing that will compensate for the positioning of sectors of the party more to the left.

This involves specifically acceptance of structural changes and replacement of persons and assumption of the obvious fact that the PS has to win votes on the right in the future, because, as was seen on 2 December, the PS and the PCP together did not succeed in obtaining a majority of the seats in the Assembly of the Republic.

Of course, the PS can choose the other alternative: bet on bipolarization, which, moreover, has destroyed it in time.

Cardia stated that the PS is betting objectively on bipolarization, even while it says that it is not, when it maintains the same strategy, the same political leadership and the same external image that led it to defeat, due to fear of introducing organizational changes or of giving rise to changes of personnel.

Since that is so, there is no point in shouting that the blame for bipolarization lies with AD [Democratic Alliance] or APU [United People's Alliance], because it also lies, to a considerable degree, with the political behavior itself of the Socialist Party.

Any halfway careful analyst could not be more clear than Sottomayor Cardia.

In fact, this is the great strategic choice of the PS in 1980. It entails necessarily a choice between retaining structures and posts as acquired rights or of introducing minimally credible changes in both.

The most startling thing is that, basically, in addition to the "moderates" led by Cardia who have the courage to say this, and the former IS members, who in spite of being more to the left, also realize that this has to be like this, and the "technocrats" who believe it but do not always say so, in order not to displease Mario Soares, there seems to be a strange pact between the "traditionalists" and a majority of party-machine men who fear any change. This pact is sufficient so that any important change will not find ready, rapid approval.

It is the inertia of a party-machine clique that does not want to lose positions. It is the stand taken by the "traditionalists" who know that sooner or later they will see their weight reduced to its real internal dimensions, but they are trying to postpone that time. It is also the paternalistic good nature of Mario Soares who wants to get along with everyone, who wants to reconcile what cannot be reconciled, who often wants to choose by not choosing.

Was it not Dr Francisco Sa Carneiro who cut off the heads of politicians and technicians far more competent and prestigious than the PS "traditionalists" and 6 months later won the elections?

10,042

CSO: 3101

## TOURISM EARNINGS, EMIGRANT REMITTANCES REPORTEDLY UP

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 14 Dec 79 p 3

[Text] Portugal's earnings from tourism almost doubled during the first 7 months of this year, and emigrant remittances rose by about 76 percent from January to August in comparison with the same periods in 1978. The Americans were the tourists who spent the most. In all, they left more than 5 million contos in our country. And it was the Portuguese living in Europe who sent the most money--about 66 million contos out of a total of 80 million.

According to data made public by the Bank of Portugal, tourism earnings reached the equivalent of 20.703 million contos, for an increase of 99 percent over the same period in 1978. On the other hand, expenditures came to 5.281 million contos (up 83 percent). It should be noted that those figures were calculated at current prices.

As far as tourists are concerned, it was the Americans who left the most foreign exchange in Portugal (5.672 million contos). Following them were the French (3.347 million contos), the Germans (3.273 million), and the British (2.776 million).

Emigrant remittances totaled 80.795 million contos. From January through August of 1978, remittances totaled 45.972 million contos. The increase therefore amounted to more than 76 percent.

Most of that foreign exchange came from emigrants living in European countries (65.89 million contos). For their part, those working in the United States and Canada sent 6.9 million contos.

Also according to data from the Bank of Portugal, the deficit in the balance on current account in Portugal's balance of payments fell from 33.8 million to 5.829 million contos. Contributing to that drop, which occurred faster than predicted by optimistic forecasts, was the smaller trade balance deficit and the spectacular rise in emigrant remittances and tourism earnings.

11798

CSO: 3101

## 'PROSPECTING' FOR GEOTHERMAL ENERGY IN AZORES REPORTED

Porto O PRIMEIRO DE JANEIRO in Portuguese 13 Dec 79 p 7

[Text] Beginning in 1980, according to expert Vitor Hugo Forjaz, Sao Miguel Island in the Azores may be illuminated by the geothermal energy produced in its volcanic subsurface.

Sao Miguel Island is now supplied by a thermal powerplant (which uses petroleum residuals) and a small hydroelectric facility.

The island's installed capacity does not exceed 15 megawatts. That is already inadequate, even for an area with practically no industrialization, but it entails considerable expense for the government of the autonomous region, since petroleum must be imported.

Work has been steadily underway since 1976 to develop the geothermal resources, whose low cost (about half the present cost) will make it possible to establish industrial zones and utilize more economically and completely the island's resources, which are now almost exclusively of the primary type.

Prospecting to determine the geothermal capacity of the Azores has now been extended to Terceira Island (where the work has not yet progressed very far) and to Faial (where it has hardly begun).

The main center of activity since 1976 has been Sao Miguel Island, recently with French cooperation.

Work is currently centered on Ribeira Grande, where it is thought that the geothermal formation may be able to produce from 50 to 100 megawatts.

The third hole is now being completed there (by a process similar to that used in collecting petroleum). Drilling of a fourth hole will follow.

One or two more drillings will be attempted later.

According to Vitor Hugo Forjaz, the third hole will probably be producing energy as early as 1980 through a powerplant which is already in the Azores but which has not yet been set up.



The water comes out of the hole salty and at a temperature of about 200 degrees.

What is involved for the time being is experimental expansion. This will be followed by a second one that will go into operation around 1988 with industrial features.

Hot gases from the powerplant will make it possible at the same time to establish industries (such as powdered milk factories) or will be used to heat hothouses for the faster production of pineapples or bananas.

11798

CSO: 3101

ERRATUM: Please substitute this article for same that appeared in JPRS 74831, 28 December 1979, No 1519 of this series pp 108-109.

COUNTRY SECTION

PORTUGAL

COMMENTARY SCORES EANES FOR RECEIVING PLO'S ARAFAT

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 3 Nov 79 p 5

[Article by Peixe Dias]

[Text] With commendable composure revealing exceptional courage, General (by self-elevation) Ramalho Eanes yesterday, unarmed, greeted armed terrorist, Yasser Arafat. Eanes thus became--so wrote the trusted DIARIO DE LISBOA--"the first European head of state (and of NATO) to meet officially with the highest authority in the Palestine struggle." The euphemism in the renowned evening paper, which includes among its notable editors an overwhelming majority of Communist Party members, should be understood to mean, once it is translated from the Russian, "the person responsible for thousands of crimes, numerous defenseless victims of terrorism, among them hundreds of women and children. He must be held responsible for those downed airplanes, attacked civilian automobiles in Jerusalem, cowardly murdered Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympic Games, etc. etc., in a wave of unparalleled terror, which no cause, no matter how just, no man, no matter how cruel, can understand and still less sanction," Ramalho Eanes, who as an officer in the Portuguese army in "Fascist times," was fighting terrorists and, perchance, killing them, has now turned around 180 degrees, the most complete rotation on the Euclidean scale, for he now receives armed terrorists while he himself is unarmed.

But this is understandable. We understand very well what is at the bottom of all this. Arafat, renowned leader of international terrorism, came to Lisbon at the initiative of the World Council of Peace--and the top-ranking person of said movement is no other than Mr Costa Gomes. Costa Gomes who was a member of the Salazar government, who was highly honored by the PIDE [International and State Defense Police], and who was commander-in-chief of the struggle against terrorism in Africa. The Africa which many Portuguese know very well, in its abandonment, cowardice, surrender and, alas, in their own flesh and blood. Costa Gomes and Melo Antunes, sent for Arafat, and, therefore, Eanes could not bring himself to go counter to the will of such distinguished hosts: one, who appointed him on 25 November and made him what he is today, the other, who advises him in the capacity of the eminent counselor.

It has come to my attention (which my eminent Belem "comrades," God forbid, have neither confirmed nor refuted) that the learned Revolutionary Council, of which Mr Eanes is chairman and in collusion with, held a very long-drawn out meeting which lasted well into early morning. And, in early morning hours, some councilors are highly adept, as, for example, the eminent navyman, Crespo, who for so many nights pursued a zigzag course in Mozambique waters to solve the touchy problem: Arafat, a cloth on his head and armed with a pistol, is going to visit Eanes--because he is the terrorist leader, because he has friends in the oil industry who can grant favors, give rebates, and he is a tough one, he is always armed, because he is a promoter of war and not a herald of peace--and, as he is armed, how is an unarmed president to receive him? And what if the Arab takes a shot at him? Shall we be without a president? No, never! And from the highly respected councilors came the profound advice: "O.K., he is going to be armed, and we are sending and surrounding him with four thugs equally armed, and the best there are, with an unerring aim, and with the assurance that, in the event of a gun fight, Belem will outshine Carson City in the good old days of Billy the Kid."

Now nothing amazes us. Eanes receiving the terrorist Arafat in Belem is simply the logical consequence of that nameless shame which they call "exemplary decolonization."

Even if the Arabs send us two or three oil tankers, as an alms; even if we have only enough oil drums to fill the cars for the president, the Revolutionary Council and the government; even if, even if...we must respect our own sense of personal pride!

Eanes is in office, alas, until 1981--3 years before Orwell's terrifying prophecy.

8870

CSO: 3101

## PREPARATIONS FOR MADRID CSCE CONTINUING

LD260354 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 2300 GMT 25 Jan 80 LD

[Interview with Oyarzabal, director of the office of diplomatic information of the Spanish Government by Gerardo Saez--recorded, date and place not specified]

[Excerpt] [Question] Mr Oyarzabal, this week there has been talk about the security and cooperation conference to be held in Madrid in November, talk in the sense that it could be postponed and that there are problems. What can you tell us on this subject?

[Answer] Well, I am going to tell you what the situation is today. Preparations for the conference are continuing, and the calendar is continuing as forecast. Therefore, for our part, we have not made any decision which would entail the postponement or even change the date of the various preparations. However, what I would like to insist upon is that the conference has always been regarded by us, by the government, as a means to arrive at detente, never as an end in itself. I wish to say by this that we understand perfectly that prior to the conference there must exist a certain climate for it not to be a failure. If this climate is not brought about, then obviously we will not want to force a meeting which we know is condemned to failure. Therefore, we are worried about the course of present events because, in effect, it could, as we were saying, put in question the possibility of the conference itself. Having said that, for the moment none of the countries which are to participate in the conference, the cosignatories of the Helsinki Final Act, nor the Spanish authorities have adopted any measure to suspend, postpone or change the planned program.

CSO: 3110

## UGT'S REDONDO INTERVIEWED ON CURRENT LABOR ISSUES

Madrid YA in Spanish 22 Dec 79 p 17

[Interview with Nicolas Redondo of the UGT [General Union of Workers], by Luis Vadillo; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] After 3 years of free union activity, how is the UGT going to grow and develop within Spanish labor unionism, as a result of the line recently adopted?

[Answer] Even when it was illegal, the labor union movement was polarized around two alternatives: one, the General Union of Workers, a class union with almost a hundred year history, and another union, founded in 1962, the Workers' Commissions. This clear choice was made plainer and more conclusive by the obvious potentialities these alternatives held for the Spanish labor union movement. The UGT has a very definite inclination toward a democratic society, and the other choice we all know about. The UGT makes up a large part of this union movement, at times bringing along with it other union options, and even the government itself. It is very satisfying to me to state that union policies of the UGT have been being taken up by the other locals, and not because of pressure from the UGT, but because of their own convictions. We have paid a price, but there is no doubt that the union philosophy of the UGT is gradually prevailing.

[Question] In this new strategy there is more use of negotiation, and pressure is only a last resort. Is this in line with an effort to take on responsibilities for alleviation of the economic crisis, or is it, on the contrary, an attempt to win the confidence of the managers for the time when the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] comes to power?

[Answer] The deep economic crisis, the situation where democracy is being broadened with the development of the constitution, and the problem of terrorism tell us that this situation is not an easy one. I am not particularly optimistic about these conditions, because I get the impression that a great deal of demagoguery is being used. We are not taking this position so that the Socialist Party may win over the managers, but for strictly union motives, and because this situation demands cohesive union action. We cannot speak



of unionism of either pressure or negotiation: the distinction is totally false. I believe that every union local knows that the first thing that they have to do is to try to negotiate, and that this negotiation always must be supported by a large mass organization with a capacity for pressure; then the pressure-negotiation dilemma does not exist. There will be times when it perhaps will first be necessary to use pressure, but I believe that the normal thing to do is to first try to sit down at the negotiating table, and if the agreement is or is not achieved you go or do not go on to pressure; but the interests of the working classes also should not be sacrificed by leading them to--I would not say mobilization--but to various periods of agitation which create frustration and in no way benefit the workers.

[Question] Does the new union attitude of the UGT since its agreement with the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] bring it near to the German unions in its concept of service unionism?

[Answer] The workers' statute bill very much resembled the concepts held by the PC [Communist Party] itself, when the management committees fundamentally had the main role in union action and representation of the workers. In my judgment it is an absolutely anti-union option, and it leads to a situation very similar to that in Italy, where there is great fragmentation of the union movement, and some unclear labor relations which give rise to very tense situations. We entered into negotiations with the CEOE because the UCD [Democratic Center Union] bill was totally unacceptable to us.

This country, like any other, needs strong union locals, large in size, with high percentages of membership, with a series of cadres which offer alternatives for every problem. The dilemma was whether it would be unionism which is argumentative, demanding, and to a certain degree left outside; or rather unionism on a large mass scale, with a series of measures to offer, with a heritage, with the responsibility of an organization which would try to participate in the social and economic life of the country. This is unionism which I would characterize as providing choices, but without sacrificing its capacity for argument or assertiveness. I would not speak of a German type unionism; I believe there are other expressions, like the unionism of Scandinavia and another series of unions, which carry out their function in the life of the country, which render an extraordinary service to the working class, and which can not be minimized.

[Question] Now is the workers statute going to affect labor relations as regards negotiations, committees, delegates, etc.?

[Answer] In the statute they have not taken away power from the management committees, despite the partisan campaign to the contrary. They have tried to manipulate the workers, but we are going to fight, because there is a monopoly in the representation of the workers, not only in the committees, but also in the union sections and in the delegates. We are inclined this way because it will be the union sections who will bring labor relations into the sphere of activity of the company. The paradox is that we have negotiated many agreements of a national scope on the level of the two most

representative locals, but later the application of them has been the business of the management committees, which had not participated in the negotiation, and which had no obligation to make them comply. This does not in any way clarify the union picture, and therefore does not strengthen unionism. We emphasize the idea that a greater strengthening of the union locals would provide greater stability and would lead to less social conflict in the country.

[Question] What is the real relation of coordination or dependence and ideological identity between the PSOE and the UGT?

[Answer] The Socialist Party has supported our attitude clearly and decisively in the agreement with the CEOE, in the workers statute, and is also in agreement with the interconfederal picture. But the situation is totally different from the CCOO [Workers Commissions] - Communist Party relationship, since the CCOO, in my judgment, is very subordinate to the interests of the PC and the latter uses it to serve various party interests: four-party negotiations, government more or less of a broad majority.

We maintain our full independence, are making our decisions in our congresses, and if we have good relationships, it is because we agree on many ideological and political points; but both of us are, especially on the level of the UGT, very jealous of our own autonomy.

[Question] If the PSOE should come to power, what would be the attitude of the UGT toward the country's major economic problems?

In this particular situation we would not be members of a coalition government. It would not be good for the country, because it would cause deep frustration, and, on the parliamentary level, would leave the opposition very restricted to a special minority. What this country needs is a group of the right which would defend its legitimate interests from the rightist point of view, and coherent, sensible leftist opposition, because the situation in the country calls for it. We find ourselves in an extremely delicate situation--and I am not a pessimist--and no one should think that there is anything to celebrate.

In the event that the Socialist Party should take power, we would behave critically, in the best sense of the word. We would never give any government a blank check, and we would take much more part in the operation of that government's programs. I believe that it would be foolish on our part to think that we supported one government or another in the functioning of some formalities. It is possible to take a more or less offensive position in the functioning of a government or its programs. For us it is not so much the men as it is the programs, and that the program which any government could have is fundamental.

[Question] What is Nicolas Redondo's personal philosophy as a union leader?

[Answer] At the age of 14 I began work in the Bilbao Naval, and as I am conditioned by so many years of work, my objective is to provide a real, coherent, serious and efficient means to serve the workers. I do not believe in charismatic leaders; I believe in the effectiveness of teams, in the operation of joint leadership; I believe in democracy to the same degree that I believe in discipline and in the efficiency of an organization; I believe, definitely, that a union local should join together a number of comrades to form cohesive teams, who are not playing at a kind of revolution, but are carrying out a series of programs to solve the day-to-day problems of the workers. My objective is to obtain some who are highly qualified, who would allow us some later conquests without any demagoguery.

[Question] What repercussions could result from a two-party agreement leaving out the CC00?

[Answer] This is now one of the most important matters before not only the workers' movement but the whole country. We have made great efforts, without any demagoguery, and we have reached a position where our views have been coming closer to those of the CEOE. There is still much to discuss, but we have the desire to come to an agreement. We believe that the viewpoints of the UGT, with a salary range of a 13-16 percent increase, reduction of the work week to 40 hours by January, 1982, lowering of the retirement age and review of the weekly salary are an achievement for the working class.

We are not going to give way to the opinions of another organization, and we are going to labor for the workers, for the ones we represent. I might ask myself what is going to happen if we do not come to an agreement. Are they again going to discuss 2,000 or 3,000 totally separate agreements, where it will be hard for the union locals to arrive at what is being negotiated and what it is possible to reach as regards the CEOE? It is possible that if we do not arrive at this agreement we will not even achieve these objectives. Every local must work with a great sense of responsibility, and strictly for the interests of the workers. I believe that the behavior of the Workers Commissions is very conditioned by the policies of the PCE itself, and as I have said in Parliament, this worries me, because in this deep economic crisis, which is having an effect on the social system, the demagogic policy of a party which is trying to make use of a union local can be extremely dangerous.

8131

CSO: 3110

'MUNDO OBRERO' REPORTS ON MEETING FOR SOLIDARITY WITH POLISARIO

LD281505 Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 22 Jan 80 p 13 LD

[Report by Jose Boloix: "Brilliant International Meeting of Solidarity With Saharan People"]

[Text] Madrid--The atmosphere of solidarity could be felt in every corner of Madrid's largest theater, and the speeches were very frequently interrupted by applause and shouts in support of the Saharan people and the POLISARIO.

"The liberation of Saharan territory," Santiago Carrillo stated when opening the meeting, "must be taken to heart by the democrats and communists in this country."

Government Must Correct Mistake of Madrid Agreements

"The West Sahara," he continued, "was a Spanish 'possession' which could have been decolonized correctly, thus correcting one of the country's historical mistakes."

"However," he said, "this was not done because the territory was 'sold' to Morocco and Mauritania through the 'Madrid agreements,' and this forced the Saharan people and the POLISARIO to launch and wage an armed struggle for their country's liberation and national independence."

"We believe," Santiago Carrillo explained, "that the present Spanish Government must correct the former Francoist government's mistake, and we must say that it sometimes seems that this was the Union of the Democratic Center [UCD] government's intention."

"However," he continued, "we were soon able to ascertain that the Spanish Government was not pursuing a consistent political line, and that this same government is not doing what it should to seek real solutions which will restore freedom and sovereignty to the Saharan people."

PCE's Stance on Sahara Problem

"The events creating tension," he explained, "should not make us--and the Spanish people less--forget that the intensification and internationalization



of the Saharan problem could be the cause of a great conflict in our area and could affect--among others--our own country."

"That is the reason for the PCE's stance on the Sahara issue, which is one of helping the POLISARIO to the best of our ability to achieve its aims and helping to the best of our ability the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic to become consolidated, peacefully occupying the whole of its territory and turning it into an area of peace."

"In seeking to achieve these aims," Santiago Carrillo stated, "the POLISARIO can rely on our cooperation, and the Saharan people have us unconditionally at their disposal."

Mansur 'Umar: "We Are Struggling in Legitimate Self-Defense

POLISARIO international relations chief Mansur 'Umar then explained in his capacity as a Saharan Democratic Arab Republic POLITBURO member [as published]:

"We are struggling in legitimate self-defense, and it is not exactly expansionist zeal which has led us to attack Hassan on his own territory and to carry the struggle inside the aggressors' territories."

"We are a people who do not beg but struggle and conquer," he added. "And we are a people who have been able to prove to those who sold us that you cannot sell a country as if it were a flock of sheep."

Mansur 'Umar explained at another point in his speech that "the Saharan people have wrecked the Madrid agreements on the spot by liberating 80 percent of their territory from the Moroccan invasion."

"The Saharan people," he continued, "have won respect and are on the point of achieving their final victory." "In the meantime, the present Spanish Government has been unable to rid itself of its legacy," he explained, referring to the "legacy" of the tripartite Madrid agreement, "and remains an 'accomplice' to the same extent as the government of the Madrid agreements."

Policy of Carrot and Stick

"People continued to resort to the policy of the carrot and the stick," he explained, "but the Saharan people cannot be made to bend the knee through blackmail and threats that U.S. aircraft will intervene against us."

Mansur 'Umar stated that "the present Spanish Government's collusive silence must be condemned" because "the internationalization and intensification of our struggle would turn a simple decolonization problem into a mistake amounting to a crime against which all the countries of the area concerned must rise up."

Manuel Azcarate: "No More Secret Agreements!"

The PCE international policy chief delivered a lengthy, sincere and very pithy speech.



"We must tell the UCD government clearly," he stated, "that democratic Spain cannot continue to do what the Francoist dictatorship did to the Saharan people." "There is too much continuism in our country's foreign policy," he said.

"No more secret agreements with Morocco on the part of the Spanish Government!" he continued. "The Saharan conflict happened through the fault of official Spain, during the Arias Navarro government under the moribund dictatorship, resulting in a real international crime."

#### [LD281506] There Are Only Two Paths

"Today there are two possible paths for the West Sahara problem," Manuel Azcarate explained.

"On the one hand, there is that of continuing the aggression and spreading the conflict. That is tantamount to saying that that entire area would become an unpredictable danger which would also affect our country."

"And the second path," he continued, "is to force Hassan II to withdraw his troops from the West Sahara, just as the Mauritanian state did."

#### Four Points Which Our Government Should Implement

Manuel Azcarate described as shameful the stance of abstaining on the part of our country's representative at the United Nations during the voting by which it was decided that the POLISARIO was--and is--the Saharan people's genuine representative.

"His abstention at the United Nations," he stated, "is shameful and demonstrates the government's total political incompetence with respect to the Sahara issue."

The PCE international policy chief then explained that the Spanish Government should implement four points to contribute to a good solution to the problem.

"The first is that it should begin to implement with the utmost urgency a policy of formally abrogating--right now--the Madrid agreements."

"The second," he continued, "is to recognize the POLISARIO officially and support it in international forums. And in addition, it should press for an international boycott against the shipment of arms to Morocco to be imposed, as long as the aggression against the Saharan people continues."

"And the fourth point is Spanish diplomatic support for resolving the conflict, setting in motion a set of initiatives to insure that Morocco and the POLISARIO negotiate the restoration of sovereignty over their territory to the Saharan people."

"If it does not base its policy on these four points," he stated, "the Spanish Government will lose many points in conducting a correct policy in Africa, the Mediterranean, the Arab World and the Third World, with all that this entails."

He then mentioned Adolfo Suarez' latest visit to the United States, complying with Carter's wishes, describing the event as "the visit of the two communities," with many obscure areas.

He likewise asked: "In whose name are Suarez and Carter starting to talk about the 'sharing out' of the Sahara?"

Manual Azcarate concluded his impassioned and brilliant speech with an appeal for solidarity with the Saharan people, placing particular emphasis on the Spanish Socialist Workers Party.

#### Speeches by French and Italian Communists

The PCF was represented by Politburo member Francette Lezard. "Giscard," she stated, "is today asserting his neutrality in the conflict. Unfortunately, that is totally untrue. France has a historical responsibility in the conflict. After intervening directly against the POLISARIO, it is still arming and officering the Moroccan army."

She stated that the situation is scandalous and intolerable, expressing the PCF's support for the Saharan people and the POLISARIO.

PCI foreign section chief Antonio Rubbi expressed the same enthusiasm as the other speakers for the joint stance aimed at resolving the African conflict, citing a meeting in Rome which will be held at the beginning of March in this connection. He explained the parliamentary actions and mobilizations decided on by the PCI with the aim of inducing the Italian Government to recognize the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic and was interrupted several times during his speech--in Italian--by the audience.

In short, the meeting of solidarity proved to be a memorable political success within the struggle in support of the POLISARIO and the Saharan people.

CSO: 3110

## OIL COMPANIES NEGOTIATE INCREASED PURCHASES OF IRANIAN OIL

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 8-14 Dec 79 p 85

[Article by E.E.: "Spain Going After Iranian Oil"]

[Text] London's city [financial section] at the end of last week and the beginning of this one, was the setting for a necessary meeting among Spain's refining firms and representatives of the NIOC [National Iranian Oil Company] to resolve two matters: the new currency which will govern crude oil trading transactions and contracts in 1980. Executives of CEPESA [Spanish Petroleum Company], PETRONOR [Northern Petroleum Refinery, Inc.] and HISPANOIL [Spanish Oil Company], traveled to London on Friday, 30 November, after having previously negotiated with Israeli officials.

Spanish firms have begun to capitalize on one fact: The fact that the U.S. embargo on importing Iranian crude oil has left some 700,000 barrels of oil per day floating in the marketplace. Who will gather this oil and what will be the price are the two questions that obsess the firms buying the oil. There is also a third question: The NIOC has demanded that payment be made in German marks instead of the dollars, which until now were the unit of account in the oil trade.

According to figures obtained by ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA, the crude oil from Iran unloaded at the national refinery terminals amounted to 3,170,657 tons during the period from January to October 1979 as opposed to 8,110,411 tons for the same period in 1978. This means that the reduction effected in Spanish imports of Iranian crude oil was no less than 114 percent.

Nevertheless, the sector's enterprises are being run according to pragmatic criteria. In the face of the 700,000 daily barrels blocked by the United States, the Spanish firms' executives are now going after crude oil to build up their stocks and prepare themselves for a possible worsening of the situation in the Persian Gulf. Hence the negotiations under way both in London and in Teheran.

The two Spanish firms which are making sizable purchases of Iranian crude oil are CEPESA and PETRONOR. This year, the former acquired some 700,000 tons and the latter some 500,000. Well, whereas CEPESA is tending to replace their purchases from new sources, PETRONOR is maintaining its pursuit of Iranian oil. ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA was told by sources close to the Bilbao firm that the refinery's plan for 1980 is to secure some contracts guaranteeing 40,000 barrels a day, that is, some 2 million tons. In 1979, the average was 10,000 barrels a day or 500,000 tons a year.

PETRONOR's representatives recently discussed the contracts for next year although for the time being there were no optimistic data from the standpoint of exceeding the 1979 levels, that is, some 500,000 tons. For its part, CEPSA has negotiated contracts for some 750,000 metric tons.

Now, while the Spanish firms received with relative calm the Telex in which the Iranian firm made it known that henceforth payment for crude oil would have to be made in German marks, there is concern that cannot be concealed. PETRONOR, for example, recognized that it will lose about 40 million pesetas in exchanging the dollar payment into marks because of the different exchange rates. And this is understandable: The dollar is steadily dropping, whereas the German mark is constantly increasing in value.

Yet the system chosen by the Iranian remains rather unclear. "We do not know," one of the sector's executives told ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA, "whether we are the ones who must change dollars into marks; nor do we know whether the price of a barrel will be stated in dollars or whether it will henceforth be stated in marks." In other words: There is still confusion as to the method of payment for purchases of crude oil.

The Iranian decisions it seems, will have a limited effect on Spain for the remainder of the year. According to the Bilbao refinery a shipment of only 100,000 tons of crude oil from Iran is expected between now and the end of December.

It has been admitted by sources of the firms that a relative calm obtains in that the firms since the beginning of the year have made a point of ensuring supplies and made purchases to cover themselves in advance. The figure of 13 million tons has been given by the administration for the present level of crude oil stocks and petroleum products. Of that amount, 10.6 million are at the refineries, which is the equivalent of an 86-day supply. So Spain finds itself within the level of stocks recommended by the AIE [International Energy Agency] whose directive it has not fulfilled with respect to crude oil imports: During the first 9 months of 1979, purchases amounted to 34,850,355 tons as opposed to 34,585,550 tons for the same period in 1978; an 0.77 percent increase. The situation is nevertheless not dramatic. With the exception of the United States, no country affiliated with the AIE fulfilled the goal of reducing its imports by 5 percent during the current year. Maintaining the 1978 levels will in any event be something positive in Spain's case.

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## TOURISM EXPECTED TO STAGNATE AT 1979 LEVELS IN 1980

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 21 Dec 79 p 47

[Text] The Ministry of Commerce yesterday anticipated that forecasts for tourism next year would show a growth trend close to zero. In line with this way of thinking, gross income for the current fiscal year has been estimated at about \$6.4 billion while forecasts for 1980 fluctuate about \$7 billion. The foreign exchange balance for last January-October rose to \$4,823,300,000, representing a growth rate of 13.8 percent in relation to the same period of the preceding year.

During the period covered by January-November of this year a drop in the number of tourists of 2.9 percent in relation to the same period of the preceding year was recorded. The number went from 37,616,408 to 36,526,051 visitors, which in absolute figures represents a drop of 1,090,357.

The rise in oil prices, with its subsequent repercussion on tourist fares, is one of the factors leading to the prediction of a drop in tourism for next year. The World Organization for Tourism, on the other hand, predicts a general growth rate of zero for the sector in 1980. This institution had predicted a growth rate of 8 percent for the current year, which the actual situation reduced to about 3 percent over that of the previous fiscal year.

As concerns Spanish investments abroad, Minister of Commerce Juan Antonio Garcia Diez said yesterday at a press conference held in Madrid that their productivity rate, following recent liberalizing measures, is similar to that of other years. "There has been 'no avalanche,'" he said "in this domain." The minister constantly repeated his intention of "maintaining this liberal practice and spirit next year. It is the only attitude compatible with our admission into the EEC."

Garcia Diez anticipated the possibility that the consumer bill would be presented in the Cortes before 15 January. He said that the bill was following the map of Europe in this domain and that it was a question of a simple kind of legislation for which there was no precedent in our country.



And finally, the minister of commerce announced that in conjunction with circumstances brought on by the economic situation, such as the short-lived increase in tourism, the bill that Spain would have to pay for importing crude oil could turn our current balance into a \$2.5-billion deficit next year. The 1979 balance will show a surplus of about \$1.6 billion.

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## FOREIGN INVESTMENT FIGURES FOR 1979 GIVEN

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 21 Dec 79 p 47

[Text] Foreign investment in Spain will this year come to about \$1 billion. Penetration of foreign capital into firms with main offices in Madrid and Barcelona having a capital stock of less than 2 million pesetas represents 8.78 percent of the total capital of such companies, according to information provided by Ministry of Commerce general manager of foreign transactions Enrique Puig.

The penetration figure of 8.78 percent presupposes a capital of 1.358 trillion pesetas.

This year Spanish investment abroad will fluctuate between \$350 and \$400 million. About 66 percent of such investments will be in Latin America, between 15 and 18 percent in the United States, between 17 and 20 percent in Europe and the remaining 2 percent in other countries.

The flow of Spanish investments abroad came to about \$246 million in 1978, while Spain received \$750 million.

During a debate organized by the APD [expansion unknown] last Wednesday, managing director of the Foreign Bank of Spain Rafael Martinez Cortina said that one of the economic factors that is stimulating Spanish investment abroad is a higher return and being able to count on raw materials, in the case of the food products industry, for example. Torras Hostench president Higinio Torras Majem added to this the additional advantage of favorable costs.

Deutsche Bank general manager Karl Otto Born argued in favor of the establishment of that financial organization in Spain to provide the opportunity to create a specific market which does not yet exist and particularly the fact that Madrid is shaping up as "an important financial center," among other reasons.

At the conference the General Motors representative confirmed the fact that the multinational concern's decision to establish itself in Spain was due to the effective solution the Spanish Government had found for problems relating to facilities, which represented such a large direct investment, somewhat more than 100 billion pesetas.

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## BRIEFS

**ASTURIAN UGT INTERNAL DIVISIONS**--The UGI's [General Union of Workers] miners union of Asturias has drawn up an internal circular in which it issues a strong warning to the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] concerning the parliamentary debates on the Workers' Statutes. The friction between the metallurgical and mining sectors cropped up again at the Asturian Socialist Federation's 20th Congress in that whereas the mining sector supports a trade union philosophy linked more closely to elements at the base and an autonomy allowing criticism of the PSOE's and UGT's leadership bodies, the metallurgical sector, to which the sector connected with the USO [Workers Trade Union], wants to increase the power of the UGT's leadership apparatus. According to sources in the Socialist trade union headquarters, these differences in trade union concepts are also being expressed within the executive committee. The old guard and the new wave differ on fundamental aspects and dialectical disputes are taking place more frequently despite the calls for order from the grand patriarch, Nicolas Redondo. "At the next UGT congress," the same sources assert, "there could be significant changes." [Text] [Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 8-14 Dec 79 p 15] 8094

**INFLATION FIGURES**--According to the index figures, the Consumer Price Index is bogged down. The evolution of inflation in recent months shows this to be so. The average annual rate has been going down slowly without there being any indications at the moment that new major drops may occur. Since December, the percentage of change in the Consumer Price Index as compared with that for the same month last year (accumulated over the past 12 months) has dropped only 1 point, going from 16.6 to 15.5 percent. To emphasize the significance of this matter it suffices to note that over the previous 10 months--February to December of the past year--the drop was 7.1 points. For its part, the average annual index--possibly the most representative one--follows a similar trend. In December, it was 19.8 percent a year and has now gone down by 4.2 points. However, what is most serious is that the evolution of the average rate makes the sudden slowing down over the past 12 months very obvious. [Text] [Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 8-14 Dec 79 p 5] 8094

**CONSUMER PRICES**--In analyzing the Consumer Price Index--which the National Institute of Statistics draws 70--it has been brought out that traditionally

the inflationary stresses were attributable to Group 1--the one carrying the greatest weight--called Food, Beverages and Tobacco. Well that has already changed. The behavior of the Price Index is quite contrary to the food group, which for the year to date shows a clear and uninterrupted tendency to drop which has caused it to reduce its particular rate by 50 percent. A very different behavior is that shown by the Housing Index which, previously undervalued, has now shot up. This has also affected the rental group with the enormous impact it has. In any event, when the structure of inflation is analyzed it must be brought out that the government has been able to contain to the maximum the evolution of prices in those sectors where it has the greatest possibility of intervening. [Text] [Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 8-14 Dec 79 p 5] 8094

**BASQUE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE**--Of the working population of the Basque Country, 17.1 percent are unemployed, according to a report on unemployment written up by the CGV [Basque General Council] Board of Labor Consultants. The level estimated by the board -- reported on 31 October 1979 -- presumes that unemployment in the three Basque provinces is 7.1 percent higher than the national average which, according to the latest statistics, is about 10 percent. In the study on the provinces, the board estimates that the highest level of unemployment exists in Guipuzcoa with 18.6 percent, followed by Vizcaya with 17.2 percent and Alava, the province that most closely agrees with the general tendency in the rest of the country, has a rate of 11.9 percent. For the first time, this study by the board was completed in terms of three levels, that is, in addition to unemployment properly speaking, special situations like those involving workers subjected to temporary layoffs, reductions in the number of working hours or early retirement were analyzed. The study, which is to be published shortly, comes under the heading of the policy the Board of Labor Consultants is conducting in the face of unemployment, one which is designed to assume jurisdiction over the matter in a short space of time when transfers from the Central Administration become a reality. [Text] [Bilbao EL CORREO ESPANOL-EL PUEBLO VASCO in Spanish 16 Dec 79 p 7] 11466

**CARTER'S MILITARY BUDGET**--President Carter yesterday sent to congress a budget for 1981 totaling \$615.8 billion--a large sum--of which one quarter is for a 5-percent increase in military spending. It has correctly been said that this is a cold war budget. The U.S. President justified the increase by referring to the present situation in the Persian Gulf. But Carter has also taken advantage of a favorable climate among senators who have to approve his proposals and who have changed their original views in the past few weeks. It is not simply a matter of making a quantitative analysis of the figures in the budget: military priorities are qualitatively worrying. These include the capacity to deploy troops very quickly anywhere in the world. Strength is, therefore, qualified by the possibility of an effective presence capable of preventing aggression or replying to it in the appropriate manner. But the United States not only has a problem in affirming its military superiority. It has another problem, perhaps a more serious one, in affirming its credibility and service in the interests of the free world. [Text] [LD291324 Madrid Radio in Spanish to Europe 1130 GMT 29 Jan 80 LD]



**TERRORIST GROUP ACTIONS**--Responsibility for the attack on the friends of UNESCO offices in Madrid in which two people were injured has been claimed by an extreme rightwing group, the Spanish-Basque Battalion, in a phone call to the newspaper INFORMACIONES. According to the caller, the organization will continue to attack communist organizations. Normally, this group's violent actions are carried out in the south of France and the Basque country against Basque refugees and members of leftwing [Abertzale patriotic organizations] [LD291902 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1800 GMT 29 Jan 80 LD]

**JANUARY-OCTOBER FOREIGN TRADE**--Madrid, 27 December (Europa Press)--This October Spain imported 163,418 billion pesetas worth of goods and exported 92,269 billion worth, with a deficit of 71,149 billion and a coverage rate of 56.5 percent, according to information from the General Customs Administration. In comparison with October 1978, imports rose by 37 billion (29.6 percent) and exports by 11 billion (14.8 percent) in comparison with the same month of the previous year. During this January-October our imports rose to 1,353,633,000 pesetas and exports to 962,601,000 with a deficit of 391,032,000 pesetas and a coverage rate of 71.1 percent. In relation to the first 10 months of 1978 imports increased 13.7 percent (the crude oil acquired increased in value by 8.5 percent), while exports rose by 19.8 percent. The deficit rose by 0.9 percent and the overall coverage rate went up 3.6 points. [Text] [Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 28 Dec 79 p 31] 11466

CSO: 3110

COMMUNIST LEADER: SOVIETS MUST LEAVE AFGHANISTAN IMMEDIATELY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 4 Jan 80 p 4

[Article by Bo Ostlund]

[Text] "Soviet troops must withdraw from Afghanistan immediately, it is vital that a superpower such as the Soviet Union respects the principle of the sovereignty of individual countries."

These words were spoken during an interview with SVENSKA DAGBLADET by VPK [Leftist Communist Party] leader Lars Werner who stressed that this principle is of vital importance to VPK.

Werner said that the presence of Soviet troops can make it harder for progressive forces in Afghanistan to lift the country out of its misery and underdevelopment.

"This does not mean that we are solidly behind the Moslem rebels who are resisting, rebels who oppose women's liberation and are actually backed by Pakistan and the United States with the CIA, but for us the important thing is to maintain unity among the progressive forces taking over after the revolution in April 1978 and it is there that we feel the presence of Russian troops can make things more difficult. For this reason, foreign intervention must be condemned," Werner said.

Asked if this kind of Soviet activity has harmed the Swedish party the VPK leader replied that the time is past when individual parties had to answer for the actions of other countries.

U.S. Error

"But I would like to remind you that the people now in power in Sweden have not been reluctant to recreate the mood of the Cold War era," Werner said.

Suddenly Lars Werner turned to the subject of President Carter:

"Carter is incredibly hypocritical! While the United States is pumping money and materiel into Pakistan and while Carter talks of setting up a force of 140,000 men who can be sent anywhere in the Middle East, he is now violently attacking the Soviet invasion and making it into a major issue. The United States has the major responsibility for negative developments and tension in the entire area!"

#### Boycott a Mistake

There is talk of boycotting the Olympic games in Moscow as a protest against the invasion of Afghanistan.

"Recommending a boycott of the summer Olympic games in Lake Placid in the United States [as written] shows what those behind the boycott proposal are up to."

Hasn't VPK earlier backed boycotts against countries such as South Africa?

"Yes, but in this case it is quite wrong."

#### The 1980's Theirs

On the domestic level VPK is preparing for an offensive. The party is rejoicing over the good SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] figures. ("They've been getting better since SVENSKA DAGBLADET started publishing them," laughed Werner.) The party is now up around 6 percent. The trend in the final days of the election campaign seems to be holding: 400 new members, mostly young, joined the Stockholm association just in the last few weeks.

"The 1980's will be ours," said Werner confidently.

"Actually we think it is strange this progress didn't occur in the 1970's. In the 1980's we will continue to take votes away from the Social Democrats in the first stages but they will come to us from the other side of the block lines in subsequent stages."

#### Bigger Than Liberal Party

Lars Werner admitted that he was personally stimulated by the reputation he gained as party leader even among his political opponents in connection with the 1979 campaign! But that also applied to the party as a whole, he said. "We were hampered by the internal party conflicts that led to the split. But now we have a calm working atmosphere again along with a steadily rising trend."

"It won't be long before we are bigger than the Liberals," Werner promised.

VPK is counting on a new election in the spring.

"We're convinced the government will collapse after the popular referendum. All three parties have managed to establish a separate line. They are doomed to fail."

Socialize Oil!

VPK will now take a hard line on socializing oil businesses in Sweden.

"We know we have very broad support for this among the general public far beyond the confines of our own party. The oil companies are making unreasonable profits while we're paying 11-12,000 kronor per cubic meter of oil. Society needs that money in the current situation," said Lars Werner.

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## LO LEADERSHIP INCREASINGLY FAR REMOVED FROM RANK AND FILE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 20 Dec 79 p 3

[Commentary by Lars Ekstrand]

[Text] Lars Ekstrand's doctoral thesis, "From Consul Goransson to MBL [expression unknown]," deals with the trade union movement.

Axel Danielsson, one of the truly great figures of the Swedish labor movement, spoke enthusiastically about labor unions at the end of the nineteenth century as a lever for working-class development that would undoubtedly have greater importance for "mankind and the future than the most significant discoveries and industrial inventions." At the time of Danielsson's speech the Swedish trade union movement had started to take its first faltering steps. Devotion and idealism were great. All were full of fighting spirit and rallied round their unions.

What happened to the pioneer idea of the Swedish union movement as one enormous popular movement or popular university? What happened to the idea of the union as everybody's organization, the bearer of the collective dream of a more just society? How has the heritage of the pioneers been administered? What do the unions look like today?

Today the Swedish union movement is an enormous bureaucratic apparatus with the union leaders in a strong position and most of the members passive and uninvolved in union work.

At least that is the impression I formed in my own study of 12 local union organizations in Gastrikland and Norduppland. The object of my study was to venture into everyday union life and diagnose the Swedish union movement. The study covered five different unions--the Municipal Workers Union, the Transportation Workers Union, the Commercial Employees Union, the Metalworkers Union and the Paperworkers Union--and included five divisions, four sections and three clubs. The last seven organizations were directly tied to the job site, especially the three clubs in



the commerce sector. A representative mixture of production and services entered into my selection. Here were people engaged in ordinary occupations, truck drivers, iron plant workers, watchmen, newspaper workers, expediting agents, etc., a total of around 22,000 members.

Thus the selection should provide a good foundation for making statements on the unions today and the tendencies dominating the labor movement.

Here I will take up general issues, what unites the various local unions, rather than what divides them.

#### Most Passive

It was quite clear from my study that most of the members, around 80-90 percent, did not take part in everyday union activities. They never attended union meetings. Many never came in contact with their union representatives or those working higher up in the organization. Most of the members pay dues to the union but are otherwise inactive. The union never becomes part of everyday life and it does not shape social views.

But if it is true that so many members are not involved in union activities what are the organizations doing about it? In my interviews with people active in the unions I met great skepticism concerning a more active membership. I ran into a defense of ingrown activity and how the inner circle feels each problem should be dealt with and resolved. For example the idea of adding special features at union meetings to attract more members to attend was rejected.

They work with traditional, tried and true methods and are unwilling to change the format of union activity. A union worker told me when I asked her how they get in touch with members:

"The only way we get in touch with them is by using the notice board. We put up the bulletins we get from the union and the division. We never make contact with them in any other way."

Those who do not attend the meetings, and most of them do not, are not involved in union activity.

But what about the new members, those who join now?

"We get the members in," said a union workers, "when they come on the job. But after that....It's the next step that we stumble over."

The new members are included on the membership rolls, they become so-called "numerical members," but they are not active aside from that.

The statutes or the formal aspect of representative democracy and its protection make union leaders run the risk of becoming blind to the problems of all the members who are left out. Or perhaps they don't even view this as a problem.

#### A Few Rule

Today the tasks are divided up among a few people. They are pulling the heavy everyday load. Union employees and an inner circle of active members carry the whole activity. The union has been turned into a service organization. The consciousness-raising element has disappeared. The members no longer speak of the organization in terms of "my" or "our" union. Tasks are concentrated on a few people. Often these are the same people who serve year after year and the recruitment problems are striking.

One can speak of a tendency toward a union movement "without members." The members are found on the rolls and act as a decoration. But they are not involved in any way. The union leaders represent and act as interpreters for a mass membership whose opinions they know nothing about and don't even ask about. Relations with members have been formalized and have turned into a routine. The movement has petrified. LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions] has solidified in a certain organizational pattern. People don't dare do anything about this or perhaps they don't want to.

The picture of a union without members is a frightening vision of the future. This involves among other things a shift in emphasis from listening to the demands of members and trying to promote them to administering laws and implementing centrally-determined decrees.

The new labor laws--MBL, the shop steward law and the job protection law--have accelerated and reinforced this tendency toward what could also be called a self-sufficient union, i.e. local unions that are less dependent on their members than they used to be. Local union activity no longer stands or falls with its members' activity or their determination to contribute to the organization. Union work is based primarily on staff members who work for the members and perform services for them.

The unions are still functioning, without the active support or influence of the members. Since the members stay away and since the work is not based on the members the leadership is not faced with demanding and expectant union members. In this way they risk working in a vacuum. Those who work in the union continue in the same old rut with the same spirit. They stay on track and are surrounded with people with similar views. A mutual view of the world and a mutual way of looking at problems is developed. "Organization professionals" are efficiently trained.

## Elitism Coming

The new laws that must be applied in daily union life make great demands on union representatives. Some posts involve a responsibility and require such talent that not every ordinary member is prepared to step into them. Thus the laws involve the risk of elitism. They promote elitism in the unions.

The position of union leaders is thus strengthened and there are risks of a deep gap between them and the "ordinary" members. Already there are many excluded members. What will happen when these laws are put into practice? Will this produce a union technocracy, whether people want one or not?

## What Happened?

Why did this happen? What became of the dream of a vital union organization? Why is one confronted by bureaucracy and inconvenience? Have the leaders deliberately betrayed the cause for their own advantage, have they "sold out"? Or has the Swedish labor movement gone in over its head with all the laws the movement fought to get passed?

Some of the answers must be sought in the ideology of centralization advocated by SAP [Social Democratic Party] and LO. All the power and all the decision-making rights have been delegated to central bodies. It is as if they don't dare rely on the members and their own resources. Therefore union democracy has also been reduced to a formality and has been steadily eroded.

In addition I don't think one can overstate the formation of big divisions and the organizational view behind this move. The union was seen as a service organization ruled by an efficient and rational elite. Pure interest organizations do not promote membership activity. That is well-known. Also it is unlikely that the involvement of individual members will extend beyond paying the membership dues. They stay in the union as long as they get something out of doing so.

## Big Divisions

The big divisions that were formed in the 1960's meant that divisions were merged, activities became more professional and organizational structure changed dramatically. The result was anonymity and increased distance between members and the leadership. Here we see the start of the trend toward a self-sufficient union which is being rapidly strengthened today.

The discussion of workers' funds within the union movement must also be placed in this context. Regardless of how one looks at this issue, as

a means of acquiring capital or as a democratic method the key question remains. Do the members back LO in this? My own studies of the unions in Sweden today indicate they do not. Will this gap between the leadership and the members gradually erode the union movement? Will LO survive merely as an outgrowth of state authority, as the extended arm of the state in the working class? With the job of making sure that laws are obeyed and implemented in union activity?

The indications are alarming.

#### Membership Figures (1978)

Municipal Workers	457,204
Transportation Workers	56,259
Commercial Workers	152,832
Metalworkers	446,729
Paper Workers	42,904
Total LO membership	2,057,290

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## AGRELL CALLS FOR CAUTIOUS REALISM AS MEANS TO AVERT WAR

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Jan 80 p 3

[Commentary by Wilhelm Agrell]

[Text] Wilhelm Agrell is associated with the research policy program at Lund University.

In what circumstances would the damage done to the Swedish society by a war be greater than the consequences of demands made on us? In my article, "Limits to Our Resistance," I brought up this question which is so seldom dealt with in the Swedish defense debate. I feel that against the background of increasingly destructive weapons and the rising vulnerability of our society security policy should contain more emphasis on the nation's opportunities to survive on a purely physical level. This limits our ability to play for high stakes in a war situation where peace is involved much more than many people think.

Not unexpectedly my article set off a number of critical articles of a very mixed nature. However all the writers with the exception of Defense Minister Kronmark are officers which means that by and large my article was criticized from the same perspective. I will concentrate here on certain common elements in the criticism; I cannot deal with all the questions involved, of course, and I have not responded to superficial criticism.

To a large extent Eric Kronmark's long article is a review of my book, "If War Doesn't Come." This discussion does not fall within the limits of the present issue and should be continued in a different context. Here I will simply comment that the criticism in Kronmark's article was essentially countered by arguments in the book.

The major criticism of the thesis in my article can be summed up in the following two statements:



Our determination to offer armed resistance in all situations must seem credible in order to deter an attack.

If we choose to give in to a threat we will automatically be hit by the retaliation of the other superpower and/or become the battleground for a conflict between them.

I will start with the question of credibility. This is Bo Hugemark's main line of reasoning. He thinks I made a "hopeless mess" out of the hypothetical question. He himself compares Sweden's security policy situation in a crisis with a poker game in which the important thing for us is to keep raising the stakes in the hope that the opponent will "fold," e.g. refrain from attacking us. If he does so anyway we'll have to see what we can do, the politicians will have to try to save the situation.

Poker principles are quite acceptable when we are playing for matches but they are more debatable when the survival of a nation is involved. This is further emphasized by the restrictions Hugemark makes in the rules of the game by ignoring the possibility of giving in in an untenable situation. According to his action model there are no opportunities to make concessions before a war breaks out. Thus when confronted with a serious threat his "poker tactics" lead inexorably to war.

#### Obstinate Finns

The consequences of Hugemark's principles can be illustrated by the actions of Finland in 1938-39 when the Finns consistently refused to enter into a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union concerning the Karelian Isthmus. Making any eastern concessions had no part in Finnish policy as a result of obstinate nationalism, incomprehension of Soviet defensive needs and a blind faith in the deterrent effect of their armaments.

Finland was caught up in its own psychological warfare and thus unable to pursue a realistic policy in the same way as Israel was before the war of October 1973.

The same thing could happen to us in a future conflict if we hold tight to a defense doctrine that deprives us of the possibility of making concessions. How many times during World War II could we have become involved in the conflict if the leaders of the nation had worked on the principle that all demands should be rejected in the hope that the assailant was bluffing?

#### Demands When Balance Shifts

The question of retaliation from the other superpower as a result of Swedish concessions must be considered in the context of the situation

that arises. If Sweden does not pursue a purely concessionary policy (which no one would advocate) it is highly likely that Sweden would not be faced with serious demands unless one superpower had achieved definite superiority over the other. In any other situation it should be clear to both sides that Sweden could successfully play the superpowers off against each other by pointing out that the advantage represented by Swedish concessions would be neutralized or outbid by counter moves from the other side.

What we need in a situation in which one side has the upper hand is a wise and realistic policy of adjustment leading us to act against the background of the strengths, weaknesses and mutual distrust of both sides. Resistance, delay and concessions are the three variables we can use in this context.

What Sweden definitely does not need is a policy that puts us up against the wall as a result of depriving us in advance of any possibility to make necessary concessions. Of course we should not make concessions that would invite massive retaliation from the other superpower or ones that would turn us into a major battlefield.

#### Many Intermediate Situations

What I am pointing out is that there are many intermediate situations between defense "to the last man" against all conceivable threats and Glistrup's automatic telephone-answering service ("We surrender.") We can call these situations the limits of our resistance.

Where we draw the limits depends largely on how our society develops and on the type of weapons used in our vicinity. Thus it is apparent that the limits are constantly changing and that this is something that must be discussed. It is only in military circles that there seems to be a widespread impression that defense goals were set once and for all after World War II with the same authority as the ten commandments.

#### More Flexible in 1970's

If we look back at the war years it seems incredible, to put it mildly, that the consistent and well-considered policy of concession which Sweden pursued at that time was replaced by a defense doctrine based on the idea that any concessions were unthinkable and that Sweden would fight to the end. It was not until the 1970's that this doctrine became more flexible. Perhaps the pompous objectives of the postwar period were a step in our psychological warfare or perhaps this was an attempt to restore some of the honor to the military that it had lost as a result of the policy of concession during the war.

We must now realize that military might is not something that should be resorted to automatically. In each situation the political leaders must weigh the threat to the nation's survival against the threat to its independence. Military resources represent one of several instruments which the political leaders may or may not choose to employ, depending on what best serves the interests of the nation as a whole.

We ourselves must decide in each situation where the limits of our resistance should lie and how we should try to keep the peace. This does not mean issuing an invitation to an assailant. But that might be the result if we declare a doctrine of automatic resistance, a doctrine that is not credible against the background of World War II and thus invites testing.

Thus it seems reasonable that defense forces--in a possible future conflict--might have to accept a reasonable Swedish policy, just as in World War II, a policy in which concessions may be needed to steer the nation out of war.

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## VOLVO ASSUMING AN INCREASINGLY MULTINATIONAL CHARACTER

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Dec 79 p 2

[Commentary by Robert Rock]

[Text] Once in a debate that was more flippant than serious a multinational corporation was compared to an octopus extending its tentacles to various parts of the world. If that image is correct one could say that in relation to the nation's population the Swedish business world contains more octopi than any other country in the world.

There is a wealth of Swedish firms with manufacturing or sales subsidiaries and affiliates in other countries. If we add partially-owned companies and companies with cooperative agreements the density is even greater.

At this time Volvo is accentuating its multinational character. This "octopus" has extended two new tentacles on the same day, one reaching to the south, the other to the north.

To the south Volvo has signed an agreement with the Renault group. This means among other things that future product development and component manufacturing will extend beyond the borders of Sweden more definitely than has been the case in the past.

To the north the "tentacle" is reaching all the way to the oil fields in the Norwegian Sea. Sweden's biggest industrial firm is expanding its scope by getting a chance to take part in the search for oil in one or more of the "squares" on the ocean floor that could prove very profitable in the long run.

The cooperation with Renault is easier to explain and easier to understand than the activity on the offshore platforms of the North Sea. The French agreement is after all within Volvo's traditional framework, it has a direct historical connection with the first passenger car manufactured in Goteborg at the end of the 1920's which led to the founding of Volvo.

By merging the research and development capabilities of Volvo and Renault both sides gain expanded resources. Since vital components--car engines have already been tested--can be manufactured in greater numbers for both companies the unit costs will be lower.

This is a simple piece of arithmetic. The only problem is to implement it in practice in an efficient and flexible way, avoiding friction. Unless this can be accomplished there is no real justification for multinational cooperation.

For this is a question of cooperation and coordination. Therefore the octopus image is really misleading.

The search for oil in Norway is a more uncertain venture, partly because this is the first time an individual Swedish firm has taken a serious part in such activities. Volvo knows a great deal about manufacturing passenger cars but it knows very little about oil exploration. The company will be relying heavily on its partners.

For the oil exploration also involves a mutual effort. During a trip through Stavanger I made at the time of the Norwegian Volvo agreement a Norwegian expert compared the group working together within a "square" to a company owning a taxi in common.

The one who can drive best starts out by sitting behind the wheel and doing the driving. The others have to go along as passengers until they get enough experience to be able to take part in making decisions.

But they all share expenses and revenue in proportion to their share of ownership rights.

During the negotiations on the Norwegian agreement this line of reasoning seemed too risky for the stockholders who felt the price Volvo would pay indirectly for its share in the taxi would be too high. On this point Volvo's information did not hold up.

For one thing it was impossible to give a total evaluation of what the investment would return since no one knew for certain how much oil the "squares" on the ocean floor would produce. Now, after the fact, quantities have been found that will produce billions in revenue.

What is happening now is that Volvo is being invited once more to climb into the oil exploration taxi with a group of professionals. In the eyes of many competitors this is an enviable starting position for an amateur. It is to be hoped that this time the stockholding experts will not try to stop things.

The company is taking a risk. But the founders of Volvo did that when they started manufacturing passenger cars. If the investment succeeds



it will not only bring in large returns in the long run it will also provide great opportunities for both Volvo and other Swedish engineering firms to supply equipment.

This would achieve what may have been the most important goal of the much-deplored Norwegian agreement.

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## COLONEL QUESTIONS VIABILITY OF SWEDISH DEFENSE EFFORT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 12 Dec 79 p 3

[Article by Colonel Hodder Stjernsward]

[Text] Colonel Hodder Stjernsward is the head of the Gotland regiment, P 18.

The government declaration of 12 October 1979 contains these words: "Sweden's policy of nonalliance, which is aimed at neutrality in war-time, stands fast. It is backed up by a strong defense."

One wonders what is meant by a strong defense. Do we have a strong defense today? Isn't it a fact that this is just an expression we are fond of using which may have nothing to do with the real situation? Otherwise our defense would have to have been excessively strong before the series of cutbacks began in 1968. And no one would claim that.

Now and then it might be useful to remind ourselves of what is lacking in our defense. We have no strategic or medium-range missiles. We have no nuclear weapons. We have no strategic bombers. We have only a few warships left, in the destroyer class, and soon our surface fleet will consist of torpedo boats, patrol boats and minesweepers. Tank units make up a small part of our army. Most of the army consists of infantry brigades and local defense units moved in unprotected vehicles or on cycles. Our most long-range artillery, aside from the coastal artillery, is our 15.5 cm gun.

Defense acts over the last 10 years have cut funds for materiel purchases successively so that only about half the military units could be modernized.

How Strong is Strong?

One wonders what lower threshold would have to be crossed before the word "strong" is dropped from the political vocabulary.

Words don't mean much here. A hypothetical opponent knows pretty exactly how strong or how weak our defenses are. Why not be honest about it instead?

One has to be honest with draftees. Career officers can't rattle off meaningless phrases or lie about the defense in which they and the draftees are involved. For example it is obvious that a vehicle with an armored chassis dates from 1942 from the date stamped on it by the manufacturer if from nothing else. If a gun has a model number from the beginning of the century that can't be hidden either.

Thus routine statements about our strong defense often strike a false note for defense personnel. This is also a question of morale. It is a complicated dilemma, on the one hand as an obvious step in training we must try to promote optimism and confidence in the materiel among the draftees, but on the other hand we know some of the weapons are not comparable with those of a possible opponent.

Of course we also have equipment we can be proud of. Our modernized infantry and Norrland brigades, for example, have a firepower and mobility far exceeding the old standards. But renewal of materiel seems to be stagnating.

Inhuman, Immoral

Fredrik Reuterswärd wrote an excellent article in SVENSKA DAGBLADET some time ago on how soldiers react in combat and how those who are facing the enemy feel about their weapons. Reuterswärd wrote that it was inhuman and immoral to send troops equipped with outmoded materiel into combat against an enemy with modern equipment and up-to-date training.

The question arises: is our security situation really so peaceful and our economy so bad that we can permit the continued de-escalation of our defense efforts? The 1978 Defense Committee had this to say about the military policy situation in Scandinavia:

"Changes concerning naval and nuclear strategy, ocean rights and oil technology in recent years have led to Scandinavia being given a more important role in the calculations of the superpowers in strategic respects. This can be seen from the way in which surveillance and training exercises have increased in our area on both sides. Similar evaluations were made by the Finnish and Norwegian defense committees whose reports were issued in 1976 and 1978 respectively. Thus the Finnish parliamentary Defense Committee stressed in its report the growing importance of northern regions. Defenses in northern Finland have been reinforced. The evaluations of the Norwegian Defense Committee led to proposals for various steps to reinforce Norwegian defenses over the next 15-year period."

The conclusion of this document is that there are no security policy arguments for weakening our defenses.

#### Deprivations Unreasonable

Our economy is still considered stable by international standards. Sweden is prosperous. We are extremely well-developed technologically. We have a very good scientific reputation. We have a large supply of natural resources. Against this background the series of deprivations based on economic reasons are unjustifiable.

Real defense costs have been declining steadily over the past 10-year period. The percentage of state spending going to military defense was around 19 percent in 1962-63 and just under 10 percent in 1979-80. In 1962 defense appropriations represented about 4.8 percent of gross national product. Today the figure is around 3.5 percent.

What has really occurred that was so ominous that we are forced to discontinue our technical progress in vital segments of our nonallied essential weapons industry? In the name of reason we should keep up with developments and not be left behind in a sector so important to our nation as our defense effort. Our defense de-escalation is quite unique in an armed area of the world. This isn't a question of a technical arms race on the superpower level. Satellites, strategic and tactical missiles, nuclear weapons, bombers, nuclear submarines and large surface vessels are military items with which we are not competing.

#### War Leads to Protection Requirements

Let's take a look at the army's combat vehicles. Civilian vehicles of the passenger car type have over the years become more convenient, faster and better-looking and thus also more and more expensive. But even so more and more people have been able to afford a car. And we can afford to drive them in spite of the high oil prices. The military organization also needs more vehicles. But there are also protection requirements in a wartime situation. It is totally unrealistic to move troops in unprotected vehicles on the battlefield.

Tanks were developed back in World War I and dominated World War II. Armored cross-country personnel transport vehicles appeared in World War II. On open terrain both elements are necessary with the destructive firepower that characterizes the modern battlefield. In today's modern armies the more effective units are built around tanks and armored personnel vehicles. The latter are being equipped with weapons that deliver more firepower. Enormous sums are being spent now on renovating the NATO and Warsaw Pact tanks.

## Attack on the Plains

Our plains, farm regions and densely-populated areas in southern and central Sweden are likely targets and attack areas in the event of war. It doesn't take much strategic expertise to be able to see that. Swedish troops would have little opportunity to defend such areas without this mobile protection and direct heavy firepower. Our tank brigades are organized, equipped and trained for combat on this kind of terrain. But they are few in number. It seems to me that maintaining them and lesser tank units and keeping their equipment up-to-date is one of the most urgent tasks our army has. But the trend has been against mechanization. Our field infantry in southern and central Sweden must also be given a chance to move on the battlefield in protected, i.e. armored, armed terrain vehicles.

Anti-tank missiles are effective and necessary weapons in our organization. But they cannot replace tanks or airplanes in the foreseeable future and they cannot be used to regain lost ground.

Swedes are generally well-versed in technical matters. They are used to motors and they are used to employing the help of motors for moving around and for working. They are not used to getting along without technical aids and the idea of Swedish guerilla fighters is unrealistic. If our defense system is to have credibility internally as well as externally it must keep pace with technical developments. What applies in civilian life in this respect must also apply to the military.

## We Can Afford It!

We can afford this. This is not a question of oversupply or a technical arms race. It doesn't involve any arms escalation. It's just a question of giving our drafted soldiers weapons and transportation that will give them a reasonable chance of combating a hypothetical opponent. And this would follow along the lines of former Swedish defense policy by providing a defense that inspires respect and can with good reason be viewed as a peacekeeping factor.

This should be the guiding star for the Defense Committee in the next few years and it should also inspire the politicians when a new defense bill is passed in 1982.

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## SVENSKA VARV LEADERSHIP PROPOSES SHARP CUTBACKS IN SHIPYARDS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 10 Jan 80 p 21

[Article by Richard Plate]

[Text] An essential element in the 5-year plan being presented by the board of directors of Svenska Varv in Goteborg on Thursday afternoon is the total approach they are trying to apply. How to utilize the expertise of subsidiary companies like Calor-Celcius, GV Motor and GV Angteknikk in combination with the experiences related to alternative production that have been gained at Arendal and at Kockums.

There are many differences in the current attitude of the Svenska Varv leadership toward shipyard problems compared with the 1970's. Today the directors are not just aiming for another few years of artificial respiration but are striving for a plan that can be used over the next 5 years. That is a striking change.

That was the situation before the final discussion and there is nothing to suggest a change in attitude even though an action like the one taken by Malmo county governor Nils Horjel Tuesday caused a deterioration in the working climate, as a board member put it in a talk with SVENSKA DAGBLADET on Wednesday.

None of the figures that have been presented so far are correct, the same board member said. The plan works with various alternatives, both optimistic and pessimistic, all covering a 5-year period. It is not possible at this time to break down the lump sums involved.

But the Svenska Varv plan has abandoned the earlier concern with proportional cutbacks involving all the shipyard units affected. In that respect the shipyard directors share the opinion presented by the Boston consultant in the preliminary study for the shipyard plan.

Unless something revolutionary occurs during the final discussion the Oresund shipyard in Landskrona will be shut down. The Uddervalla yard

will retain its labor force practically intact while the future of Goteborg and Malmo is a matter of conjecture.

What happens will depend to a large extent on what the board decides in its evaluation of the total resources of the shipyard complex for production other than ships. Will Arendal get the whole thing or will Kockums also have a piece of the action?

In any case it will be a three shipyard solution. The Boston consultant recommended shutting down Arendal too--as SVENSKA DAGBLADET reported earlier. There might have been some justification for such a step at an earlier stage but not since Arendal brought some order into its alternative production.

The plan will retain the big Goteborg shipyard mainly for the production of oil-drilling platforms, floating factories and the like. The personnel there have been the subject of discussion and the same is true of Kockums, where some cutbacks seem unavoidable.

If one looks at what happened in the last half of the stormy 1970's the reductions have not had the proportions mentioned in the public debate. On the contrary this process has been quite gradual. According to the most reliable statistics SVENSKA DAGBLADET could obtain the cuts in the labor force stopped at around 27 percent at big shipyards.

Goteborg has had to take the brunt of the cutbacks. Over 4000 shipyard jobs have disappeared. And in the last half of 1979 the cuts in Goteborg have continued with a loss of about a thousand jobs, while there have been only minor cuts at the other shipyards.

Political lobbying has begun already, especially in Skane. The importance of the shipyards for the various regions will naturally be strongly emphasized. As far as Goteborg is concerned the situation has changed radically since 1974.

At that time 25 percent of all industrial employees there worked for the shipyard. The figure for Malmo was 19 percent. Today shipyard employment is roughly the same in both cities.

The situation has not changed much in Uddevalla and Landskrona over the 5-year period. The Oresund shipyard still accounts for 39 percent of industrial employees in Landskrona while in Uddevalla 52 percent work at the shipyard.

That is the background for the statement made to SVENSKA DAGBLADET by Industrial Minister Nils G. Asling that a quick radical solution to the shipyard problem is not possible from a political point of view. A decision will cut into party lines--including that of the Social Democrats.

People in the union movement seem to realize that further postponement is impossible. For instance AFTONBLADET published an editorial openly discussing a three shipyard solution. That is not in line with what the Social Democrats have said in the past. They are still talking about employment guarantees, etc.

Svenska Varv is not thinking that way in the plans it is considering and neither is the Industrial Affairs Ministry. The industrial affairs minister told SVENSKA DAGBLADET that as much as possible available resources should be used for industries with good future prospects. This is the balance sheet for the shipyard industry from 1973 to the present:

Purchase subsidies in the form of depreciation loans	2.46 billion kronor
Aid to developing nations	125 million kr.
Stock acquisition and owner subsidies in the acquisition of Kockums	5.646 billion kr.
Coverage of Eriksberg losses	1.279 billion kr.
Value guarantees for Svenska Varv	3.35 billion kr.
Aid for alternative production	200 million kr.
Research grants	75 million kr.
Total	13.135 billion kr.

Aid to shipyard regions should be added to the amounts given above. Even though the 525 million kronor in regional aid did not go directly to the shipyard industry the money was paid as a result of the industry's insolvency. This brings the sum of tax money close to 14 billion kronor or 13.66 billion to be exact.

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## REDUCTION OF BURGEONING SHIPYARD SUBSIDIES DEEMED ESSENTIAL

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Jan 80 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] The board of directors of Svenska Varv proposed cutting total employment at the shipyards by 30 percent by 1984, partly by shutting down the Oresund shipyard in Landskrona. This may cause a fuss in parliament. On the radio program, "Jobs," Industrial Affairs Minister Asling explained that the government and parliament should simply set the economic limits for shipbuilding; the directors of the shipyard concern should decide how to distribute the cuts.

A Liberal from Landskrona has threatened to lead a parliamentary revolt against a resolution on closing the Oresund shipyard. Thus Asling's plan is an attempt to avoid a new Konigson affair.

In principle it is economically correct to allow the shipyard leadership to decide how and where production should be cut. Parliament is hardly likely to be better-informed on shipbuilding techniques and market prospects.

But in practice it will be hard for the government to avoid a resolution. If one shipyard is not closed down the state will have to increase its subsidies by several billion kronor. If the shipyard in Landskrona is closed the city will need state employment subsidies in some form or another. Both courses of action would require bills and parliamentary resolutions.

Parliament should be given better background information than the report from Svenska Varv. Among other things production and financing should be accounted for separately so that one can see to which extent losses are due to poor production techniques or poor financing.

Shipyards have received totally unreasonable subsidies. They provide only about 2.5 percent of industrial employment but in the period

1977-79 the branch has received annual subsidies corresponding to 30 percent of the industry's total investments. Even with the cuts being planned by Svenska Varv the concern will need another 6.5 billion kronor according to its own calculations. And this is counting on some profits from alternative production--floating factories, offshore equipment--even though shipyards in competitive nations with big state subsidies are going into the same manufacturing areas.

The decision is up to the Social Democrats. The government cannot and will not reduce shipyard subsidies without broad political backing. If there is political conflict over this issue the billions will probably continue to flow--although any alternative use of the resources would provide greater socioeconomic benefits and more employment.

The question will be how many billions a political tactic is regarded as being worth.

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## SWEDISH SECURITY POLICE CRITICIZED BY RETIRING OFFICER

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 14 Jan. 80 p 14

[Interview with Melker Berntler, retiring Swedish Security Police superintendent, by Cecilia Steen-Johnsson]

[Text] The number one watchdog of Swedish security-- Sapo [Swedish Security Police]--is an unreliable animal, sniffing left-wing extremists and terrorists behind every bush but unable to detect spies in its own organization. That is the opinion of retiring Sapo superintendent Melker Berntler. Sapo does not always follow its master obediently and it breaks the rules without the knowledge of its chief and the politicians.

"There would be a violent reaction if the public found out the reasons why Sapo keeps files on people. The rules spelling out the guidelines for registration are classified secrets but they should be made public. In practice this is secret legislation," says superintendent Melker Berntler who is retiring after 25 years with the security police.

He has become known as one of Sapo's most severe critics. His many years of experience give his criticisms a weight that is hard for the authorities and the politicians to simply dismiss.

Many attempts have been made to modify his criticism, to play down what he says. In recent years he has been going to work at an empty desk at Sapo. In this interview he gives his view of Sapo's work and orientation.

[Berntler] I became politically aware from working with Sapo. Gradually I started reacting to the threatening picture seen by Sapo. Anything concerning the left wing, from the Social Democrats to the most extreme left, is viewed with suspicion. Sapo has no feeling for democracy, it is extremely conservative in spirit.

## Paranoid

Every shred of negative evidence that can be found on leftist organizations is gathered. One must be able to paint a very black picture of things to advance up the ladder at Sapo.

[Question] Does one become paranoid (unduly suspicious) from working at Sapo?

[Answer] Probably, unless one was that way from the beginning. Not everyone supports all this nonsense but on the other hand people don't speak up about it either.

I am an obvious example of what happens to critical people. There is massive indoctrination (pressure) in the Sapo training activities.

[Question] Did you ever get anywhere with your criticism?

[Answer] I have been able to detect some changes in attitude. For example they have been more careful about saving so-called surplus information acquired from wiretaps since my report to the attorney general's office in 1978.

Information obtained during wiretapping which does not pertain to the matter under investigation can no longer be written down in files on individuals, only in those dealing with organizations.

Lectures on terrorism have also become more balanced since I objected. In the past lecturers used to lump together real terrorist groups such as the Red Army and Black September with liberation movements. But now a clear distinction is made.

[Question] Why did you stay with Sapo as long as you did?

[Answer] Being a Sapo superintendent is a very comfortable job. No night duties, for example. But the most important thing for me was that I hoped to be able to correct the situation there.

## Iceberg

Every time we got a new chief I hoped he would listen to me. But that never happened. I've had a lot of experience. The chief doesn't see more than the surface. Sapo is like an iceberg.

[Question] Maybe the chief isn't supposed to know everything.

[Answer] No, that's the way it has been. But for example it says in the instructions for registration that the person in charge is to

consult the chief in doubtful cases. I asked Sven-Ake Hjalmarth (chief of Sapo) if he was ever consulted but he never was.

When I myself served as assistant recorder I went to the chief at that time, Hans Holmer, on several occasions and asked him about dubious assignments. He took my side and that angered many people.

There is a lot the chief doesn't know. For example, when foreign intelligence organizations get in touch with Sapo. They may want to find out about cases involving foreigners in Sweden, political refugees. Sometimes they ask what Sapo knows about a person's past life or contacts in Sweden.

The remarkable thing is that some of these inquiries from abroad are never entered in the secret journal. They are listed on a separate sheet of paper kept by one of the supervisors. I found proof of that on two separate occasions a few years ago.

#### No Protection

Of course foreign contacts should also be entered in the journal. Now the chief of Sapo, the politicians and the attorney general are all in the dark about what is going on in this area. Foreigners, political refugees for example, have no protection at all.

[Question] What kind of activity can arouse Sapo's suspicions so that a Swedish citizen goes into the registration files?

[Answer] Those regulations are so classified that I can say nothing about them. But I can tell you this much, certain types of political activity are considered suspicious in one party but not in another.

[Question] Which activities?

[Answer] There are many, from mildly illegal actions to those that give some status within the party. The regulations are elastic and I consider it very undemocratic that they are kept secret.

People ought to know the consequences of certain actions later on in life. Registration of political beliefs should stop and no records should be kept of political activity and political sympathies for organizations regarded as "respectable" in a democratic country.

I find it strange that the public doesn't react to this. In practice this is a secret law.

Actually Sapo breaks many of the regulations concerning its activities. The chief and the politicians on the board don't know this.

## One-sided

It is naive to think that various changes in the organization will help. There have been no fundamental changes in the approach to the job. Sapo is still one-sidedly pursuing leftists and casting suspicion on them; I've seen many examples of this myself.

The big spy cases in this country, Wennerstrom, Melin, Bergling, had nothing to do with the left wing, they didn't even have any political motivation. This ought to make Sapo stop and think. The Bergling case was a real scandal, a Soviet spy working inside Sapo.

Bergling was backed on various occasions by Olof Franstadt, Nils Risberg and Gosta Danielsson, all high Sapo officials. He was regarded as ambitious and obliging. No move was made against Bergling in spite of many tips received in the last few years. And don't forget, it was the Israelis who caught him.

The colleagues up there think there are more like Bergling. I don't know anything about that.

## CIA Professional

I think the Bergling case has a lot to say about Sapo's amateurish working methods. I have visited the CIA in Frankfurt, they are professionals working on an entirely different level. They view the whole thing as a game among equals, they don't moralize the way we do in Sweden. They don't try to cast suspicion on everything and everybody the way Swedish Sapo does.

Take the Polish art salesmen, for instance. They turned up conveniently at the time when the Bergling case was in the forefront, as if to counteract criticism of Sapo. No charges were brought against them, although it was said they were collecting information about Swedish military installations. Simply gathering information is an offense for which one can be prosecuted.

No, this story resembled the spy stories about Russian saw filers in Sweden during World War I.

But I can understand why things like this happen. It isn't fun to work as an investigator, to sit and stare at a door day in and day out. You know you have to come up with something, otherwise the job is meaningless. And then you exaggerate what is actually ordinary human behavior.

[Question] Is Sapo unnecessarily large?

## Behind Every Bush

[Answer] Yes, definitely. The staff could be cut in half. Take the terrorist division, for example. The exact number of men is a secret but I would think they have about as many as the criminal violence division, which is very overworked. We don't have very many terrorists in Sweden but the young men working in the division see them behind every bush. Move them over to the criminal division.

[Question] What do you regard as Sapo's most important job today?

[Answer] Uncovering spies. They say this is so common but if we look at the number of cases detected it makes you wonder.

[Question] Do you think Sapo acts as a deterrent?

[Answer] Yes, perhaps it does to some extent. But I don't think keeping an eye on the eastern embassies, as we did for 30 years, has been very productive. There must be other networks unrelated to the embassies.

[Question] Now that you are retiring, will your criticism stop?

[Answer] No, I will continue to deal with Sapo's activity and orientation in the general debate and politically in the Stockholm district. I have not given up hope of bringing about some changes.

## Sapo Chief Responds

Sapo chief Sven-Ake Hjalmarth would not comment on Melker Berntler's charges. He said: "Berntler has written and said a lot of things through the years, things that have been exaggerated, investigated, supported and denied. I don't have time to comment on these charges again."

## Up to Government to Change Sapo

"The things Melker Berntler criticized are really the responsibility of the government," said member of parliament Bengt Gustavsson (Social Democrat), member of the National Police Board Committee. "The government should step in, as it did in Lennart Geijer's day, take the responsibility and initiate the changes that are needed. I am glad Melker could note some improvements. More are on the way.

"After discussions and studies on the part of the committee changes have been made that should increase security," Gustavsson said. "Almost a year ago we asked the government to make certain changes and recently we asked the government to make a study aimed at sharply reducing the number of undercover services.



"We want to reduce the number of undercover services in order to make the risk of irritation as small as possible and to direct the major effort to really urgent work. The government should quickly come to a decision along these lines. Otherwise I would consider using the opportunities I have as a member of parliament to bring some pressure to bear," said Bengt Gustavsson.

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CSO: 3109

## 'LE MONDE' EDITORIAL ON THE END OF KEMALISM

Paris LE MONDE in French 11 Dec 79 p 2

[Editorial by Paul-Marc Henry, former secretary general of the International Society for Development: "The End of Kemalism"]

[Text] Western Europe shows a certain surprise in front of the great politico-religious events which, like earthquakes of great extent, traverse the great spine of Asia from Ankara all the way to the Khyber Pass. This is the time to repeat, with a slight modification, the famous phrase: "Europeans, you have a short memory."

Less than 60 years ago, the victorious arms and diplomacy of Kemal Ataturk were imposing on the French and British allies a settlement of the Ottoman question they had certainly never wanted. Turkey escaped partition, saved Istanbul from the lust of the great powers, Russia included. The inglorious departure of the last sultan, protected favorite of England, before the victorious troops of the new secular, nationalistic, and militaristic Turkey, led by Refet Pacha, sounded the death-knell for the last theocratic empire inherited from the Middle Ages.

In the person of the sultan were combined the religious supremacy of the leader of the faithful--endowed with the essential power of declaring Holy War against the infidel--and that [authority] of the head of an empire extending from Europe to the heart of central Asia. Europe had won its secular war against the Ottoman Empire, that militant Vanguard of an Islam which was the conquerer of central Asia, protector of the Holy Places and of the Islamic people to the south who from now on would be subject to the imperialistic rivalries of the Western European nations. It lost its war against the new Turkey.

Kemal had brought onto the battlefield of World War I the same weapon used by France and Great Britain to destroy both Vienna's and Constantinople's empires: nationalism. Everything transpired as if the Anatolian plateau had been a supreme fortress in the shelter of which a great people could forge anew the profound forces drawn from its own religious and ethnic identity.

Traditional Islam and its theocratic tendency represented a major obstacle to the accomplishment of this historic task. Under the pressure of Great Britain, Arabic Islam was exacerbated under diverse forms, all hostile to Turkish interests, whether one speaks of the Hedjaz, the great Bedouin kingdoms, or the countries of the Red Sea. Moreover, the Islamic masses in the great empire of India, thanks to the perseverance of the Aga Khan, had not answered the Jihad's summons to holy war and had served loyally the cause of the allies.

Kemalism, this is the great attempt to build nation-states on the ruins of multi-racial and theocratic empire. It was necessary to protect oneself against the grasp of the West. It was necessary to face the threats of the new communist empire which resumed the Slavic push toward the Far East through the subjugated emirates of central Asia. It passes a critical point in its refusal of integration in a western empire dominated by Western Europe or in the eastern empire dominated by Moscow.

The founder of the Pahlevi dynasty, the father of the present shah, as the reformer king of Afghanistan, Nadir Shah was a disciple of Kemal. Like him, they tried to impose rapid modernization on a rural mass profoundly linked both temporally and spiritually to Islam, whose law of the Koran responded to their needs and essential aspirations. Like him, but certainly with less success, they tried to build a parliamentary and democratic facade which could not deal with a social situation marked by a fully accepted archaism. Like him, they maintained ambiguous relations with the large neighbor to the north. Oftimes, Westerners asked themselves to what extent might not the sovereign reformers be inspired by the radically secular model of the Bolshevik Revolution.

### The Masks Fall

For Iran, World War II was an unmasking. To organize the war against Germany (which was ever interested in the great Asiatic spine via Turkey, Mesopotamia, and Iran to the Indus), Great Britain and Soviet Russia jointly occupied Iran and sent Reza Shah Pahlevi into exile. A little later, the United States and Soviet Russia divided Afghanistan de facto into a northern and southern zone. Kemalism, which proved its worth in its country of origin by sparing Turkey the humiliation of foreign occupation, could not survive in the neighboring countries, despite the renewed efforts of the descendants of the sovereign reformers. Even in Turkey, the situation is changing rapidly. One saw, after the death of Ataturk, a reaffirmation of profound tendencies which, as Islam has become more and more politicized, seek new formulas for rejecting the West, blending economic, political, and cultural grievances.

It is the same at the other extremity of the spine, that is Pakistan. Despite the efforts of Marshal Ayub Khan, the Islamic Republic born of the partition of the Indian Empire, could not--and perhaps did not want

to--approach secularization. It reaffirms overtly its adhesion to the fundamental principles of the Koran in political and social matters.

All these countries present the same picture, on the economic and social plane, of being confronted with apparently insoluble problems, to integrate the rural and recently urbanized masses into an open economic system in the global system. The justification for this system could only be found in accelerated growth of the gross national product and in equitable redistribution of revenues, taking into account the extremely rapid demographic growth. This objective was not attained.

Turkey, like Iran and Pakistan, has seen its population double in less than 30 years. Only Afghanistan, protected, it seems, by its archaism, has retained some balance between population and resources.

The fatal illusion of the economists of the American school will turn out to be thinking that the great task of modernizing the masses could be accomplished, with a few modifications, just by the market economy dominated by the multinationals. Certainly, immense progress has been made. Certainly, the apparent Westernization of the urban populations and some progress in agriculture in Pakistan and Turkey (but less in Iran) have brought creditable results in the field of production, but, as everywhere else in the Third World, this has been at the cost of gigantic social trauma.

#### The Peoples' Drive for Identity

It is time to realize, in Asia as in Africa, in both northern and southern Islam, that no development project, no model of consumption is neutral culturally, even less so religiously. No project, no model, can be separated from its historical and ethnic context, nor ignore or reject as optional the drive for identity of the people and respect for the personality of individuals. In this respect, one must regret the persistence of the tenacious illusion which tends to regard as essentially "political" or, more exactly geopolitical (created artificially by internal or external agents) the phenomena of profound demands for equality and dignity which transcend immediate economic considerations. Kemal and his emulators could still hold to the illusion that the countries of Asiatic Islam would protect themselves against the West by Westernization.

One must now understand that western and central Asia, which in common with the north half of Africa and a portion of its eastern flank is experiencing an Islam in full spiritual and social rebirth, have entered into a veritable cultural and political revolution. And this at the precise moment when the West, like Soviet Russia (for different, but ultimately convergent reasons), is trying to establish a degree of social conservatism and to protect it internally as externally by a technological super-globalism. A globalism which is in process of running aground just as 50 years earlier the secularizing Westernism ran aground. Globalism: its Achilles heel is oil, which itself seems to be God's gift to the people of Islam.

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CSO: 4900

## PROFILES OF NEW PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR APPOINTEES

Ankara YANKI in Turkish 7-13 Jan 80 pp 12-16

[Text] The new government has made the largest appointment of governors in the history of the Republic, replacing the governors of all 67 provinces at once.

Eleven governors switched provinces, 20 were appointed from the central governors' office, 10 from district government, 4 from deputy governor's positions, 13 from civil service inspectorships and 3 from ministry advisory positions. Two were retired governors and 4 were appointed from the central government.

Ihsan Dede (Afyon) - Was at the central office. Not considered very successful in efforts to date to improve administrative efficiency and productivity in such areas as control and coordination. Impressed public and employees as pro-JP [Justice Party]. Careful to maintain dialogue with those of opposing view and to be impartial in dispensation of right and justice. Committed to the principles of secularism and the Ataturkist reforms. Failed to use powers in student actions, fearing "I would open the way to worse incidents." This timidity led to heightened influence among the people of certain leftist organizations, such as Dev-Yol [Revolutionary Road].

Abidin Coskun (Amasya) - Was at central office. Tried to evaluate problems from a narrow world view and thus failed to maintain healthy dialogue with regional organizations. Inability to use state authority effectively in cases of disturbance of the peace in recent years laid groundwork for gradual spread among citizenry of conviction that he discriminated according to his political views. Said to see no difference between JP and NAP [Nationalist Action Party], Coskun has large share in failure of respect for the state to be engrained in Sinop Province even today.

M. Raif Guney (Balikesir) - One of 10 governors appointed by other than Demirel government. Was governor of Aydin. Used every recourse in case of public employees allegedly involved in illegal incidents. Was careful that no shadow fell on his administration. Ensured necessary harmony



between security and gendarmerie forces to ensure success in prevention of student incidents. Used his authority in evenhanded crack down on associations. An organized administrator who governs by the book. Extremely sensitive to public and press relations. His remaining in office through all administrations attributed to being son-in-law of Mahmut Ulker (former Third Army Commander).

Mehmet Erdem (Bilecik) - One of governors recalled to the capital by the RPP government. Oversight of matters envisaged in development plan and annual programs disorganized. Failed to establish effective administration over provincial administration's branch chiefs and public establishments. Despite good will and moderation in public behavior, he feared leaders of power parties during coalition governments and failed to resist their unjust demands. While Tokat governor, misjudged incidents at RPP rally in Niksar on 26 April 1977.

Rafet Ucelli (Corum) - Was governor of Kutahya. Failed to establish state authority in provinces he governed, drawing attention by even weakening existing authority in Urfa. Has not been successful in general, failing to apply principle of impartiality. It was thought well to try him in a province with fewer problems. Brother-in-law of Faruk Sukan.

M. Zekai Gumusdis (Rursa) - One of the two retired governors returned to duty. Known for having full control over general administration of provinces he governed. Never seen to act contrary to the secular and Atatürkist reforms throughout his service. Worked hard to prevent social disturbances and incidents of anarchy. Gained stature with many through initiatives in which he provided personal leadership.

Naci Babacan (Edirne) - Governor of Mugla prior to Edirne appointment. Said to be insensitive to problems, but exercised his lawful powers in keeping with the principle of the democratic legal state. Was late in taking measures against disruption of the schools and actions directed against public security of life and property. Encouraged initiatives toward provincial economic, social and cultural development. Imposed his strong personality and prestige on his surroundings. While governor of Balikesir, was judged capable of success in upper level provinces.

Sabahattin Cakmakoglu (Gaziantep) - One of 20 governors appointed from the capital. Worked hard for success and occasionally achieved it, but later began to complain of pro-NAP practices among the people. Owing to the political characteristics of Isparta, where he served for an interval, it was thought he would be better appointed to another province in order to prevent further deterioration.

Nevzat Ayaz (Istanbul) - Has put no blot on respect of the administration or the office through his personal attitudes and behavior. Committed to Atatürkist reforms and principles. Successful in ensuring public safety and orderly conduct of education. Worked within existing possibilities to implement plans and programs. Known in Zonguldak for timely and effective use of his powers.

Nazmi Cengizci (Izmir) - Largely correct in performance of general duties and functions of office of governor and duties and functions pertaining to Provincial Special Administration. Established authority over public employees under him. Contributed to provincial economic, social and cultural life. However, failed to pursue legal channels in case of certain public employees at director level who were said not to be performing duties impartially. Disregard for the principle of impartiality figured heavily in his recall to the capital. Relieved of duty while in Kutahya.

Babur Unsal (Kayseri) - Said to have taken sides in the incidents occurring in Kayseri as soon as he took office, Unsal has been accused of failing to apply the principle of impartiality in past service also. Said also to have admitted, himself, that he cannot enforce the impartiality required by law. Accused of building house against regulations in wife's name at Gelibolu while in office in Canakkale and having public employees draw up plans and projects for it. Said to have obtained and borrowed construction materials from state-connected shippers. Was asked to leave office as this behavior impugned the office of governor. Was at the central office.

Metin Sarioglu (Kirsehir) - Had positive effects on social, economic and cultural problems. Timely and effective use of powers within normal standards. As matter of principle, carries favor with members of party in power. Occasionally cut off dialogue with other political party members owing to loss of impartiality. In Kastamonu, where he served at one interval, initiated complaints in local press that Hat Reform Festival, held there every year on 23 August, was gradually dying out, and while it was being held on the one hand, complained on the other that the festival grounds were filled with citizens wearing black skull caps and carrying old-fashioned lunch boxes and such. No objection to his remaining if office preceded his recall to the capital.

Cela. Kayacan (Kocaeli) - Switched from Denizli to Kocaeli by Demirel government. Acted impartially on the job, in procedures, attitudes and behavior. Took necessary measures for education to proceed in order and safety. Seen in no actions to cause blot on prestige of the office. Despite positive contributions to provinces' needs and social and economic requirements, while serving in Bolu, failed to accord necessary importance to implementation of 5-year plan in the province. Continued service in the same or another province deemed suitable.

Lutfu F. Tuncel (Konya) - Advancement of services-related procedures and attitude toward general administration of province considered successful. Takes care to appear informed and impartial in personal behavior. Relations with NAP and JP correct. Service in Tokat now switched to Konya.

Sadri Turan (Sakarya) - Made an issue of his impartiality while serving in Erzurum. Performance of the night prayer service at different mosque every night during Ramazan immediately upon taking office in Erzurum

prompted rumors of pro-NAP sentiments. Later established close relations with JP. Former JP Deputy General Chairman Ismail Hakki Yildirim said to have been largely influential in his appointment to this post. Said to have been especially sensitive to desires of JP and Yildirim in such board services as Highways, Water and Electric Affairs which handled province's social work and to have stood by while partisanship on this board reached acute stage. Failed to take any measures in dormitories under occupation by right-wing students. Waited 8 to 10 hours before searching dormitories to which assassins fled after killing of Docent Orhan Yavuz and this interpreted as protection of right-wing terrorists. Made no effort to enforce resolution sent to his office by Erzurum University Senate disallowing exhibit in faculties of any photographs other than those of Ataturk. Grey wolf [ ] and triple crescent [NAP] posters were said to be kept in middle and high schools despite ministries' orders. Upshot of these situations was failure to take necessary measures to ensure public safety and safe conduct of education. It was deemed suitable to remove him from the office of governor.

Mehmet Kasaroglu (Samsun) - Retired while in office. Criticized for failure to act impartially. Inability to act impartially toward incidents hampered successful execution of duties. Failed in timely and effective use of powers. Was therefore relieved of duty while in office in Bursa.

Nuzhet Erman (Tekirdag) - Until recalled to the capital, failed to act with full impartiality in conduct of duties related to municipalities and associations and appointment of teachers and employees. Was unable to convert state and special administration resources into investments smoothly, made no special effort to eliminate impediments. Continuation in the office of governor was deemed inadvisable.

A. Riza Yaradanakul (Trabzon) - Despite being an Ataturkist revolutionary, failed to show necessary interest and sensitivity in performance of duties prior to recall to capital. A good man, an experienced and competent administrator. Was unable to enforce impartiality in tasks assigned security forces for orderly conduct of education in Sivas, where he served for a while. Recalled to the capital for this reason.

Metin Dirimtekin (Adana) - Was director general of security during first National Front administration. Removed from this job during second National Front. Was governor in various provinces. Said to have lost impartiality, to have become politicized after 1970. Recalled to the capital after 2 weeks as governor of Gaziantep during last RPP government.

Yener Rakicioglu (Adiyaman) - Was district officer of Karamursel. Known among peers as opportunist. Gives priority to demands of partys' provincial or district chiefs. Ability to stand up to directives from top said to be weak.

**Tuncer Perinçler (Agri)** - First time in office of governor. Was Tirebolu district officer. Known for his impatience with routine and inflexibility. Works to keep public relations smooth and positive. Said to act at direction of Haldun Menteseoglu while district officer of Koycegiz in Mugla.

**Vecdi Gonul (Ankara)** - On the Korkut Ozal team which opposes NSP [National Salvation Party]'s Erbakan. Drew attention while director general of security during second National Front as person who made possible the organization of NAP members at the ministry. Built chapel at the government residence while governor of Kocaeli and forced employees to attend services.

**Kadir Uysal (Antalya)** - Known as a JP fanatic. Said to have contributed largely to outbreak of Serik incidents while district officer. Has never forgotten Serik. Went to home of Serik JP district chief the day before taking office, left there in a convoy flying party banners and took up office with the blood of the sacrificial lamb upon his forehead amidst affirmations of the greatness of God.

**Husnu Tuglu (Artvin)** - Known as a JP conservative while civil service inspector. What he will do as governor is questionable.

**Kemal Senol (Aydin)** - Created pro-JP image among public while governor of Afyon and Kars. A positive democrat, however. Success chart is high. Expected to continue his success.

**Ahmet Ozer (Bingol)** - Was civil service inspector. Sent to Elazig to replace Gungor Aydin by Ecevit government. Soon recalled, however. Failure to prevent terrorist incidents said to be reason for recall.

**Ertan Yaramanoglu (Bitlis)** - Was Havram district officer. Has reputation for competence and flexibility among colleagues. Tries to get along with everybody.

**Mithat Cerin (Bolu)** - Recalled to advisory position in capital while governor of Gumushane. Known as pro-NSP. Administrative ability said to be weak.

**Recai Tosyali (Burdur)** - Said to have made his reputation as pro-NSP while Korkut Ozal was minister of interior. Recalled to advisory position during RPP administration. Hearing of his return as governor, colleagues commented: "He has returned to the nest."

**Fikret Kocak (Canakkale)** - Known as competent administrator. Was governor of Sivas.

**Ismail Tulek (Cankiri)** - Was civil service inspector. Known as leaning to the right. Prefers to keep his distance from the press.



Musa Atik (Denizli) - Those who say he is pro-JP also say he does not confuse his political beliefs with his work. Was civil service inspector.

Erdogan Sahinoglu (Diyarbakir) - Said to have been RPP, had change of heart during second National Front and is NSP. Was deputy undersecretary at Interior Ministry. Known as good administrator.

Kemal Katitas (Elazig) - Seen as a complex one at the civil service inspection office. Said to have tried to strengthen his weak points through party channels. An administrator close to the JP.

Yucel Balgen (Erzincan) - The person whom Nevzat Ayaz, now governor of Istanbul, removed from duty saying, "He cannot perform the duties of district officer here," while he was district officer of Safranbolu in Zonguldak. Said to have overcome this failure.

Cahit Bayar (Erzurum) - Known to public and civil servants as pro-NSP. Called to the capital in the aftermath of events following death of Malatya Mayor Hamid Fendoglu.

Naim Comertoglu (Eskisehir) - Appointed by RPP government as actual governor of Icel, where he was deputy. Those who say he leans to the right also point out that he is all right as an administrator.

Hayri Guler (Giresun) - While governor of Denizli, his wife drew a pistol in public during an incident. Known to dislike contact with public.

Sevki Pazarci (Gumushane) - Father of two boys. Said to be pro-JP. Both of his children are NAP members. A timid administrator who loves money.

Irfan Kurucu (Hakkari) - Comes from Prime Minister Demirel's home town. Requested a job in the capital because of heart trouble. Irfan Ozaydinli complied with this request, appointing him chief of Administrative Services Office. When Hasan Fehmi Gunes was interior minister, he frequently mentioned in the corridors that he was a classmate of the minister's wife.

Ilhan Sozgen (Hatay) - Known as NSP member, but is said to be close to NAP. While governor of Rize, piously left for pilgrimage to Mecca at 0855 on 10 November. Was advisor in the capital.

Erdinc Buyukakalin (Isparta) - A founder and first general chairman of JP youth chapter. Formed close relations with Fehim Adak, then NSP minister of public works, while district officer of Kiziltepe. Turkey's youngest governor. Hasan Fehmi Gunes had been unable to appoint a person his same age as governor because Koruturk declared him too young.

Fahri Ozturk (Icel) - When Serafettin Elci took a position with the Ecevit government, Ozturk was made governor of Mardin. Performed duties successfully. A democratic bureaucrat.



**Fevzi Baysan (Kars) - Was Cankaya district officer in Ankara. Liberal.**

**Mustafa Gomul (Kastamonu) - One of the governors appointed by RPP not recalled. Has close friendly relations with Interior Ministry Under-secretary Durmus Yalcin. RPP Deputy Secretary General Imadettin Elmas is also an old friend.**

**Mecit Sonmez (Kirkklareli) - Said to be a poor administrator. Recalled while governor of Gumushane. Known as pro-NSP.**

**Feridun Gultekin (Kutahya) - Ran for senator from Mus in 14 October partial Senate elections in order to split JP-NSP votes. Seen as a bureaucrat fully versed in religion.**

**Enver Hizlan (Malatya) - Attends to the particulars of the bureaucracy. Appointed as governor during RPP period, now switched to new post.**

**Fahrettin Turan (Manisa) - Known as intimate of party in power. A very good administrator. Impartial in his duties and admired by the public. Was at the central office.**

**Nurettin Yilmaz (Kahramanmaras) - Known to be partisan. Recalled by Korkut Ozal when he struck NSP mayor of Mus in an argument.**

**Ozdemir Hanoglu (Mardin) - Despite appearing to be very competent, is said not to have demonstrated this competence so far. Was district officer of Kemalpaşa in Izmir.**

**Cetin Birmek (Mugla) - Admired in his circle while civil service inspector. Reportedly will not be bad in his new position. Colleagues from Faculty of Political Science all speak highly of him.**

**Erdogan Cebeci (Mus) - One of Undersecretary Durmus Yalcin's district officers. A practicing bureaucrat who does not let truth and impartiality interfere in public administration.**

**Fevzi Aloglu (Nevsehir) - Was civil service inspector. Friends say he is very close to ruling party. Quite advanced in age. Said to be one of the oldest governors.**

**Behcet Guler (Nigde) - Known to date for quick defense of certain views then soon changing his mind. It is hard to say whether he is close to any particular party. This part of his makeup is the only known quality. Was civil service inspector.**

**Hikmet Gulsen (Ordu) - Known for his impartiality. Very meticulous in performance of his duties while civil service inspector.**

Kurtulus Sismanturk (Rize) - After serving as district officer for a while, was appointed as advisor at Reconstruction and Resettlement Ministry. Only governor not to come out of Interior Ministry. A moderate bureaucrat who wavers back and forth between right-wing parties.

Ibrahim Sahin (Siirt) - Was district officer of Fethiye. Ingratiated himself with the public by establishing dialogue with everyone. A bureaucrat who has not lost his enthusiasm.

Necati Ozan (Sinop) - Said to have preserved his impartiality. Quit the RPP and turned to JP, but his actions while district officer of Bafra provoked JP complaints. Said to have a weakness for drink.

Sukru Ozhan (Sivas) - Had good relations with everyone while district officer of Fatih in Istanbul. Appointment as governor said to have increased enthusiasm even more. An objective democrat, whose numbers have grown rarer in recent years.

Adil Kerimoglu (Tokat) - A relative of Minister of State Metin Musaoglu. Elder brother was member of parliament during JP administrations. Said to have played important role in transfer of Metin Musaoglu while civil service inspector.

Ummet Onalan (Tunceli) - Related by marriage to Public Works Minister Selahattin Kilic. RPP government's attempt to remove him as district officer of Reyhanli was prevented by threat by an RPP Hatay national deputy to resign from the party. Said to approach his new position with trepidation.

Nurettin Turan (Urfa) - Turkey's tallest governor, at a height of around 2 meters. Said to be a radical rightist. An NAP supporter within the JP.

Kemal Esensoy (Usak) - Was civil service inspector. Colleagues indicate that he stresses daily affairs.

Yurdagur Unal (Van) - Liberal. Known to have a fondness for alcohol while civil service inspector.

Naim Ural (Yozgat) - Friendly and on good terms with everyone, but fails to choose his words carefully, sprinkling conversation with swear words. Known for his impartiality while district officer of Erdek.

Galip Demirel (Zonguldak) - A bureaucrat of integrity. Formerly an RPP member, said later to have switched to NSP. Was undersecretary at Interior Ministry during second National Front government.

## COLUMNIST CALLS FOR REEVALUATION OF EEC MEMBERSHIP QUESTION

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 8 Jan 80 p 11

[Column by M. Ali Birand]

[Text] Within Common Market circles, the idea of Turkey's applying for full membership is a topic which still provokes apprehension, despite a diminishing of such feelings in comparison with previous weeks. According to a representative of the Commission for Europe, this is a possibility that "plunges the Community into terror."

Although these fears were more widespread during the period when the Demirel government was just being formed and just beginning its work, reports from the Ankara embassies of EEC member-states, the impressions of Community delegations as reflected to Brussels, and finally the fact that Demirel has not mentioned the topic since forming his government have caused the anxiety to abate somewhat, even though it still has not been entirely eliminated.

The reasons for such hesitation by the Community in the face of a Turkish application are many-sided. In addition, there is the fact that the EEC has not yet been able to make a definite decision with regard to Turkey (on the matter of full membership). According to one high-level official of the Commission for Europe, Turkey is going to make such an application "with political intent", in order to closely follow Greece. As for the general feeling within the Commission, the same official expressed it as follows: "We can't tell yet whether you are Europeans or not. From the political and military standpoint, you're a part of Europe, but, from the economic standpoint, you're not."

The perennial rationale used against the Turkish application by Community organs and the diplomats of its member-nations can be summarized as follows: "Not only would full membership not be sufficient to resolve the problems of the Turkish economy, but the EEC cannot absorb the Turkish

economy. For this potential we have neither sufficient markets nor sufficient money to support you in building up your economy." In addition to the technical and economic reasons, the reservations are increased by the fact that the Community has not yet expressed a final decision regarding Turkey, and by the spread in some circles of the approach that says "How can a Muslim nation be put into an organization formed by Christians?", particularly following the recent events in Iran.

It is certain that, in the current situation, full membership for Turkey would result in catastrophe from the purely economic standpoint. Full membership, which would mean a total transformation of the whole economic system of the nation, as well as of the entire bureaucratic approach, is seen as "premature" even by those who desire integration with the EEC.

When the matter is viewed from the political angle, however, it is quite late for an application at this stage. If application had been made in 1975, immediately after that of Greece, a different attitude by the EEC would be seen from the political standpoint, and, in addition, more attractive guarantees could perhaps have been obtained against a Greek veto, which is the object of such unjustifiable fears. Turkey's political premises are out of date; the real worry should be that the application may encounter a veto not from Greece but rather from the other EEC member-states.

The Community cannot say "no" to a Turkish application, but it will work to delay a Turkish application at this stage by imposing conditions which will essentially boil down to a "no".

#### What To Do Now?

A number of negotiations lie ahead of Turkey, both on general topics and on specific issues related to new developments. In these negotiations, two extremely significant cards are held by Turkey, which holds the possibility of a serious application for full membership above the EEC like the Sword of Damocles. These are the textile and financial issues.

On the matter of textiles, Turkey is one hundred percent justified. And the possibilities in the financial area are such as could be utilized more extensively.

Instead of being intransigent on the topics of agricultural compensation and free circulation of Turkish workers, if Ankara stressed the matters of textile and financial compensation, great benefit could be obtained. For, in view of the unemployment in Europe, Turkey can obtain nothing insofar as free circulation of workers regardless of what it does. On this topic, nothing could possibly move Germany, which is desirous of cancelling the related article of the agreement.

No pressure can be exerted on the Community on these two issues without abandoning the others completely, and, if everything is requested at once,

the negotiators will return without having obtained anything, just as in previous rounds of negotiations. The Community refers to the private sector in Istanbul as "the Istanbul government" and benefits by the differences of opinion between it and the government in Ankara.

If the new Demirel government avoids falling into the same error as previous Demirel governments, it could utilize methods which could in a short time be more beneficial to the nation, and, in this way, could be able to secure commercial advantages even without full membership in the Community.

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CSO: 4907



## EXPERTS REMARK ON EXPLOITATION OF NATION'S COAL RESERVES

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 8 Jan 80 p 9

[Article by Zeynep Atikkan]

[Text] Turkey, which accounts for 2.5 percent of the world's production of lignite and .2 percent of the world's coal production, is still incapable of exploiting its coal resources in an enlightened manner. Experts say that "We are very fortunate insofar as coal as concerned, yet we present a frightful example of incompetence when it comes to utilizing the coal in a productive and appropriate manner."

For years, coal mines have been transferred back and forth between the state sector and the private sector. Yet the place of coal within the general energy policy has not yet been determined; exploration has been insufficient, and Turkey's energy crisis is becoming more severe with every passing day. Professor Senai Saltoglu, Dean of the Mineral Sciences Faculty at Istanbul Technical University, and Prof. Cemal Biron, also of the Mineral Sciences Faculty, answered our questions as to whether coal will become the solution to our energy problems, now that the petroleum crisis has begun to be perceived in its true significance. Stating that Turkey has great coal potential and that these resources must be exploited in a well-organized manner, Professors Saltoglu and Biron said that "For years, we have been doing things the easy way. It was easy to build an oil-powered generating plant, so therefore this type was preferred. It was never considered that the petroleum shortage would reach today's proportions. Basically, to build coal-fired power plants is both more difficult and more expensive. Moreover, to produce coal requires great investment as well. Because of all this, the alternative of building coal-fired plants was not chosen."

The experts said that transferring the previously-nationalized coal mines back to the private sector in the middle of winter was a great mistake, and that this situation could give rise to a coal shortage.

## How Are Coal Reserves Exploited?

Prof. Cemal Biron stated that there might be coal reserves in unexpected areas in Turkey and that, in these days when the petroleum crisis has begun to be really felt, these resources must be exploited. Stating that, in order to reduce Turkey's coal shortage, fundamental work in this area must be initiated, Prof. Biron spoke as follows:

- "From the production standpoint, the total area of coal deposits is limited. Production could rise to perhaps 10 million tons.
- "New areas (such as the Zonguldak area, and the provinces of Kastamonu and Antalya) should be explored. Every sort of technical aid should be utilized in this endeavor, yet not only the state should carry out the exploration; bids should also be awarded to large exploration companies, and the effort should be made a reality as soon as possible. It is necessary to utilize the private sector during the exploration stage. After coal reserves have been located, the state must step in in order to make larger investments.
- "In parallel with the exploratory work, feasibility studies of new coal-fields should be made, and bids on viable new coalfields should immediately be awarded to contracting firms.
- "Production should be stepped up by means of new mines in both the known and any newly-discovered reserves at Zonguldak.
- "Coal production should be removed from the Turkish Coal Works. As a raw material of the steel industry, coal should be extracted by this industry. Since the steel industry is a profitable enterprise, it can engage in this sort of research activity."

## Bright Future in Lignite

Prof. Cemal Biron said that the coal-containing areas are limited insofar as production is concerned, so that it is necessary to conduct exploration in order to locate new resources. Stressing meanwhile that Turkey possesses quite extensive resources of lignite, Prof. Biron summarized the measures to be taken so that this lignite may be utilized as follows:

- "The future of the nation is very bright insofar as lignite is concerned. Action should be initiated immediately in this area, and thermal generating plants should be put into operation quickly in areas where large lignite deposits are found.
- "Lignite reserves such as those at Soma, Yatagan, Can, Orhaneli, and Kangal should be administered under one management. The most equitable way of doing this would be to immediately establish corporations selling shares to the public. And thermal powerplants, cement plants, nitrogen and fertilizer factories, and nylon and other chemical facilities should be established in an integrated fashion without delay in these areas."

Ham Kömür üretimimiz (ton olarak)								
(1) Yıllar	(2) Taşkömür			(3) Linyit			(4) Kömür Genel Toplam	
	(5) Devlet	(6) Özel	(4) Toplam	(5) Devlet	(6) Özel	(4) Toplam	(7) Ton	(8) Devlet %
1960	6.314.987	2.716	6.317.703	2.860.562	1.006.089	3.866.651	10.184.354	90.1
1961	6.831.929	5.331	6.387.266	2.626.335	1.029.176	3.655.511	10.042.777	89.7
1962	6.485.282	6.337	6.491.619	3.218.426	1.116.521	4.334.947	10.826.566	89.6
1963	6.793.430	6.837	6.800.267	3.861.257	1.130.621	4.991.878	11.792.145	90.4
1964	7.140.891	9.182	7.150.073	4.472.846	1.432.838	5.905.684	13.055.757	88.9
1965	7.806.998	11.639	7.018.637	4.640.728	1.708.967	6.349.695	13.368.332	87.1
1966	7.368.942	12.813	7.381.755	4.726.024	1.845.127	6.571.151	13.952.906	86.7
1967	7.456.744	11.953	7.468.744	5.039.389	1.610.627	6.650.016	14.118.760	88.5
1968	7.494.558	11.615	7.506.173	6.365.369	1.713.375	8.078.744	15.584.917	88.9
1969	7.713.032	12.245	7.743.277	6.609.904	1.907.215	8.517.119	16.260.396	88.1
1970	7.598.316	9.968	7.608.284	6.638.049	1.806.288	8.442.337	16.250.621	87.6
1971	7.846.499	8.772	7.855.271	7.340.417	1.800.000	9.040.417	16.895.688	89.3
1972	7.862.422	8.387	7.870.809	7.557.562	2.689.645	10.247.207	18.118.016	85.1
1973	7.841.755	9.250	7.851.005	7.631.290	3.034.095	10.665.385	18.516.390	84.1
1974	8.948.445	5.205	8.553.650	8.014.142	3.146.963	11.161.105	19.714.755	84.0
1975	8.360.747	4.554	8.365.301	8.732.395	3.127.057	11.860.052	20.225.353	84.5

Key:

1. Year
2. Coal
3. Lignite
4. Total
5. Tons produced by state sector
6. Tons produced by private sector
7. Total tonnage produced
8. Percentage of total produced by state sector

9173

CSO: 4907

## MODUS OPERANDI OF SOUTHEASTERN GUN SMUGGLERS REPORTED

Istanbul AYDINLIK in Turkish 8 Jan 80 pp 1,3

[Text] It has been determined that contraband weapons smuggled into the country from the south were brought in by Mustafa Cay, the founder and first chairman of the Progressive Youth Organization (IGD) in the Samandag district's village of Tekebasi. It has also been learned that the smuggling carried out through this area is run by Abdurrahman Cay, Seci Cay, and Mustafa Cay, together with other members of their family.

The weapons being transported are unloaded\* into the sea between Mersin and Antalya. Later, the weapons are taken into shore by small motorboats. From there, some go to Adana while some are taken to Iskenderun.

Arms smuggling has attracted great interest among the Turkish public for some time, and has played a major role in the rapid rise in anarchic incidents; while the question of just who are the people who run this activity is a matter of debate, the fact that IGD members have played an active role in the business has been interpreted as a notable development.

## Modus Operandi

Just as in the smuggling carried out through Bulgaria, the smuggling on the southern route also involves heroin, smuggled in this case from Turkey to Egypt. Weapons brought from Syria, as well as other contraband goods, are then smuggled into Turkey.

The fact that heroin can be sold illegally for extremely high prices on European and Middle Eastern markets plays a major role in the smugglers' having adopted this method of operation.

Saying Mersin, They Go to Lebanon

The Cay family owns fishing boats of 3 to 5 tons which sail out of the port of Iskenderun. These boats leave the harbor at Iskenderun after



receiving permission to make a three-day voyage. As they leave, they inform the harbormaster that they are going to Mersin, yet, shortly after setting out, they begin to set a course straight toward Lebanon.

They transport the heroin to Egypt. When they are unable to find sufficient quantities of heroin in Turkey, they obtain the rest of their needs from Lebanon and Syria and then transport it to Egypt. But because the Egyptian ports are very tightly controlled, they hand over the heroin to confederates while still offshore near Egypt. Nevzat Cay, however, a member of the Cay family which runs the smuggling operations in the region, was captured because he approached too close to the shore while smuggling heroin into Egypt, and he was sentenced to 25 years at hard labor. He is currently in prison in Egypt.

#### Weapons Loaded on Board

After delivering the heroin to Egypt, the smugglers set out on the return journey. This time, the fishing boats' route goes past Lebanon and Syria.

The smugglers take on the contraband weapons which they will transport to Turkey in the port of Tripoli first and then at the island of Jazirah al-'Awra near the port of Latakia.

They then bring the arms which they have loaded in Lebanon and Syria into Turkish territorial waters, dumping the contraband weapons into the sea in waters off Mersin and Antalya. The arms are then taken into shore by other boats. A portion of the smuggled arms are taken to Adana for distribution, while the rest are taken to Iskenderun. The smugglers' boats which have dumped the arms also dump electronic equipment in waters closer to the shore.

#### Forgery and Collaboration

The smugglers specify Mersin as their destination on the manifesto which they must complete when departing from Turkish ports. But after leaving, rather than sailing to Mersin, they sail outside of Turkey's territorial waters. Since they are obliged to turn in a manifesto at the port of destination, they prepare false documents. Engaging in further falsification on these counterfeit papers, this time they declare that they are sailing from Tripoli to the island of Rhodes. But this time, utilizing the Mersin manifesto already in their possession instead of the one for Rhodes, they dump their cargo in the sea in waters between Mersin and Antalya and then anchor in the harbor at Mersin.

In order for the smugglers to be able to engage in such open falsification, a number of officials must turn a blind eye to such dealings. It is reported that the price of this collaboration is quite high. The smugglers are so confident of their arrangements that once they even unloaded their smuggled goods in broad daylight in the vicinity of Alanya. But, since the incident was observed from nearby, security forces interfered, and one smuggler captured then is currently incarcerated in the Alanya Prison.



## Cay Family

The leader of the Cay family, which stems from the village of Tekebasi near Samandag, is Abdurrahman Cay. In order to be able to carry out his illicit dealings, Abdurrahman Cay has settled in Lebanon. Thirty-one years of age, Abdurrahman Cay organizes all the ring's affairs from Lebanon and prepares the goods to be loaded on board. He does not become involved in the distribution and sales of the smuggled goods within Turkey. It is reported that his personal fortune is so great as to be beyond estimation.

Seci Cay is Abdurrahman's cousin, and takes care of marketing the goods smuggled into Turkey. He is thus the "number two man." His personal fortune is estimated to be 20 to 30 million lira. It is also said that he owns real estate in Mersin and in Samandag. Previously, he used to transport the smuggled goods back and forth, but now, thanks to his greater wealth, he only involves himself in matters of supervision and sales.

As for Mustafa Cay, he is the third man, although he is not a partner of the others. He is the captain of the fishing boat and thus is responsible for the contraband's actually being brought into the country. It is notable that, although his father possesses no great fortune, Mustafa Cay leads a very luxurious life. He was one of the founders of the Tekebasi village IGD organization, and served in addition as its first chairman. He has also taken part in the IGD's aggressive activities in the area.

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\* In the language of the smugglers, to "unload" [bosaltma] goods into the sea means to dump goods into the water in such a way that they float. Generally, foreign-flag ships "unload" their contraband goods into the sea in areas not subject to any supervision. These goods are later picked up by small motorboats and taken to their destination in these boats. The term "transfer" [aktarma] is also applied to the unloading of the goods into the sea.

Foreign-registered ships, making use of the Montreaux Convention on the Straits, generally unload contraband goods near areas of the coastline which are far from observation. In the event of a tipoff concerning foreign vessels, Turkey can but follow them until they exit from Turkish territorial waters. But, if the "unloading" occurs within Turkish territorial waters, then Turkish security forces can step in.

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